Case law

Flynn v. Thibodeaux Masonry, Inc.

311 F. Supp. 2d 30 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2004

A “genuine issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. … “[I]t is clearly not necessary that all of these factors be present in a given case to justify piercing the veil.” Id. at 97 .

United States v. Rehl

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 28, 2021

That is so because wrongfully provides another well-settled meaning applicable here: “contrary to law, statute, or established rule.” … Indeed, “[u]nlawful activities clearly fall within the meaning of ‘corrupt’ acts under any plain construction of the term.” United States v.

United States v. Cooper

91 F. Supp. 2d 90 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 14, 2000

The Flores Court held that because section 1111 includes simple felony-murder requiring only an intent to commit the underlying felony, it also encompasses those defendants who may not qualify for the death penalty under … The indictment against Cooper clearly satisfies this requirement.

Richardson v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.

991 F. Supp. 2d 181 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 6, 2013

Second, although it is possible to conclude that plaintiffs should have alleged more clearly their intent to continue purchasing the products, requiring them to amend their complaint to strengthen those allegations would … Nothing indicates that counsel are not qualified or experienced. Hence, the Court finds that the proposed class meets all of the requirements under Rule 23(a). B.

United States v. Slatten

District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 30, 2019

Slatten claims that Murphy wasn’t qualified to make the inference, and that it is factually incorrect. … I will qualify him right now as an expert in these types of tests.

In Re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Foundation, Inc.

237 B.R. 518 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 20, 1999

The case law is well established that this provision may be used to avoid unperfected security interests. … Then the debtor could sell the residual 10 percent value to a third party for the full value of that 10 percent, thereby immunizing the hen from being preserved under § 551, and thereby discouraging any attempt by a trustee

Genesis Health Ventures of Naugatuck, Inc. v. Leavitt

563 F. Supp. 2d 170 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 30, 2008

The regulations establishing the guidelines for determining “reasonable cost” are published in 42 C.F.R. Part 413 (2001). … It is clear that employer FICA contributions do not qualify as liability insurance. Therefore, the Board could not have applied Longwood’s reasoning in this case.

American Federation of Government Employees v. Office of Personnel Management

618 F. Supp. 1254 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 1985

observed that, upon expiration or repeal of H.J.Res. 413, OPM would be free to put the regulations into effect by whatever means it “deemed necessary,” unless Congress were to direct otherwise, 733 F.2d at 120 , a proposition clearly … Each rating of “exceeds fully successful" qualifies an employee for seven additional years; each "fully successful” rating earns an additional five years. 13 .

Barrett v. United States Civil Service Commission

69 F.R.D. 544 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 10, 1975

Legislative History at 1589-1590 (statements of Senator Javits), 1773 (statements of Senator Williams), and Senator Williams, in his section-by-section analysis of the final version of the 1972 Amendments, observed: ‘In establishing … Having met the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), plaintiffs must also qualify under one of the sub-sections of Rule 23(b).

Huisha-Huisha v. Gaynor

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 16, 2021

Cir. 1987) (stating that district courts may “exercise . . . broad discretion to redefine and reshape the proposed class to the point that it qualifies for certification under Rule 23”). … ) ‘must not have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class’ and (ii) ‘must appear able to vigorously prosecute the interests of the class 29 through qualified

Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 3, 2015

Additionally, the record clearly bears out the “goal and import (as articulated in the IEP) of the specific service that was withheld.” Turner, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (citing Wilson, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 275). … Joaquin has established by the preponderance of the evidence that FPCS deviated from the BIP in these two respects, see Tr. 132–34, she has not established that these deviations were sufficiently “material,” either standing

Jones-Herrion v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 10, 2019

The process kicks off when the “local education agency,” in this case DCPS, performs an “initial evaluation” to determine if a child has a qualifying disability. Id. § 1414(a)(1). … Without necessary assessments, its evaluation was clearly deficient.

Firsthealth Moore Regional Hospital v. Azar

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 20, 2021

The request for reinstatement, however, is less clearly so. … The rule does not, however, use language, such as “shall” or “must,” that makes withdrawal clearly mandatory.

Jones v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 15, 2019

Probs. 187, 205-06 (1984) (“Many of the fee award statutes are clearly intended to tip the litigation balance to compensate somewhat for the inordinately unequal economic status of disputants.”). … As result, the Court plays a significant de facto role in establishing the customary, “prevailing” rate for IDEA cases.

Asylumworks v. Wolf

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2023

EAJA authorizes fee awards to parties prevailing against the United States “and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity.” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). … Defendants’ actions both before and during the litigation were not in bad faith because the law regarding Wolf’s appointment as Acting Secretary was not clearly settled law at the time the challenged rules were enacted,

Burdick v. Burdick

33 F. Supp. 921 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 27, 1940

Of course, no British statutes were “in force” in Maryland in 1801 nor had any been in force, legally or literally speaking, since 1783, the date of the treaty establishing the independence of the Colonies, or probably since … their sound discretion in holding and disposing of securities received by them as a result of reorganization proceedings of corporations in which the testator held securities . although such reorganization securities do not qualify

Lee v. Christian Coalition of America, Inc.

160 F. Supp. 2d 14 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2001

A cut in pay of more than 50 percent qualifies as a “significant change” in a person’s employment status. … Accordingly, the court holds that the plaintiffs have established a prima-facie case of unlawful retaliation.

United States v. United States Gypsum Company

124 F. Supp. 573 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 6, 1954

But expedition cannot be had at the sacrifice of rights which the original decree itself established. … Multiplicity of actions prevention is a long established basis of equity jurisdiction. We think such jurisdiction is present here.

Livnat v. Palestinian Authority

82 F. Supp. 3d 37 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 11, 2015

Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000), involved a constitutional challenge to the state sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See id. at 53. … These connections are not enough to establish specific jurisdiction over this claim.

Vasquez v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 9, 2018

Plaintiffs therefore insist that WFMI “qualifies under all five of the cited bases for this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.” Id. … “Even where there is a showing of a clearly identifiable policy, the D.C.