Case law

Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Castro

37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 92 · Supreme Court of Florida · Feb 9, 2012

On the one hand, the conduct giving rise to this petition clearly undermines the public’s trust in the judicial system. … The evidence established that Castro logged over 13,000 hours of community service during the past eighteen years— equivalent to an impressive 700 hours of service per year.

Robinson v. Epping, Bellas & Co.

24 Fla. 237 · Supreme Court of Florida · Jun 15, 1888

It is contended by appellants that the law of this case, as established by the former opinion, is that a petition is necessary and jurisdictional to the action of the County Court in the appointment of an administrator. … according to law ” and having “ duly qualified according to law” in the order and record of the letters.

Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson

64 So. 2d 162 · Supreme Court of Florida · Feb 20, 1953

door"; that for the small price customarily charged for seed the producer thereof rightly feels that he could not afford the warranty; that crops are destroyed and impaired by many causes which are difficult to identify clearly … However, we are not inclined so to rule in this case because the variance in variety established by the evidence is deemed by us to be a material variance resulting from a defect in the seed which was latent, that is to say

State v. Hosty

944 So. 2d 255 · Supreme Court of Florida · Nov 9, 2006

Other states that provide hearsay exceptions for statements by disabled or dependent adults have more narrowly and clearly defined who qualifies as a disabled adult. See 720 Ill. Comp. … Thus, the victim was clearly "under the jurisdiction of the district school board" when the crime took place.

In re the Trust Estate of Smith

75 So. 2d 686 · Supreme Court of Florida · Oct 26, 1954

Stevenson qualified as trustees. Young died on October 18, 1950 and appellant Jacob Levy was appointed as co-trustee on April 9, 1953. On May 23, 1953, Stevenson died. Effie S. Smith survives. … But, as will later appear, Paragraph Sixth clearly requires another measuring life for the trust, that of Effie, S.

Murray v. State

692 So. 2d 157 · Supreme Court of Florida · Apr 17, 1997

The general acceptance under the Frye test must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added). … The qualification of this expert witness was clearly erroneous.

Cherry v. State

6 Fla. 679 · Supreme Court of Florida · Feb 15, 1856

We are clearly of opinion, that the premises upon which, the argument is based are false in point of fact, and, consequently, the argument, and with it the conclusion must fail. … It is not denied that a Grand Jury have the right to qualify and limit their finding to any extent that they may deem proper under the circumstances and facts which may be developed by the investigation of the case; and the

Sims v. Brown

574 So. 2d 131 · Supreme Court of Florida · Jan 18, 1991

In my view, this is clearly misapplication conflict, and this Court should address it. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] The preoperative examination performed by Dr. … Such interpretations could be construed as out of court statements used to establish a material fact and, if so, would be hearsay.

Florida Power Corp. v. Public Service Commission

424 So. 2d 745 · Supreme Court of Florida · Dec 16, 1982

This conclusion was premised on the required establishment of measures to prevent the use of incorrect or defective material in safety-related activities. … This would clearly violate Florida’s strong public policy in favor of post accident investigations. *748 We need not consider appellant’s other points on appeal.

Quince v. State

414 So. 2d 185 · Supreme Court of Florida · Mar 4, 1982

The trial judge clearly did not ignore every aspect of the medical testimony as the judge did in Huckaby v. … We believe that the severe beating, wounding, raping, and manual strangulation of an eighty-two year old, frail woman easily qualified as heinous. Cf. Peek v.

Courington v. State

74 So. 2d 652 · Supreme Court of Florida · Jul 30, 1954

In our judgment, the immunity does not extend that far." … Under the circumstances disclosed by this record, the search was clearly reasonable; and it is unnecessary to decide whether, absent such circumstances, the mere fact that a person "took something from the front of the car

In Re Fogan

646 So. 2d 191 · Supreme Court of Florida · Dec 1, 1994

Before reporting findings of fact to this Court, the Commission must conclude that they are established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. … Under Opinion 75-6 and the facts found by the Commission, Judge Fogan clearly should have known that he was writing a letter that would be used in a federal sentencing hearing.

State Ex Rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett

138 Fla. 330 · Supreme Court of Florida · May 30, 1939

Sbordi has never passed any examination or otherwise qualified himself to practice medicine in the State of Florida, and the Certificate No. 8 purportedly issued by the Board of Eclectic Examiners to Enrico V. … Rowlett and find that the same is not subject to the vice as therein shown, but clearly complies with the rule.

Hansbrough v. State

12 Fla. L. Weekly 305 · Supreme Court of Florida · Jun 18, 1987

Martin testified that the state had made no deals with him, and the state attorney advised defense counsel that Martin had not been given immunity. … Rather, "it must be clearly shown that the dominant or only motive for the murder was the elimination of" the victim/witness. Oats v. State, 446 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1984).

Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris

143 Fla. 189 · Supreme Court of Florida · May 24, 1940

As well said by Judge Cooley, ‘The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be left alone.’ Cooley on Torts, 29.” … out the thought that the trial of lawsuits is not a game of chance but is a seeking after the truth and merits of the action, this court is of the opinion that we have not reached the point and that it would be unwise to establish

State v. City of Orlando

576 So. 2d 1315 · Supreme Court of Florida · Mar 14, 1991

The city responds that, pursuant to the authority of section 166.111, Florida Statutes (1989), the city is authorized to issue these bonds either for the purpose of investing the proceeds at a profit or for the purpose of establishing … Clearly, we are unable to say whether the profits the city hopes to obtain will be used for a paramount public purpose.

Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle

32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 81 · Supreme Court of Florida · Feb 15, 2007

In the instant case, however, there are federal decisions and established rules of law that directly address the liability of a ship owner for the alleged negligence of the ship's physician. … See Nietes , 188 F.Supp. at *470 220. [8] The position espoused by the Third District has some appeal because much has changed in the world in the one hundred years since the earlier courts held ship owners immune from such

Wernle v. Bellemead Development Corporation

308 So. 2d 97 · Supreme Court of Florida · Jan 29, 1975

It is clearly established that the land which is the subject of this cause is wild and not in the possession of either the Plaintiff or the Defendants." … It is clearly established that the land which is the subject of this cause is wild and not in the possession of either [Appellee] or [Appellants]."

State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Goodgame

91 Fla. 871 · Supreme Court of Florida · May 5, 1926

The Commissioner at large shall be elected by a majority vote of the qualified voters of the City as a whole voting. One Commissioner shall be elected by the qualified voters of each Ward. … That these conditions are so clearly expressed in the Statutes, or so forcefully implied by the positive mandate of the Statutes that the conclusion is inevitable.

Cheshire v. State

568 So. 2d 908 · Supreme Court of Florida · Sep 27, 1990

However, it clearly would be unconstitutional for the state to restrict the trial court's consideration solely to "extreme" emotional disturbances. … Second, the trial court clearly erred in confining its written order solely to the statutory mitigating factor of "extreme" emotional disturbance.