Case law

Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce

2012 IL 111253 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 22, 2012

statute, which sets forth the information that must be included in the resolution, states: “The resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination shall be duly acknowledged before an officer qualified … To hold otherwise would be clearly against the legislative intent in making this amendment and against this state’s position in favor of ballot access for candidates running for public office.

Berg v. Allied Security, Inc.

Illinois Supreme Court · Jul 6, 2000

It therefore could not qualify as any kind of motion, much less a post-trial motion under section 2–1203. … It is not a reason for holding that the motion does not even qualify as motion. A lame horse, after all, is still a horse.

People v. Carey

2018 IL 121371 · Illinois Supreme Court · Aug 15, 2018

Therefore, the indictment, read as a whole, clearly informed defendant that the State intended to prove that he possessed a firearm at the time of the shooting. ¶ 27 However, without citation to authority, the … In support, defendant contends that the State failed to prove that the inoperable and unloaded .22-caliber derringer qualified as a “firearm.”

People Ex Rel. Christiansen v. Connell

2 Ill. 2d 332 · Illinois Supreme Court · Mar 17, 1954

Its clearly intended purpose is to afford an opportunity to explore the possibility of a reconciliation. … In any event, this law could be sustained as a rule of procedure only if the procedure sought to be established applied uniformly to all cases.

Continental Insurance v. Ruckman

127 Ill. 364 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 26, 1889

The rule is well established that this constituted them the general agents of the insurers in the matter of soliciting and accepting risks, agreeing upon and settling the terms of insurance, and carrying the same into effect … The contention is that the word “acknowledged” qualifies the entire clause, and that the statute therefore applies to no person who is not acknowledged by the insurance company as having authority to act for it in its insurance

People v. McLaurin

2020 IL 124563 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 22, 2021

She concurred with the majority, however, that the evidence in this case did not establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. … The court noted that she testified “clearly and plainly and without impeachment that she saw a firearm, and that the defendant was the person holding that firearm.”

Amberson v. Amberson

349 Ill. 249 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jun 24, 1932

The attempt of the complainant to connect the defendant with an affair with a young high school girl whom she found sitting in the defendant’s automobile one evening also failed to establish any serious misconduct on his … In support of this fee one attorney testified that he thought “$1500 is a modest fee” but stated he was not familiar with practice in divorce cases, and further qualified his testimony by basing it upon the income of the

Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Coopers & Lybrand

Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 18, 2003

The audit interference doctrine clearly has a foundation in Illinois common law. … It is well established that legislation intended to abrogate the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis , 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997).

People v. De La Paz

204 Ill. 2d 426 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 8, 2003

A petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must, inter alia, “clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 2 (West 1994). … “Waiver” is a well-established term of art in the legal field. This court has long recognized that we may, in appropriate cases, reach issues notwithstanding their waiver.

In Re Petition for Removal of Bower

41 Ill. 2d 277 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 22, 1968

There was no such wholesale fraud established in the case at bar. … However, while such spouse-signing is clearly improper and would shift the burden of proof or invalidate the petitions if established in sufficient volume, the failure of circulators to object thereto is not the type of active

In Re Marriage of Lappe

176 Ill. 2d 414 · Illinois Supreme Court · May 1, 1997

The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity. People v. Adams, 149 Ill. 2d 331, 338 (1992); Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 227 (1986). … Thus, the pertinent provisions of sections 10 — 1 and 10 — 10 clearly authorize the Department to intervene and petition to establish child support on behalf of Larry.

Franzen v. Hallmer

404 Ill. 596 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 18, 1950

departed this life, intestate, at Downers Grove, Illinois, on March 26, 1944; and that his widow, Kathrina Hallmer, was appointed Administratrix of his estate by the Probate Court of Du Page County, Illinois, and that she qualified … In the Winkelmann case it was clearly shown by the evidence that Winkelmann said he and his wife would take the baby and adopt her as their legal child.

American Access Casualty Co. v. Reyes

2013 IL 115601 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 23, 2014

We may only take that step when the provision is “clearly contrary to” established public policy or “manifestly injurious” to the welfare of the public. Supra ¶ 9. … Furthermore, the facts and circumstances do not establish that the excluded driver provision in the parties’ insurance contract is “clearly contrary to what the constitution, the statutes, or the decisions of

Caradco Window & Door v. Industrial Commission

86 Ill. 2d 92 · Illinois Supreme Court · Sep 30, 1981

Caradco, by contesting liability for claimant’s medical expenses, clearly put their causal relation to the employment in issue. The determination of liability necessarily involves the issue of causation. … The Commission could also consider the claimant’s own testimony concerning her condition before and after the accident, medical testimony not being required to establish a causal connection. (Pulliam Masonry v.

Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Schwartz

Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 24, 2003

In other words, the contract, “by its own terms, established a lesser knowledge standard” than that required by the statute. Green , 704 So. 2d at 1391 . … and belief] require[ ] that knowledge not defy belief ***. *** What the applicant in fact believed to be true is the determining factor in judging the truth or falsity of his answer, but only so far as that belief is not clearly

Comstock v. Redmond

252 Ill. 522 · Illinois Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1911

The sons were named as executors, but George being a minor when his father died, only the elder brothers qualified and assumed the duties of that trust. … He then named certain persons whom he desired to appraise his real estate in Illinois and in Iowa, and directed his executors, upon the final settlement of his estate, to establish. by their final report the amount of a fund

Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board

59 Ill. 2d 290 · Illinois Supreme Court · Nov 27, 1974

The provisions here in question rather clearly direct that the unreasonableness of an alleged air-pollution interference must be determined by the Board with reference to the section 33(c) criteria. … It was also established that appellant had funds available to pay for the installation of such equipment.

People v. Belk

203 Ill. 2d 187 · Illinois Supreme Court · Jan 24, 2003

This section of Western Avenue had numerous restaurants and other establishments that were still open for business. … The State contends that the felony-murder rule does not require an intent to kill and that an intent to kill is irrelevant to the determination of whether a felony qualifies as a forcible felony.

Gaffney v. ORLAND FIRE PROTECTION DIST.

360 Ill. Dec. 549 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 17, 2012

The facts established that Gaffney believed he was responding to a training exercise, not an emergency. … As our appellate court has held, an "emergency" clearly requires an urgent and immediate response.

Kingston v. Turner

115 Ill. 2d 445 · Illinois Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1987

The court in Thompson did not use these qualifying words in relation to the statutory language “causes the intoxication.” … Nor are we prepared to say that this jury was clearly confused.