Case law

Nichol v. Stass Text corrected - Oct. 2, 2000

Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 10, 2000

Nor is state employment established, for purposes of sovereign immunity, through the State Employee Indemnification Act. … It would be anomalous to grant a qualified immunity to educators and biological parents but to deny immunity entirely to foster parents, who, in their relationships with their foster children, share many important similarities

Hutchings v. Kraject

34 Ill. 2d 379 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 24, 1966

The county directs attention to such general principles as: the legislature has a wide range of discretion in making classifications, that one questioning its judgment has the burden of showing it to be clearly erroneous … But, the real thrust of the county’s argument is that involuntary local subdivisions established by the State without any vote or consent of the inhabitants, such as counties and townships, are quasi-corporations and may

County of Cook v. Ogilvie

50 Ill. 2d 379 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 28, 1972

as well as all “single employables” who had qualified for General Assistance. … (Section 4 of article XIII of the constitution of the State of Illinois of 1970 abolished sovereign immunity subject to legislative action, but Public Act 77 — 1776, effective January 1, 1972, provides that claims against

Schoeberlein v. Purdue University

129 Ill. 2d 372 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 17, 1989

established limits on liability. … Nevertheless, because it was an in rem property action, Streeper is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and not dispositive of the issue before us.

The People v. Price

371 Ill. 137 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 15, 1939

Clearly the evidence of Allen before the grand jury was competent. It was not necessary for the trial judge, in disposing of the motion, to adopt Price’s theory of defense. … The court simply reversed the order of proof and kept the burden upon the People to establish the confession as his voluntary act.

City Savings Ass'n v. INTERNATIONAL GUARANTY AND INS. CO.

17 Ill. 2d 609 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 19, 1959

The defendant International Guaranty and Insurance Company is a foreign corporation qualified to do business in this State, and defendant McAdams-Van Wagner, Inc., is an Illinois corporation qualified as a surplus line insurance … condition prevents them from obtaining insurance with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, have been deprived of their freedom to contract in violation of section 14 of article II; that special privileges and immunities

Rexroad v. City of Springfield

207 Ill. 2d 33 · Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2003

, unlike the school, Soldier Field’s “overall and regular purpose” was clearly recreational); Capps v. … We do not believe that this was the intent of the General Assembly when it immunized public property “intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes,” qualifying it with a list of examples of the kinds of public

Cates v. Cates

156 Ill. 2d 76 · Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 26, 1993

Clearly, the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity, its history and underlying policies were argued in Nudd. … What Hewlett “really did was to establish a new rule of exceptional character rather than enforce a rule already established.” (Dunlap, 84 N.H. at 358 , 150 A. at 908 (citing case).)

Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital

33 Ill. 2d 326 · Illinois Supreme Court · Sep 29, 1965

The author’s competence is established if the judge takes judicial notice of it, or if it is established by a witness expert in the subject. … Moyle qualified the doctrine of" charitable immunity by permitting recovery against nontrust funds of a charitable corporation, specifically an insurance policy.

Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago

112 Ill. 2d 211 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 4, 1986

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Ptak was a policeman acting within the scope of his employment, which duties clearly included the execution and enforcement of traffic laws. … 2 — 202 and 2 — 109 of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill.

Haase v. Kankakee School District 111

2025 IL 131420 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 20, 2025

Dayhoff clearly was not. However, the legislature unambiguously intended to immunize Illinois school districts from liability for the type of negligent conduct alleged in this case. … ¶ 46 On this record, we conclude that the defendants established they were immune from liability under section 3-108 of the Tort Immunity Act and, thus, were entitled to summary judgment.

First Finance Co. v. Pellum

62 Ill. 2d 86 · Illinois Supreme Court · Sep 26, 1975

Thus, the attempt to establish by specific statutory provision the governmental immunity from garnishment which existed by court decision prior to Henderson did not succeed. … It is clearly distinguishable from an action in which a judgment or decree is sought against a defendant and does not serve to make the State “a defendant or party” within the contemplation of the Immunity Act.

Nichols v. Fahrenkamp

2019 IL 123990 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 19, 2021

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (explaining that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial … from liability. ¶ 48 The facts of this case clearly demonstrate the flaw in Nichols’s claim.

People ex rel. Akin v. Butler Street Foundry & Iron Co.

201 Ill. 236 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 18, 1903

Immunity statutes must be given a reasonable construction and not a strained and artificial one, and when the court can clearly see that a person is fully protected from the effect of his testimony he should be required to … The defendant urges three reasons why the immunity afforded by this statute is not complete: (1) The immunity does not cover prosecutions under the Federal law nor under the law of the other States; (2) the immunity can not

Boub v. Township of Wayne

183 Ill. 2d 520 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 22, 1998

Accordingly, the present plaintiff must qualify as both a permitted and an intended user of the property involved in this case if he is to maintain the action alleged against the defendants in count I of the third amended … We do not construe Marshall as establishing that historical practice alone is sufficient to make a particular use of public property an intended one.

The People v. English

31 Ill. 2d 301 · Illinois Supreme Court · Sep 29, 1964

The court appointed two qualified psychiatrists to personally examine defendant as provided by the act and ordered defendant to appear before them individually for examination. … This, of course, would amount to a judicial grant of immunity.

Nelson v. Hix

122 Ill. 2d 343 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 23, 1988

Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1001 (the Immunity Act). … The State of domicile, moreover, “has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family relationship.” Emery v. Emery (1955), 45 Cal. 2d 421, 428 , 289 P.2d 218, 223 .

DeSMET EX REL. v. County of Rock Island

219 Ill. 2d 497 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 20, 2006

This court’s holding in Huey that the public duty rule exists ‘ [i] ndependent [ly] of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity’ (emphasis added) (Huey, 41 Ill. 2d at 363 ) establishes that neither this court … statute is not at issue here because the record in this case clearly shows that these governmental defendants rendered police protection service to the general public via their dispatch centers.

Kinzer v. City of Chicago

128 Ill. 2d 437 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 20, 1989

This does not, however, conclude our discussion of immunity, because Illinois recognizes the common law public official immunity doctrine, notwithstanding the Tort Immunity Act. (Mora v. … Grim’s official conduct in entering into contracts, incurring expenses and charging these expenditures to Fund 666 clearly fall within the boundaries of the common law public official immunity doctrine.

Loman v. Freeman

Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 17, 2008

Defendant is not immune from liability. … Clearly, this was not a “walk-in” procedure.