Case law

Tobias v. U.S. Department of Interior

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 2024

“To qualify for the deliberative process privilege, an intra-agency memorandum must be both pre-decisional and deliberative.” Abtew, 808 F.3d at 898. … Defendants’ declarations and Vaughn Indexes, credited with being made in good faith, are sufficient to establish the non-segregability of the disputed exempt records. IV.

Leitner-Wise v. Koniag, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 13, 2018

That claim accrued on January 20, 2006, when Defendant sold its interest in LWRC, see Def.’s Facts ¶ 1, clearly demonstrating that the promises to treat LWRC as a “going concern” or to fund it through a private offering … See supra note 3. 15 established procedural requirements of a Rule 56(d) motion.

Naegele v. Albers

110 F. Supp. 3d 126 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 23, 2015

Where, as here, “appellants have not demonstrated that there is an intervening change in the law or that the previous decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice,’” “[t]he court’s prior ruling is … Subsection (b) of the Long Arm Statute qualifies its reach by noting that “[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be

United States v. Jae Shik Kim

103 F. Supp. 3d 32 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 8, 2015

He explained that “it would be inappropriate to search his laptop without – without an individual who’s qualified to preserve the contents of the laptop. … in that case since the Saboonchi court was otherwise constrained by the Fourth Circuit precedent in Ickes. 30  does not render the contents of a suitcase immune

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics v. U.S. Department of Justice

142 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 27, 2015

Neither case establishes that the prevailing market rate charged by for-profit lawyers is necessarily the market rate charged by lawyers in the largest law firms. See id. … This data is not immune from methodological critique.

Dutton v. U.S. Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 19, 2018

This again is based on the failure to produce a specific document, which is not sufficient to establish that the document was unlawfully withheld. Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 315. … In order for particular records to qualify for Exemption 7(C), the agency must first demonstrate that the documents were compiled for law enforcement purposes. See Rural Hous. Alliance v. U.S.

Beatty v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · May 29, 2026

Cir. 1997) (holding that the Smithsonian does not qualify as an “agency” for APA purposes). … And board members naturally rely on findings, analysis, and recommendations developed by experts and other qualified personnel.

Wilson v. United States Department of Transportation

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 11, 2010

A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. … against any qualifying public interest in disclosure.

Braeburn Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 22, 2019

At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff may establish standing by affidavit. Id. at 168. As Braeburn notes, “the D.C. … Of course, as Braeburn also highlights, “[e]conomic harm to a business clearly constitutes injury-in-fact.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 33 (quoting Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

United States v. Trabelsi

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 5, 2023

e “I want to ask also about several letters [she] sent to me when she says clearly that I am incapable of hurting anybody or anything, not even a fly.” Id. … Amal’s] credibility and establish that she ha[d] a motive to lie.” United States v. Clark, 657 F.3d 578, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2011).

Morsell v. Symantec Corporation

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 19, 2023

Ervin involved a situation in which a company reasonably relied on a qualified subcontractor who ran a flawed model. Ervin, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 102. … Those falsely inflated prices were clearly material to the CMAS contracts—they were the entire basis of those contracts.

Allen v. Brown

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 24, 2020

. ; or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). … And, the Court does not agree with plaintiffs’ non sequitur that the existence of a camera in Thompson’s office in March 2016 “clearly provides evidence that there were more hidden cameras located throughout the facility

Public Citizen, Inc. v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 8, 2019

controlling_regulatory_costs.pdf. 3 Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/ 2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf. 5 deregulatory actions, in contrast, need not qualify … 23, 2014).12 Based on the comments received in response to that notice, the Department issued a supplemental notice on January 19, 2017, proposing to “require air carriers, foreign air carriers, and ticket agents to clearly

Cause of Action Institute v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 20, 2021

The parties therefore do not dispute that the contested records qualify as “intra-agency” documents. … Cir. 2020), clearly illustrates. The D.C. Circuit in Machado Amadis considered the adequacy of an agency’s foreseeable harm showing under the deliberative process privilege.

Groundfish Forum v. Pritzker

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 21, 2019

Under the groundfish FMP, the Service regulates fishing for Pacific cod in the region by establishing yearly harvest limitations. … They insist that the Service may only regulate conduct that qualifies as “fishing” under the MSA, but A113, they contend, exceeded that authority by regulating onshore processing activities.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Ashe

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 28, 2020

FWS stated that “[n]o one factor alone conclusively establishes whether the species is ‘on the brink’ of extinction. … The agency clearly states that the memo explains the consistent application of the phrase over the agency’s 37-plus years of administering the ESA rather than being a “litigation position.”

Climate Investigations Center v. United States Department of Energy

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 19, 2018

The absence of such records does not, however, establish a deficient search. … The persons most qualified to discuss industry competition and the competitive harm that may befall a company are company officials who know the business and the industry.

Evans v. Fenty

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 1, 2010

Defendants object to this ruling on the ground that Sumner’s “education and experience make him eminently more qualified than the Special Masters to determine what data provide a sufficient basis for systemic conclusions … Decl. ¶ 4.) 11 established by the court orders.” (Id. at 12.)

Taylor Energy Co. v. United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

271 F. Supp. 3d 73 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 21, 2017

“To qualify for the deliberative process privilege, an intra-agency memorandum must be both pre-decisional and deliberative.” Abtew, 808 F.3d at 898 (citing Coastal, 617 F.2d at 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); Whitaker v. U.S. … These statements not only explain how the redacted emails involved communications with an attorney, but also clearly link the four redacted emails to the “attorney-client relationship” that the BSEE formed with DOJ to obtain

N.S. v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · May 4, 2010

A qualified impartial hearing officer conducts the due process hearing in accordance with the Act. 5 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 3030.1. … In essence, then, the IEP established only an initial placement in the inclusion setting, with specialized services to be determined at a later date.