Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersdcd

8,912 results

0.35s

  • Danzy v. Iatse Local 22

    District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 23, 2020

    However, Local 22 qualified that if, for other reasons, discovery is reopened, then it would still want all information requested in its motion to compel. … Danzy’s requests for clearly pertinent information, including the depositions of its own officers and agents whom Mr.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP v. Internal Revenue Service

    537 F. Supp. 2d 128 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 14, 2008

    Because “[t]he Agency must ... carry the burden of establishing that documents contain the ideas and theories which go into the making of the law and not the law itself,” Arthur Andersen & Co. v. … “This was a communication from one Cabinet level Department to another and drafting such a document can be delicate in that Treasury wanted to carefully and clearly convey the message that they no longer wanted [DOT] to permit

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Alaska v. United States Department of Agriculture

    273 F. Supp. 3d 102 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 20, 2017

    Importantly, the Act explicitly retained Congress’s authority to designate which areas qualify as “wilderness areas.” Id. § 1132. … In the FEIS, the USDA included a discussion of socio-eco-nomic factors and published the SBA’s comment letter, which clearly outlined the SBA’s position on the applicability of the RFA.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Aero Corp. v. Department of the Navy

    493 F. Supp. 558 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 4, 1981

    Navy planning for SLEP began in January of 1977 with the establishment of a C-130 SLEP program subject to formal procurement planning in accordance with the Defense Acquisition Regulation (“DAR”) § 1-2100. … B-194445.2, alleging that the Navy “has clearly decided” to award the SLEP contract on a sole-source basis.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • 12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Board

    District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 4, 2019

    INTRODUCTION In 2005, Congress established Defendant Unified Carrier Registration (“UCR”) Plan Board. … The Board’s boilerplate notices clearly fail to satisfy the “specific nature” standard.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Richardson v. Petasis

    160 F. Supp. 3d 88 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 7, 2015

    Richardson clearly attempts to use the anonymous post for the truth of the matter asserted, it is, as Defendants argue, pure hearsay, and it has no value. See Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. … Second, courts have recognized that the same actor inference is “just that, an inference, which cannot immunize the defendant from liability for subsequent discrimination.” Ragsdale v. Holder, 668 F.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Intervet, Inc. v. Merial Ltd.

    643 F. Supp. 2d 97 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2009

    “To establish literal infringement, all of the elements of the claim, as correctly construed, must be present in the accused [product].” Id. … An epitope is an immunodominant region of a protein (i.e., it is the part of the protein that is recognized by the immune system). 5 .

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Bilal-Edwards v. United Planning Organization

    15 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 21, 2013

    In order to establish a prima facie case in the context of an ADEA employment termination claim, the plaintiff must show that he (1) belongs to the statutorily protected age group, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) … Here, the plaintiffs EEOC complaint clearly alleges age discrimination, and so the Court will consider the plaintiffs claims about the odor at the Alabama Avenue facility as the basis for a possible inference of discrimination

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Sloan v. Urban Title Services, LLC

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 14, 2009

    Plaintiff opposes UTS’ motion, arguing that, “while Mary Juergens clearly had the ability to make the regular $792.90 monthly payments on the loan out of her $5,500.00 monthly stipend from Mr. … Juergens were able to establish a good payment record on the Owen Loan, she would be able to refinance at the end of the year ‘without penalty, hardship, or material loss of equity.’”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Chien v. Kerry

    District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 25, 2018

    While Defendant acknowledges that earlier, time-barred incidents can qualify “as part of the same actionable hostile work environment claim . . . if they are adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment claim, … “Both incidents barred by the statute of limitations and ones not barred can qualify as ‘part of the same actionable hostile environment claim’ only if they are adequately linked into a coherent hostile environment—if, for

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Matiella v. Murdock Street LLC

    District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 10, 2025

    The Court found that, although Galarnyk was qualified to offer expert testimony (and was not barred from doing so by D.C. … Galarnyk clearly relied on “his years of experience—or, perhaps, experience along with training and educa- tion—in construction and related fields” to form his opinion, but he “fail[ed] to explain how that experience,

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Hispanic Affairs Project v. Perez

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 9, 2016

    Cir. 1985) (“The legislative history of [the INA] (as initially passed) clearly evinces a congressional purpose to keep American labor stalwart in the face of foreign competition in the United States. . . .”); 20 C.F.R. … immigrants who are capable . . . of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Milligan v. Pompeo

    District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 19, 2020

    Given the clarity of section 1182(f), however, this Court finds no basis to defer to State’s practice, however well established it may be. … See Opp. at 19 (citing Proclamations State contends “clearly envision enforcement . . .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Padilla

    District Court, District of Columbia · May 4, 2021

    Counts 3 and 5 of the Indictment charge Padilla with assaulting, resisting, or impeding officers using a dangerous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b)—an offense which this Court has already concluded qualifies … Cody, 498 F.3d 582, 591 (6th Cir. 2007), but the government has not clearly articulated a nexus between suicidal thoughts and flight risk in the pretrial detention context, see Hr’g Tr. 25:8–20.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dc2ny, Inc. v. Academy Bus, LLC

    District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2019

    To determine whether this kind of pattern has been established, the D.C. … Where those factors do not “clearly favor either jurisdiction,” courts apply “the law of the forum state (D.C.) as a tie-breaker.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Parker v. District of Columbia

    832 F. Supp. 2d 32 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 29, 2011

    Supp. 2d at 12 (discussing the standard billing rates of senior partners at Wilmer Hale; finding that the relator established that Wilmer Hale’s established billing rates were consistent with the rates charged by partners … See Pl.’s Mot. at 1 (“Perdue 55   confirms beyond all doubt that this case qualifies for two of three authorized upward fee adjustments: a matrix adjustment to market rates, and

    Cited 51 timesPublished
  • Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran

    404 F. Supp. 2d 261 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 14, 2005

    They didn’t have established expertise; they didn’t have a group of people locally whom they could draw upon to do this. … Here, the plaintiffs have clearly chosen to seek recovery under the wrongful-death statute; they reference the Virginia survival statute only as an alternative theory of liability. See Pis.’

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • St. Mary Medical Center v. Alex M. Azar

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 20, 2022

    Under that reading, Section 4410(b)’s carveout would apply to all hospitals, which the Secretary explained “cannot ultimately be correct” because “Congress clearly intended to establish a budget neutrality adjustment that … As is evident from the public comments, the proposed rule clearly explained the Secretary’s intent to apply an in-state budget-neutrality adjustment: Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, many hospitals were able to predict

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Matson Navigation Company, Inc. v. Department of Transportation

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 12, 2020

    MARAD concluded that, “by incorporating Section 12111 into the MSA, Congress clearly and unambiguously established that trade with Guam under a registry endorsement, as provided in section 53102(a)(1)(A), is allowed under … The statutory text does clearly resolve the question.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Desai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 22, 2021

    The Government notes that “[b]ecause [Plaintiff] filed his petition before the requisite amounts were increased, he may still qualify under the old amounts.” See Defs.’ … But the question posed by TRAC is not whether Congress has established a “binding” timetable, but whether it has provided an “indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.