Case law

Fisheries Survival Fund v. Jewell

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2018

Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757 (“CEQ regulations allow an agency to prepare . . . an [EA] . . . if the agency’s proposed action neither is categorically excluded from the requirement to produce an EIS nor would clearly require … BOEM determined that fourteen different bidders were “legally, technically, and financially qualified to hold a commercial wind lease” and to bid in the auction. Id. at 75,430 (NYAR-0075589).

Middleton v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 2018

in the past and appeared to remain qualified for such programming. … First, District of Columbia law establishes different academic requirements for diploma track and certificate track.

Allen v. Mnuchin

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 24, 2019

Not all acts will qualify, though; acts must be “of such severity or pervasiveness as to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working environment.” Id. … Allen’s factual allegations establish a plausible retaliatory hostile work environment claim.

M3 USA Corporation v. Qamoum

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 7, 2021

Finally, Warpas and Qamoum argue that M3 “has not even established that the allegedly stolen contact information lists qualify for actual trade 44 secret protection under … Indeed, if anyone suffered reputational harm, it was Qamoum (who is most clearly the target of the client’s annoyance).

Page v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.

213 F. Supp. 3d 200 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 3, 2016

To qualify as ambiguous, the contract term must be “reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. … The lack of a date in the next sentence clearly avoids unnecessary repetition. Likewise, the use of “a” in that sentence is simply consistent with its resulting grammatical structure.

Hobson Ex Rel. Hobson v. Hansen

327 F. Supp. 844 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 25, 1971

The burden of establishing that these test results reflect something other than the proven discriminatory distribution of educational opportunity falls upon defendants. … — October 20, 1966,” revised in pencil to October 16, 1969, plaintiffs have calculated that 21.6% of the teachers west of the Park have master’s degrees or higher, while only 11.8% of teachers in Anacostia are similarly qualified

Deripaska v. Associated Press

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2017

three defamation-by-implication cases and concluded that “if a communication, viewed in its entire context, merely conveys materially true facts from which a defamatory inference can reasonably be drawn, the libel is not established … Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Deripaska’s complaint with prejudice because the statements in his complaint do not qualify as false and defamatory statements under D.C. law.

Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 13, 2025

The challenging party bears the burden of establishing that the agency action violated the APA. Pierce v. SEC, 786 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2015). … Unsurprisingly, the statement (and its counterpart “Do not cover Braille”) are grouped separately on the Hetlioz label from the language that clearly qualifies as conditions of use, such as “20 mg per day taken before bedtime

Ruiz v. Millennium Square Residential Association

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 1, 2022

Third, the repair and maintenance services at issue do not qualify as consumer goods and services. … Over the Trust’s objection, the Court already gave Ruiz another chance to “clearly name the correct defendants and state their relationship to the wrongs he alleges.” Mem. Order at 3.

N.S. Ex Rel. Stein v. District of Columbia

709 F. Supp. 2d 57 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 4, 2010

A qualified impartial hearing officer conducts the due process hearing in accordance with the Act. 5-E D.C. Mun. Regs. § 3030.1. … In essence, then, the IEP established only an initial placement in the inclusion setting, with specialized services to be determined at a later date.

Ash v. Reilly

433 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 5, 2006

Over the years, Courts applying Morrissey , including this Circuit, have evolved a balancing test to determine when this qualified right to confrontation is triggered. … Neither the police report nor Officer Shepke’s testimony establish that any of the individuals who pointed and yelled “that’s him” personally witnessed Ash assault Simms.

Karadzic v. Gacki

District Court, District of Columbia · May 6, 2022

The individual “may submit arguments or evidence that the person believes establishes that insufficient basis exists for the designation.” Id. § 501.807(a). … respect it.”). 5 Even if Luka’s statements could not qualify as “obstruction,” OFAC relied on more than just his speech.

Toomer v. Panetta

266 F. Supp. 3d 184 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 19, 2017

But “[w]hen a party objects . . . to a magistrate judge’s determination with respect to a non-dispositive matter, the Court must modify or set aside all or part of the magistrate judge’s order if it is ‘clearly erroneous … Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199 (“[S]poradic verbal altercations or 26 disagreements do not qualify as adverse actions

United States v. Microsoft Corp.

231 F. Supp. 2d 144 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 1, 2002

The power to determine which software code constitutes a ‘Windows Operating System Product” for purposes of the SRPFJ cannot logically be viewed as a grant of special rights or immunity from prosecution under the antitrust … The Court considers it imperative, in this unusually complex case, for the Court’s retention of jurisdiction to be clearly articulated and broadly drawn.

United States v. Little

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2022

The petty-offense clause 11 clearly modifies "offense," and the particular "offense" at issue is described in the preceding phras~''the same or a different." … But the phrase ''that is not a petty offense" qualifies that default rule with an exception.

ltmc/dragonfly v. Mwaa.

699 F. Supp. 2d 281 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2010

Because the Enabling Act specifically requires MWAA to follow open and competitive contracting procedures, it logically follows that a losing bidder would qualify as an "aggrieved party" who may bring a challenge to ensure … Such relief is clearly contemplated by the Enabling Act.

Government of the Province of Manitoba v. Norton

273 F. Supp. 3d 145 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 10, 2017

Before it can consider the merits of Missouri’s challenges, the Court must first establish with certainty that it has jurisdiction over the State’s claims. Missouri bears the burden of establishing its standing. … However, it decided that the extent to which a state may sue as a representative of its residents “must be qualified by [a] statement of the type and extent of the interests to be represented, and of the defendants against

National Fair Housing Alliance v. Carson

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 17, 2018

The plaintiffs’ asserted injury must be clearly identified and then assessed under the D.C. … For example, state housing finance agencies must still use Qualified Allocation Plans (“QAPs”) to “establish the criteria by which applicants will be awarded low-income housing tax credits.” AFFH Rule, 80 Fed.

Plummer v. Gallaudet University

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 13, 2026

Instead, her complaint very clearly asserts five “Claims for Relief ” and four “Legal Claims,” none of which includes federal employment or civil rights claims. ECF No. 32 at 6–10. … Nor does Gallaudet point to any language in the Faculty Handbook that “disclaims the establishment of contractual obligations.” See Grove, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 149.

Budik v. Department of the Army

742 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2010

is dispersed through the document, Mead Data, 566 F.2d at 261, and where an agency’s submission does not specify which portions of the documents withheld are disclosable and which are allegedly exempt, it does not even qualify … The PPE and Exemption (b)(6) Exemption (b)(6) applies to “personnel and medical files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6).