Case law

Marshek v. Marshek

599 So. 2d 175 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Apr 29, 1992

The district courts should exercise this discretion only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Combs v. … erroneous. [1] Nor in my judgment is the order reviewable under the far more stringent certiorari standard for the simple reason, as stated in Combs , that "there has been [no] ... violation of a clearly established principle

ETHAN ELALOUF v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY

District Court of Appeal of Florida · Jan 6, 2021

Unlike Brooks and Murphy, the qualifying statements here clearly warn that serious injuries can occur even if reasonable precautions are taken. In Merlien v. … This qualifying language, which by its capitalization and size appears far more important than the small print language releasing liability, does not clearly absolve appellee from its own negligence, when that negligence

Stone v. Compuserve Interactive Services, Inc.

804 So. 2d 383 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Oct 3, 2001

The Stones purchased a qualifying computer on August 26, 1999. … Florida clearly has a significant contact with the claim of overpayment of port charges made by each claimant.

Haridopolos v. Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc.

78 So. 3d 605 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Nov 23, 2011

the state education budget has eliminated funding for seventh period and summer school; (6) the statutes have allowed too many students for each writing teacher; (7) teacher salaries are too low, and teachers are under qualified … Nor are the respondents’ allegations challenging present legislative action enough to immunize improper judicial review from the reach of the writ of prohibition. In State v.

Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.

185 So. 2d 749 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Apr 22, 1966

The Court said: "Such a contract is clearly one for services, and, just as clearly, it is not divisible. … immune, Goelz v.

Welch v. Complete Care Corp.

818 So. 2d 645 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Jun 7, 2002

It is immune from suit under section 440.11, Florida Statutes (1993). As the WQBA court noted, if the plaintiff/subrogor has no rights against the third party, the subrogee has nothing to inherit. 731 So.2d at 647 . … Welch's allegations in his previous suit against Prime did not establish Prime's fault in this lawsuit.

WILL TWIGG v. STATE OF FLORIDA

254 So. 3d 464 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Aug 24, 2018

Therefore, as an LPN, the nurse victim did not qualify as a “registered nurse” as used in the definition of “emergency medical care provider.” … Thus, the State also did not prove that the nurse victim qualified as an “emergency medical care provider” under either classification.

STUART N. BORNSTEIN and GRANADA, LLC v. IRA A. MARCUS and IRA MARCUS, P.A.

275 So. 3d 636 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · May 8, 2019

Appellants argue that the Distribution Agreement did not qualify as a novation based on the parties’ lack of intent to completely replace the Fee Agreement and, therefore, the court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim … The Distribution Agreement clearly and unambiguously modified both the contingency fee and retainer credit provisions of the Fee Agreement.

N. WEST FLA. HOME HLT. AG. v. Merrill

10 Fla. L. Weekly 1257 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · May 21, 1985

The privilege instead raises a presumption of good faith and places upon the plaintiff the burden of proving express malice — that is, malice in fact as defined by the common law doctrine of qualified privilege. … The Florida Bar, 390 So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), where the court concluded that it makes little significant difference whether the protection to potential complainants is phrased in terms of immunity or in terms of absolute

Summers v. State

747 So. 2d 987 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Nov 19, 1999

Likewise, an habitual offender sentence imposed for a felony which does not qualify for habitual offender treatment is illegal because under the law the court could not have imposed it in any circumstance. In Carter v. … Although defendant's 3.850 motion was inartfully drafted to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, he clearly established an illegal sentence which must be corrected. See Hayes v.

Hurt v. Kitroser

50 So. 3d 62 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Dec 8, 2010

The distinction between a corporate officer acting on one’s own and a corporate officer acting on behalf of one’s corporation is set out clearly in Bloom v. A.H. … Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.1981), which was quoted in Doe, the corporate shield doctrine does not imply that an individual who commits a tort while acting on behalf of his employer should be immune from personal liability

Venezia v. Egan

671 So. 2d 175 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Mar 1, 1996

Crane raised the defense of "borrowed servant immunity" under Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, section 440.11(2), Florida Statutes (1991). … A qualified signalman, exactly.

Miller v. Gross

788 So. 2d 256 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Aug 30, 2000

Clearly Fair does not support the proposition that Judge Miller should be allowed on the ballot for a judicial office in Broward while she is serving as a judge in Dade. … for judicial office immediately after establishing domicile within the court's territory and becoming an elector there.

School Bd. of Osceola County v. UCP of Fl.

905 So. 2d 909 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Apr 22, 2005

Following the procedures established in section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes (2003), UCP submitted its application for the establishment of a charter school to the School Board. … The reason given by the School Board to justify its denial of the application and qualify as good cause was inadequate charter school capital funding.

Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District v. Paul

157 So. 2d 156 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Oct 29, 1963

of some private enterprise is not sufficient to make the establishment of such enterprise a public purpose.” … We think Justice Drew clearly recognized *167 that there is -usually a distinction by saying (text, 132 So.2d p. 276): “Generically, of course, there is a difference but, so far as the use of the words in this particular

De La Cova v. State

355 So. 2d 1227 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Feb 28, 1978

Prejudice cannot be presumed simply because the State used a witness known to the defendant after a late grant of immunity. … It clearly was not fundamental because the premises were fully described and no prejudice to the defendant could have occurred. The possibility of double jeopardy, as urged by the defendant, does not exist. Cf. Llano v.

Morhaim v. State, Department of Transportation

737 So. 2d 1234 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Aug 4, 1999

to the appropriate agency and the DOI within 3 years after the claim accrues and the DOI or the appropriate agency denies the claim in *1237 writing. 5 Because section 768.28(6) is part of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity … The law is clearly established that each spouse must provide notice to the agency in which he or she is suing in order to preserve their claim under the sovereign immunity statute. See Metropolitan Dade County v.

RESOURCE HEALTHCARE OF AMERICA v. McKinney

940 So. 2d 1139 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Aug 11, 2006

Resource Healthcare has never qualified, or applied to qualify, as a foreign corporation with the Secretary of State of Florida. … Coats' affidavit clearly contradicted the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. Hence, the burden of proving that personal jurisdiction existed was placed on Mr. McKinney. See Peznell v.

Gore v. Lee County School Board

43 So. 3d 846 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Aug 31, 2010

In response, the E/C argued that the Legislature clearly intended to subject prostheses to the statute of limitations and that the JCC was bound to carry out the Legislature’s intent. … We agree with Claimant that a prosthetic device qualifies as a medical apparatus, the use of which may toll the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19(2).

Volusia County v. Eubank

151 So. 2d 37 · District Court of Appeal of Florida · Mar 12, 1963

opponents had discarded much data accumulated in the course of presenting their position before the Board in opposition to the first petition, and that it would be quite difficult, time-consuming and expensive for them to re-establish … The order requiring said petition to be kept under seal until a future order of the trial court permits it to be opened to the public is contrary to public policy and clearly erroneous, hence said order should be and it is