Case law

Crude Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

923 F. Supp. 222 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 10, 1996

The substantial evidence standard was clearly in effect at the time of the initial administrative hearing. … In holding TCC liable, FERC applied the two-pronged test for “animating force” liability established in Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v.

Azcao Carrillo v. Dandan, Inc.

51 F. Supp. 3d 124 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 26, 2014

Cir. 1986) (“Few public policies are as well established as the principle that courts should favor voluntary settlements of litigation by parties to a dispute.”). … The second factor, whether the settlement was reached by arm’s length negotiation is clearly met here.

Clemmons v. Academy for Educational Development, Inc.

107 F. Supp. 3d 100 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 2015

The people who were involved with such actions have been formally addressed, very clearly and directly. As a result, it is our expectation that [Dr. … The Court did not clearly err by denying her request for an adverse inference on this basis.

Nine Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Service to the United States v. Kerry

168 F. Supp. 3d 268 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 7, 2016

As discussed in section I.B. above, Plaintiffs Alpna, Bravo, and Delta have clearly received final decisions granting their SIV applications. … That decision is clearly unreviewable, however." (emphasis added) ) ; Semiani v. United States, 575 F.3d 715, 715 (D.C.

Federal Trade Commission v. Libbey, Inc.

211 F. Supp. 2d 34 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 20, 2002

Clearly, however, both are subject to Section 7’s prohibitions. The FTC’s argument that defendants have in some manner sought to evade FTC and judicial review by proposing the amended agreement is without merit. … Staples', 970 F.Supp. at 1082 (“any market with an HHI over 1800 qualifies as ‘highly concentrated’ ”) (quoting FTC v. PPG Indus. Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1986)).

Dorsey v. Drug Enforcement Administration

85 F. Supp. 3d 211 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2015

“On its face, Title III clearly identifies intercepted communications as the subject of its disclosure limitations.” Lam Lek Chong v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 929 F.2d 729, 733 (D.C. … Any information that “applies to a particular individual” qualifies for consideration under this exemption. U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982); accord New York Times Co. v.

Georgia v. Ashcroft

195 F. Supp. 2d 25 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 5, 2002

It follows from these principles that there is no retrogression where, as here, the facts establish “sidesliding” rather than “backsliding.” … Although that does not immunize the proposed redistricting plans from complying with § 5, it argues against a finding of discriminatory purpose. III.

Campbell v. United States Department of Agriculture

515 F. Supp. 1239 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 4, 1981

. §§ 2011 et seq., requiring establishment of a system whereby eligible Supplemental Security Income (SSI) applicants and recipients could apply for food stamps at their social security offices. … Clearly, expedited processing would be accomplished within the one week suggested by the 1977 House Report. (There is no statutorily imposed time frame for expedited processing).

Tatum v. Morton

386 F. Supp. 1308 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 14, 1974

When persons thought to be “outsiders” joined the vigil, police lines were established, and the vigil participants were ordered to disperse. … To borrow from the Court in Doherty , it was clearly their right to do this, but by doing so they failed to take reasonable steps which could have avoided at least in part subsequent injuries.

Block v. District of Columbia

748 F. Supp. 891 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 16, 1990

Although the standard of review is not as clearly defined as it could be, it is well established that in this kind of case courts do not start with a *895 clean slate. … In most instances, the IEP "is to be developed jointly by a school official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the parents or guardian, and where appropriate, the child."

Webster v. United States Department of Justice

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 17, 2021

FOIA complainants bear the burden for establishing reasonableness. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107–08. … Second, there is no presumption that FOIA cases qualify as complex federal litigation.

Electronic Privacy Information Center v. National Security Agency

988 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 21, 2013

Cir. 2003) (holding that the agency “bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the claimed exemption.”). … And substantive declarations of policy are clearly ‘law’ within the meaning of that prohibition.” Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 713 (D.C.

Hodes v. US DEPT. OF HUD

532 F. Supp. 2d 108 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 31, 2008

Well-established doctrines of interpretation counsel against reading a statute so as to render any word or phrase meaningless. See Tax Analysts v. … support for Hodes's argument that an agency must immediately invoke an exception (even prior to litigation) or lose it forever. [3] Although HUD does not raise the argument, the Court notes that Ginnie Mae may, in fact; qualify

Combat Veterans for Congress Political Action Committee v. Federal Election Commission

983 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2013

The text of 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4) clearly imposes a reporting requirement on political committees. Id. … Similarly, the statute clearly speaks to the responsibility of the treasurer to file reports.

Barry Farm Tenants and Allies Association, Inc. v. District of Columbia Housing Authority

District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 30, 2018

In seeking to create “vibrant mixed-income neighborhoods,” the New Communities Initiative established four principles to guide redevelopment. Id. ¶ 30. … confer a benefit upon a plaintiff, but rather must clearly confer a right upon individuals.

State of Tex. v. United States

802 F. Supp. 481 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 17, 1992

While expressing clearly its preference for its own plan over the plan enacted by the legislature the Terrazas court failed to substantiate in any way its legal objections to the legislature's plan, instead relying principally … As a result, two of the districts identified in the Terrazas plan as minority districts and one of the districts identified in SB 1 as a minority district failed to qualify as minority districts under the standards of Mr.

Ghawanmeh v. Islamic Saudi Academy

268 F.R.D. 108 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 20, 2010

Clearly, defendants would still oppose plaintiff=s motion to file a second amended complaint. … Plaintiff defeats the privilege only by establishing malice. Kroger, 172 S.E. 2d at 723.

Proriver, Inc. v. Red River Grill, LLC

27 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 1998

Since defendant concedes that it decided to use RED RIVER in the name of its restaurant in early 1995, it does not qualify as a prior user of RED RIVER. 3 Defendant’s contract argument, however, may ultimately prove to be … Although the Assignment and Option Agreement clearly acknowledges the existence of the Licensing Agreement, the only provision of that agreement which plaintiff agreed to accept was that if CBI did not use the mark RED RIVER

Armenian Assembly of America, Inc. v. Cafesjian

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 22, 2010

Cafesjian has chosen to pursue this matter in the courts” and concluded by expressing a renewed commitment to establishing the museum. Id. … his statements are true, “failure to observe an ordinary degree of care in ascertaining the truth of an assertion before publishing it to others does not alone yield the bad faith or ill will necessary to overcome a qualified

Dscc v. Trump

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 13, 2026

Fourth, the Rule establishes procedures governing noncompliance. … “[T]raditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms,” will “readily qualify as concrete injuries under Article III.” Id. at 425.