Case law

Nakai v. Jewell

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 23, 2017

The agency bears the burden of establishing that a position was substantially justified. Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. … First, the DOI’s motion to dismiss clearly states the basis of Nakai’s automatic denial of eligibility as the prior legal interpretation of the Lumbee Act. (Defs. Mot. at 3).

Dorsen v. United States Securities & Exchange Commission

15 F. Supp. 3d 112 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 14, 2014

The result is that plaintiffs can now qualify as ‘substantially prevail[ing],’ and thus become eligible for attorney fees, without winning court-ordered relief on the merits of their FOIA claims.” … The defendant makes no effort to argue that any administrative processing delays caused the delay in production of responsive records; indeed, the number of responsive documents totaling five pages is clearly not a voluminous

Day v. United States Department of Defense

District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 31, 2025

July 12, 2000) (“The FOIA clearly directs district courts to review agency actions de novo. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). … “Under [the] public-domain doctrine, materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record,” Cottone v.

Cls Bank International v. Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 9, 2011

A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Id. at 252. … This question has not been clearly answered by the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.

Mohammad v. Napolitano

680 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 18, 2009

Petition because it found “insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the proposed employment of the alien would specifically benefit the national interest of the United States to substantially greater degree than a similarly qualified … complete discretion in the Secretary,” and noting that “[t]o suggest otherwise and create a judicial standard or ‘clarification’ for good and sufficient cause would replace the Secretary’s judgment with judicial oversight clearly

Thomas v. Town of Salisbury

284 F. Supp. 3d 66 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 3, 2018

A most liberal reading of the record establishes that Harrington may have wanted Thomas gone, and may have encouraged St. … This court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count I on the basis that the letter was not protected speech, and that even if it was, Harrington was entitled to qualified immunity.

Hagelin v. Federal Election Commission

332 F. Supp. 2d 71 · District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 12, 2004

A court need not “accept meekly administrative pronouncements clearly at variance with established facts.” Antosh v. Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F.Supp. 850, 853 (D.D.C.1984) (citing Braniff Airways, Inc. v. … Clearly FECA and FEC regulations do not require debate-staging organizations to admit all candidates to sit in the audience at debates.

White Coat Waste Project v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 10, 2020

In this case, the names of the principal investigators qualify as “similar files” under D.C. Circuit case law. See id. … The parties agree that 35 U.S.C. § 205 is a qualifying statute under Exemption 3. See, e.g., Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 10-1 at 13; Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 13-1 at 51.

Fargo v. Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Department of Labor

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 12, 2025

Fargo cannot establish that a federal court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to award the unemployment benefits that he seeks. … Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.”).

CARITAS MEDICAL CENTER v. Johnson

603 F. Supp. 2d 81 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 26, 2009

In applying Chevron, the Supreme Court has held that “[administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally … The defendant counters that the rationale for his position is articulated clearly in the rule and that his position in this litigation “is precisely the position” that he took in promulgating the rule.

Phoenix Restoration Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Group Inc.

District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 10, 2020

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 701 make this point clearly, stating that this rule “does not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay testimony,” such that “it is possible for … Accordingly, even if the defendants sufficiently establish a foundation, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, for Elmore’s expert testimony regarding claims processing and accounting, given his critical role as a defense

Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Office of Science and Technology Policy

161 F. Supp. 3d 120 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 10, 2016

The Court held, therefore, that the draft at issue in that case “falls within Exemption 5 as clearly as did the draft in Russell.” … Rather, the court recites the foregoing because it clearly shows that, at a minimum, Dr.

Xiaomi Corporation v. U.S. Department of Defense

District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 12, 2021

See Qualifying Entities Prepared in Response to Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (PUBLIC LAW 105-261). At the time, no explanation for the designation was provided. … For this reason, the Court agrees that “the wiser formula requires that the economic harm be significant, even where it is irretrievable because a defendant has sovereign immunity.”

United States v. Hinckley

525 F. Supp. 1342 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 17, 1981

[T]he court shall cause the accused ... to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the Court .... … The scope of the officers’ search was limited only by materials clearly marked attorney-client documents.

University of the District of Columbia Faculty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees

994 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 3, 1998

J. at 24). *10 Clearly, this is not what Congress intended to do when it passed the Appropriations Act. … Thus, a faculty member who is RIF’d in one department ("bumper”) and qualified to teach in another may join that other department.

United States v. Khatallah

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 28, 2017

;qualified person" under existing precedent. Second. … Abu Khatallah was arraigned in 2014 and the Oovcrnmcnt clearly intended to use these records by January 2017. when it first obtained a certil'1cation from /\yad.

Zakeri v. Rubio

District Court, District of Columbia · May 28, 2026

And the Consul General “appears to qualify as a commissioned consular officer with authority over visa adjudications” such that an order directed at the Consul General could redress Zakeri’s injuries. Liew v. … Zakeri asserts that “the U.S. government has already issued an absurd finding of inadmissibility due to immigrant intent” and that this finding “is clearly a fig leaf to cover a discriminatory decision to not let someone

Cooper Hospital University Medical Center v. Burwell

179 F. Supp. 3d 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 11, 2016

Medicare DSH Adjustment Medicare, established as Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et. … Given this circuit’s prior holdings, the Court concludes that it clearly has. A.

UNITED MOTORCOACH ASS'N, INC. v. Welbes

614 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 5, 2009

Second, the charter service regulations clearly provide that exceptions are to be granted by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis after due consideration of the facts, 49 C.F.R. § 604.11 (c), and that exceptions cannot … As the Administrator explained, “Mariners baseball games do not qualify as events which are unique” because they "happen every year at the same time and with the same frequency.” (A.R. § II, No. 1.) 6 .

Fudali v. Pivotal Corp.

623 F. Supp. 2d 25 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 5, 2009

Finally, Pivotal argued that the contract clearly limited plaintiffs commissionable revenue to licenses and the first year of maintenance and thus no parol evidence should have been admitted to explain the meaning of the … That there was a contract between Syngenta and Pivotal is not a trade secret; only its terms expressed in pricing information could possibly qualify.