Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan

    768 F. Supp. 870 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 22, 1991

    Congress specifically requested an environmental assessment (the § 1002 Report) and clearly intends that it be used to inform the decisionmaking process. … To hold that plaintiffs lack standing and thereby immunize the LEIS from challenge would completely undermine these essential purposes of NEPA.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Perkins v. Berryhill

    District Court, District of Columbia · May 7, 2019

    To qualify for Supplemental Security Income, a claimant must establish that she is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(D), 1382(a)(1). … More so than in these cases, the record here is far from clearly substantiating a disability.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Cloonan v. Holder

    768 F. Supp. 2d 154 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 8, 2011

    Stein, sent a “clearly malicious and defamatory” letter which “relied upon information obtained by David Barnes in his official capacity as a supervisory employee of the” USMS. Id. at ¶ 34. … Barnes was acting within his official capacity, and thus the true party of interest is the United States, which is immune from defamation claims.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Fisher v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New Eng., Inc.

    380 F. Supp. 3d 155 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 21, 2019

    The first of those requirements is that "[e]very employee benefit plan shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures governing the ... notification of benefit determinations." 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (b). … While the second letter sent to plaintiff arguably satisfied that requirement, the first letter clearly did not.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Neguse v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 17, 2025

    Denial of access to property is a “tangible harm,” which can qualify as a “concrete injury in fact.” See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. … The Court in Raines contrasted both the alleged institutional injuries in Raines (which failed to establish standing) and the vote-nullification injury in Coleman (which did establish standing), with the injury that the

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 15, 2021

    to establish industry-funded monitoring in the Atlantic herring fishery. … Under the APA, courts must set aside agency action that is “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Jacobson v. Hofgard

    168 F. Supp. 3d 187 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 1, 2016

    Restatement (Second) of Torts concurs with this view: “A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying … Here, in sharp contrast, the Complaint clearly alleges that Defendants’ representations about the Property’s condition were material to Plaintiffs’ decision to purchase it.

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Cabezas v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2022

    To qualify for the deliberative process privilege, the agency must demonstrate that the material is (1) pre-decisional, (2) deliberative, and (3) that it is reasonably foreseeable that release of the material would cause … As a result, courts have “no need to consider Exemption 6 separately because all information that would fall within the scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C).” Roth v. U.S.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Walker v. McCarthy

    170 F. Supp. 3d 94 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 22, 2016

    In fact, the defendant’s asserted evidence clearly indicates that each of these employees was permitted to work “remotely from an Agency facility in Edison, New Jersey,” Def.’s Mem., Ex. 2 at 7 (emphasis added), and the plaintiff … First, while filing a complaint with the EEOC clearly constitutes protected activity under Title VII, Forkkio, 306 F.3d at 1131–32, the plaintiff’s submissions in connection with the present motion leave some uncertainty

    Cited 25 timesPublished
  • Securities and Exchange Commission v. Whittemore

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 27, 2010

    A defendant who spends all the proceeds of his fraudulent scheme is not immune from an order of disgorgement. Id. … “[A]n order to disgorge establishes a personal liability, which the defendant must satisfy regardless whether he retains the selfsame proceeds of his wrongdoing.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Thompson v. United States Department of Justice Criminal Division

    146 F. Supp. 3d 72 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 19, 2015

    He argued, again, that his request qualified for such rapid treatment under various criteria set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 16.5(d)(1). See id. … On this record, the government-misconduct exemption is clearly inapplicable.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc.

    511 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 7, 2007

    Because Bestseller could not, as a matter of law, establish priority, the TTAB dismissed its Opposition with prejudice. Id. … Here, the TTAB’s opinion clearly states: “[Bestseller] does not assert ... that [it] has made any common law use of the JACK & JONES mark....” AKTIESEL-SKABET AF 21. NOVEMBER 2001 v.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Sarfati v. Antigua and Barbuda

    923 F. Supp. 2d 72 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 7, 2013

    Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the applicable statute of limitations bar the suit. … This they have clearly managed since it is undisputed that the claims accrued in 2000 and suit was not filed until 2010. The burden then shifts to Plaintiff to establish that the limitations period should be tolled.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Humane Society of the United States v. Kempthorne

    481 F. Supp. 2d 53 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 9, 2006

    In order to establish irreparable injury justifying preliminary injunc-tive relief, a plaintiff must establish injury that is great, certain, and actual, not merely theoretical. Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. … The legislative history of the ESA clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend to authorize a lethal depredation control program of an endangered species.

    Vacated by Humane Society of the United States v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 181 (2008)Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Justice

    District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2020

    Gov’t, 656 F.2d at 869–70 (“Witness names are clearly covered . . . . … Cir. 2011)), because, “while Exemption 6 requires a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ to qualify for withholding, Exemption 7(C) requires only that disclosure ‘could reasonably be expected to constitute

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co.

    549 F. Supp. 2d 78 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 17, 2008

    It therefore must establish standing based on injuries suffered while it was a duly licensed corporation. … The term “federal payments” clearly encompasses rental assistance payments provided by the federal government. Neither the passage of the 2002 legislation or the 2005 technical amendments undermines this conclusion.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • United States v. Kuch

    288 F. Supp. 439 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 1, 1968

    A nihilistic, agnostic and anti-establishment attitude exists. These beliefs may be held. … Clearly, then, she cannot, at this point, argue that the Food and Drug Act is administered so as to deny her *451 either the use of marihuana or LSD and thereby deny her the equal protection of the laws.

    Cited 63 timesPublished
  • Chenari v. George Washington University

    172 F. Supp. 3d 38 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 23, 2016

    Paul Durr for a “[g]eneral check up and immunizations.” Dep. of Paul G. Durr, M.D., Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Opp. [Dkt # 24-2] (“Durr Dep.”) 30:1–13. … But plaintiff does not claim that ADHD came up during either of these meetings either, see id., and the testimony he cites does not establish that it was discussed.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Lohrenz v. Donnelly

    187 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 10, 1999

    In order to establish the factual basis for their defamatory allegations against the Plaintiff it will be necessary for the Plaintiff to have an opportunity to establish through discovery exactly what records the defendants … In Laxalt , the court of appeals held that the “Privacy Act ... does not create a qualified discovery privilege as that concept is generally understood. ...

    Modified on other grounds by Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (1999)Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Wesby v. District of Columbia

    District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 25, 2019

    And because Defendants have not established that any further action by this Court is necessary on the issue, the Court denies the motion for entry of an order for payment of Defendants’ Supreme Court litigation costs. … The Supreme Court departed from the lower courts in finding that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs and, in any event, were entitled to qualified immunity. See Wesby III, 138 S.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

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