Case law

Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh

238 Ill. 2d 620 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 21, 2010

This is clearly immunized activity. According to the uncontroverted deposition testimony of Walsh and Hrycko, the statements regarding the building issues at 6030 N. … This clearly applies to Walsh’s statement to a reporter made during a public forum concerning proposed legislation targeting condominium conversions.

Rockford Life Insurance v. Department of Revenue

112 Ill. 2d 174 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 4, 1986

In determining whether the open account was constitutionally immune from taxation, the court first considered the nature of the claim and then described the characteristics of instrumentalities generally qualifying for exemption … This interpretation is in accord with the long established Congressional intent to prevent taxes which diminish in the slightest degree the market value or the investment attractiveness of obligations issued by the United

Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc.

460 Ill. Dec. 706 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 21, 2022

In the alternative, respondents ask this court to find that a Rule 224 respondent may file a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 if affirmative matter is needed to establish the qualified privilege. … Once a defendant establishes a qualified privilege, however, a plaintiff must show “ ‘ “a direct intention to injure another, or *** a reckless disregard of [the defamed party’s] rights and of the consequences

Housewright v. City of LaHarpe

51 Ill. 2d 357 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 30, 1972

Clearly, it is unreasonable to suppose that such a result was intended by the legislature.” ( 104 Ill.App.2d 285, 293 .) We do not agree with this interpretation. … Defenses, established elsewhere in the Act, apply to all municipalities whether they are uninsured and depend upon statutory immunity or whether they have procured insurance.

Moore v. Green

219 Ill. 2d 470 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 20, 2006

Section 4—102 of the Tort Immunity Act provides: “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection … Section 305 and sections 4—102 and 4—107 cannot be harmonized because clearly the immunity provided by both statutes applies to Moore’s allegations.

Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education

63 Ill. 2d 165 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1976

There is no contention made that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish wilful and wanton misconduct. … The principle is firmly established that classifications designed to confer immunity on a local governmental entity must be based, not on the nature of the entity, but on the type of activity or function involved.

Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC

450 Ill. Dec. 131 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jun 18, 2020

However, even assuming the plain language of the EMS Act is not sufficiently clear to immunize defendants, my conclusion is confirmed by the broad construction of the EMS Act’s immunity provision established … - 26 - ¶ 98 Thus, our case law has established that, absent willful and wanton misconduct, the EMS Act provides immunity for acts and omissions that occur

Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist.

207 Ill. 2d 359 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 17, 2003

Municipal defendants are required to establish both of these elements in order to invoke immunity under section 2-201. … These allegations on their face clearly describe a discretionary policy decision, and the defendants were clearly entitled to immunity.

Leetaru v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

2015 IL 117485 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jul 1, 2015

That is something they clearly have authority to do in furtherance of the University’s educational mission. … Immunity from suit in the circuit courts is established by the Immunity Act, not the Court of Claims Act. See, e.g., Brandon v. Bonell, 368 Ill.

People v. Denson

59 Ill. 2d 546 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 21, 1975

It is less clear whether or not the prosecutor thought that he would be able to use the testimony given under immunity to establish that prior perjury. … Walker, 28 Ill.2d 585 , established that such testimony given under immunity could not be used for that purpose.

Kettles v. People

221 Ill. 221 · Illinois Supreme Court · Apr 17, 1906

Penal statutes are to be strictly construed, but not with such technicality as to defeat their purpose and the clearly expressed intention of the lawmakers. … Whether the plaintiff in error was licensed to practice dentistry in the State of Illinois was a matter of defense which devolved on him to establish.

Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.

221 Ill. 2d 558 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jun 22, 2006

The second class encompasses conditional or qualified privileges where immunity is conferred because of “the occasion upon which the allegedly false statement is published.” Modern Tort Law § 36:24, at 36 — 39. … However, once a defendant establishes a qualified privilege, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant either intentionally published the material while knowing the matter was false, or displayed a reckless disregard as to

Hutchings v. Kraject

34 Ill. 2d 379 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 24, 1966

The county directs attention to such general principles as: the legislature has a wide range of discretion in making classifications, that one questioning its judgment has the burden of showing it to be clearly erroneous … But, the real thrust of the county’s argument is that involuntary local subdivisions established by the State without any vote or consent of the inhabitants, such as counties and townships, are quasi-corporations and may

Rexroad v. City of Springfield

207 Ill. 2d 33 · Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2003

access to front entrance of school, distinguishing Sylvester on the basis that, unlike the school, Soldier Field's "overall and regular purpose" was clearly recreational); Capps v. … We do not believe that this was the intent of the *1046 General Assembly when it immunized public property "intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes," qualifying it with a list of examples of the kinds of

Harrison v. HARDIN COUNTY COMMUNITY UNIT

197 Ill. 2d 466 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 18, 2001

The court found that this qualified as the making of policy under Harinek , and thus the coach's actions were immunized under section 2-201 of the Act. Johnson, 301 Ill.App.3d at 809-10 , 235 Ill. … Under the principles set forth in Harinek , Brumley's actions clearly qualify as the making of policy.

Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights

139 Ill. 2d 501 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 30, 1990

He maintains that his complaint clearly alleges that he was a "beginner adult swimmer" and that defendant purportedly supplied a "qualified" swimming instructor. … This not only would run against the grain of the common law, but is clearly prohibited by the Tort Immunity Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 85, pars. 3-106, 3-108, 3-109.

People Ex Rel. Director of Public Health v. Calvo

89 Ill. 2d 130 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 21, 1982

More specifically, in keeping with the broad purposes of the statute, a grand jury qualifies as a tribunal. (See State v. Deets (Iowa 1972), 195 N.W.2d 118, 121 .) The statute prohibits two types of disclosure. … Besides, the legislative history clearly establishes that “the identity of individuals contained in such reports will be confidential and not subpoenaed in courts of law.” (Remarks of Rep.

Williams v. Medical Center Commission

60 Ill. 2d 389 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 24, 1975

Section 2 of the Act establishes a commission of seven appointed members to manage the affairs of the District. … Ct. 1347 , indicates clearly, we believe, that the assertion of sovereign immunity by a State is not offensive to any provision of the Constitution of the United States.

Moore v. Chicago Park District

978 N.E.2d 1050 · Illinois Supreme Court · Oct 18, 2012

Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 508 (1997) (walkways and parking lots adjacent to stadium increase recreational usefulness of the facility and therefore qualify as property intended for recreational … irrelevant to our determination of the certified question, a reading of section 3-106 which encourages the maintenance of a parking area adjacent to a recreational facility through the removal of snow and ice clearly

Rexroad v. City of Springfield

207 Ill. 2d 33 · Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2003

, unlike the school, Soldier Field’s “overall and regular purpose” was clearly recreational); Capps v. … We do not believe that this was the intent of the General Assembly when it immunized public property “intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes,” qualifying it with a list of examples of the kinds of public