Case law

Crowe v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 9, 2025

These contentions are sufficient to establish injury in fact. … Crowe clearly lacks such standing, given the subsequent commutation of her sentence, see supra at 11. Nor does the decision in Epps help her. In that case, the D.C.

Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

979 F. Supp. 2d 104 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 17, 2013

The third factor – the convenience of the parties – does not clearly favor either side. … “To qualify for standing, the petitioners must demonstrate that the alleged future injury is ‘imminent.’” Chamber of Commerce v. E.P.A., 642 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Bennett v.

McWILLIAMS BALLARD, INC. v. LEVEL 2 DEVELOPMENT

697 F. Supp. 2d 101 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 24, 2010

Plaintiff clearly points to negotiations that took place between itself and the individual defendants on behalf of Level 2 and L2CP concerning the loan that was “absolutely necessary” in order for defendants to move forward … Defendants argue that the alleged “misrepresentation” that the loan would be repaid does not qualify as a fraudulent misrepresentation because if it did, “anyone who borrows money and fails to repay it would be liable for

Scarborough v. Harvey

493 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 22, 2007

“[I]n order to qualify as a *15 record, information must be ‘about’ an individúale,] ... [and it] must contain the individual's name or other identifying particular.” Tobey v. … The plaintiffs state that they are in need of "discovery pursuant to which they can establish the exact role Mr.

Guindon v. Pritzker

240 F. Supp. 3d 181 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 3, 2017

The IFQ program works as follows: (1) Each qualifying vessel receives shares of the commercial quota based on the vessel’s historical participation in the fishery; (2) At the start of each season, each shareholder receives … If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, Congress has not spoken clearly, and a permissible agency interpretation of the statute merits judicial deference.

New Lifecare Hospitals of North Carolina LLC v. Cochran

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 27, 2019

For a state to qualify 2 for federal funding, the Secretary must approve the state’s Medicaid plan, which sets out, among other things, covered medical services. 42 U.S.C … And the Board found that “pre-1987 bad debt policy in the [Manual] clearly established that providers have an obligation to bill ‘the responsible party.’” A.R. 57. But briefing it to the Board was not enough.

Accurso v. U.S. Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 5, 2021

Plaintiff also disputes defendant’s assertion that no public interest outweighs the victims’ privacy interests, arguing that a collateral attack on his sentence qualifies. See Pl.’s Surreply at 8. … It makes no mention of filenames, and nothing in the record of this case establishes that filenames and victims’ names are the same.

Snyder v. Central Intelligence Agency

230 F. Supp. 2d 17 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 14, 2002

The Court concludes that both these statutes qualify under Exemption 3 and that plaintiff therefore is precluded from receiving those records that fall under these *23 two statutes. See Central Intelligence Agency v. … Exemption 6 Exemption 6 of the FOIA permits the government to withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.

Petruss Media Group, LLC v. Advantage Sales & Marketing LLC

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 25, 2023

Respondents have not established that this case presents an exceptional circumstance under Colorado River. B. … Petitioners have not met the heavy burden to establish manifest disregard of the law as to these claims. See ARMA, 961 F.

Ellis v. Georgetown University Hospital

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 6, 2009

to Georgetown, Ellis's formal EEOC charge "is devoid of any reference to a claim of retaliation" and, moreover, she "failed to check the box for 'retaliation' in either her Charge or Intake Questionnaire, both of which clearly … According to Georgetown, Ellis now claims, for the first time, that (i) she has a "record of impairment" qualifying her as disabled under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the DCHRA, (ii) Georgetown "regarded her as"

Freedom of the Press Foundation v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · May 20, 2026

Circuit clarified that “[t]he Armstrong I opinion does not stand for the unequivocal proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the [Records Act] are immune from judicial review.” Id. at 1293 (emphasis added). … The Supreme Court has recognized that “it is clearly less intrusive to place custody and screening of the materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside agency” take responsibility of

Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler

587 F. Supp. 753 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 16, 1984

Rather than diminishing its ability to recruit qualified scientists, the University’s conduct can only enhance its position as a leading, responsible center for scientific research. … The public interest clearly favors the maintenance of the status quo until the merits of this litigation are reached.

Hardy v. Hamburg

69 F. Supp. 3d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 23, 2014

§ 211(g) (“If . . . an officer of the Regular Corps . . . is found . . . not to be qualified for promotion he shall be separated from the Service.”). The defendants’ contention is conclusory at best. … So now under 42 U.S.C. § 213a(a)(18), “[c]ommissioned officers of the [Public Health Service] . . . are entitled to all the rights, benefits, and immunities now or hereafter provided for commissioned officers of the Army

Betesfa, Inc. v. United States

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 17, 2019

. § 2021, the FNS is required permanently to disqualify a retail food store from participating in the SNAP if the store has engaged in “trafficking in [SNAP] coupons or authorization cards” and if the store does not qualify … Any one of the 149 transactions is sufficient to establish a violation.”).

United States v. Akintomide

185 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 17, 2001

The PSR must contain, among other things: information about the defendant’s history and characteristics, including any prior criminal record; the classification of the defendant and his offense under categories established … “Minor” Participation To qualify as a “minor” participant under subsection 3B 1.2(b), the defendant must, at a minimum, show that: (1) “the ‘relevant conduct’ for which the defendant would, within the meaning of section lB1.3

Telematch, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 27, 2020

Knowing how “farmers are using their land,” Pl.’s MSJ Br. at 28, or whether they are “accurately reporting data to qualify” for benefits, id., does not directly shed light on USDA’s operations or activities. … FMID’s primary problem establishing standing on its policy or practice claim is quite basic: it has not established the existence of an unlawful policy or practice.

Washington Blade v. United States Department of Labor

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 4, 2024

that precedes OPA’s media response” is clearly predecisional. … A document from a junior to a senior is likely to reflect his or her own subjective opinions and will clearly have no binding effect on the recipient.

Fischer v. U.S. Department of Justice

723 F. Supp. 2d 104 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 13, 2010

“To qualify, a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against … July 19, 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs segregation claim where agency declaration “very clearly declare[d], under penalty of perjury ... that ‘all reasonably segregable information has been disclosed’ ”).

Telematch, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture

District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 27, 2020

Knowing how “farmers are using their land,” Pl.’s MSJ Br. at 28, or whether they are “accurately reporting data to qualify” for benefits, id., does not directly shed light on USDA’s operations or activities. … FMID’s primary problem establishing standing on its policy or practice claim is quite basic: it has not established the existence of an unlawful policy or practice.

Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Justice

511 F. Supp. 2d 56 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 5, 2007

This statute qualifies for FOIA protection pursuant to Exemption 3. See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. NSA 610 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.1979); Hayden v. NSA 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C.Cir.1979). E. … “To establish that a document is predecisional, the agency need not point to an agency final decision, but merely establish what deliberative process is involved, and the role that the documents at issue played in that process