Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersdcd

8,912 results

0.64s

  • Sai v. Transportation Security Administration

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 12, 2020

    To qualify for withholding under this privilege, “information must be both ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative.’” Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1992). … Dkt. 174-1 at 20; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (permitting withholding when disclosure of information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway

    382 F. Supp. 610 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 6, 1974

    Thus the word any in Section 401 is qualified by Section 5, to the extent that the criteria of Section 5 are met. … First, the Plaintiffs have clearly shown, and, the Defendants have admitted, that the character and capacity of the proposed Locks and Dam 26 will be substantially increased.

    Vacated on other grounds by Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722 (1977)Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 21, 2011

    Clearly, then, such evidence is -- at the very least -- relevant in assessing whether Section 5 remains "justified by current needs." Nw. Austin II, 129 S. Ct. at 2512. … Nevada contended that Congress had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority by abrogating state sovereign immunity in the FMLA.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Trombley v. National City Bank

    District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 1, 2011

    The numerosity requirement is clearly met. See Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 32-33. -18- 2. … interests of the named representative must not be antagonistic to or compete with the interests of the unnamed class members; (2) the representative must appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Public Citizen v. Carlin

    2 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 22, 1997

    If a document qualifies as a record, the FRA prohibits an agency from “discarding it by fiat.” Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at 1278 (citing American Friends Serv. Comm. v. … Given that Congress established General Records Schedules, in large part, “to conserve space and filing equipment,” 31 the Archivist and NARA should be promulgating general schedules that encourage and prod agencies to establish

    Reversed on other grounds by Public Citizen,appellees v. John Carlin, Archivist of the United States,appellants, 184 F.3d 900 (1999)Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Nextera Energy, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 12, 2010

    Therefore, the six emails accompanying the second Dawson declaration do not establish the inadequacy of defendant’s search. … July 19, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s segregation claim where agency declaration “very clearly declare[d], under penalty of perjury, . . . that ‘all reasonably segregable information has been disclosed’”).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sloan v. United States

    District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 31, 2012

    Supp. 2d 1348, 1350 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (Transfer Order); accord Practice and Procedure Order Establishing the Governing Practice and Procedure Upon Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) at 1, In re Long–Distance Tel. … This, clearly, is inconsistent with the American rule and the common benefit exception. Id. at 460 (quoting Trujillo v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 928, 931 (D.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Taylor Energy Co. v. United States Department of the Interior

    734 F. Supp. 2d 112 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 31, 2010

    To establish a secure source of funds to carry out its decommissioning obligations, Taylor and MMS negotiated an agreement under which plaintiff would establish and fund a trust for the benefit of MMS (“the Trust”), with … In fact, prior to the May Decision, “BP ha[d] clearly stated” to the agency that it was “no longer requesting the information from Taylor” that was referenced in the agency’s February 2, 2009 letter (AR 344), which included

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • American President Lines, LLC v. Matson, Inc.

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2022

    It is well-established, however, that lobbying is immunized from antitrust liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “regardless of [its] intent or purpose.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. … Circuit does not appear to have established a threshold market share percentage that plaintiffs must meet to establish dangerous probability of success, other courts have. See Neumann v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Boca Investerings Partnership v. United States

    167 F. Supp. 2d 298 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 5, 2001

    The testimony at trial makes clear that while tax consequences clearly were a consideration in AHP’s evaluation of the investment partnership proposal, the Treasury Department evaluated the proposal as an investment from … Circuit approved the Tax Court’s intent-based “inquiry” under Culbertson and affirmed the decision of the Tax Court under the clearly erroneous standard of review.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • NEW LIFE EVANGELISTIC CENTER, INC. v. Sebelius

    672 F. Supp. 2d 61 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 8, 2009

    GSA in turn determines whether such excess property qualifies as “sur plus,” — i.e., "excess real property [that is] not required by any Federal landholding agency for its needs or the discharge of its responsibilities, as … Rather, read in proper context, it indicates only that, in HHS' view, New Life had not clearly articulated how it intended to facilitate (i.e., deliver) such services through its proposal to provide its clients with referrals

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1812 v. Broadcasting Board of Governors

    District Court, District of Columbia · May 18, 2010

    “[D]ocuments qualify as ‘agency records’ subject to FOIA disclosure if they are (1) created or obtained by an agency, and (2) in the agency’s control.” United We Stand America, Inc. v. I.R.S., 359 F.3d 595, 598 (D.C. … Exemption 6 Exemption 6 permits the withholding of “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sinobia N. Brinkley v. District of Columbia

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 27, 2026

    show an inference of age discrimination under either the ADEA or the DCHRA,” but “[i]nstead, [the plaintiffs] make . . . conclusory allegations,” Def.’s Mot. at 45.29 The plaintiffs argue in response that “[t]hey both clearly … Plaintiff Brinkley responds that she “claim[ed] with specificity that she was a qualified person for the position of SPO,” Pls.’

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Cumberland Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Food and Drug Administration

    981 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2013

    This is because courts “review scientific judgments of the agency ‘not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that we are qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly … It is well-established that the FDA’s “judgments as to what is required to ascertain the safety and efficacy of drugs fall squarely within the ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit deference.” Schering Corp. v.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • United States v. Butler

    275 F. Supp. 3d 7 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 16, 2017

    He specifically qualified his testimony that the hairs were “the same” by saying that “hairs do not contain enough identifying characteristics to be positively identified to the exclusion of all other individuals,” id. … First, the defendant argues that because “Agent Scholberg’s testimony carried with it the weight of science,” a “reasonable juror could think that the testimony offered by the then-seven- year FBI veteran, qualified as

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lazaridis v. United States Department of Justice

    District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 24, 2011

    Exemption 3 covers records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute either “(A) [requires withholding] in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,” or “(B) establishes … Criminal Rule 6(e) qualifies as a statute under exemption 3, because it was affirmatively enacted by Congress. See Fund for Constitutional Government v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • M3 USA Corporation v. Qamoum

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 2021

    Finally, Warpas and Qamoum argue that M3 “has not even established that the allegedly stolen contact information lists qualify for actual trade secret protection under [D.C.] law.” Dkt. 25 at 19. … Indeed, if anyone suffered reputational harm, it was Qamoum (who is most clearly the target of the client’s annoyance).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hinds v. Cordray

    District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 20, 2018

    The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing that: “(1) she is 7 See Compl. at ¶ 18 (alleging that a manager gave Ms. … Many of her claims fail for the additional reason that the conduct of which she complains does not qualify as adverse employment action. Ms.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence v. U.S. Department of Justice

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2019

    protects records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . if that statute—(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes … Most clearly, a number of the redactions appear to omit information that the ATF obtained directly from the records subject to the Tiahrt Rider.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Burwell

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 28, 2016

    As a general matter, the agency is permitted to forgo notice -and-comment procedures if its act qualifies as an adjudication (formal or informal), see Blanca Tel. Co. v. FCC, 743 F.3d 860, 867 (D.C. … Nothing in the text of romanette iii clearly resolves this dispute or otherwise establishes Congress’s intent with respect to the meaning of “such drug.” And romanette iv presents similar ambiguities.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.