Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersdcd

8,912 results

1.45s

  • Payne v. District of Columbia

    279 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 31, 2011

    Plaintiff concedes that “Council review, hearing consideration and approval [are] ... protected by legislative immunity.” Id. at 2-3. … to those decisions was a finding that “the information is being gathered as part, in connection with, or in aid of a legitimate legislative act[ ]” (id. at 57), or that the allegations of the party seeking the discovery “establish

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Gold v. Gensler

    840 F. Supp. 2d 58 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 5, 2012

    The panel reviewed the applications and put each candidate in one of four categories: “Best Qualified,” “Well Qualified,” “Qualified,” and “Minimally Qualified.” 17. … A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she was a member of the statutorily protected age group (over the age of forty); she applied for and was qualified for the position sought; (3) she was not

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Thomas v. Gandhi

    650 F. Supp. 2d 35 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 3, 2009

    This Court thus accepts as the law of the case that Thomas did not establish he is significantly better qualified than Edmonds. C. Insufficient Evidence of Age Discrimination. … Having failed to establish that he was “ ‘significantly’ or ‘markedly’ more qualified for the job,” see Hendricks v.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Vasser v. Shinseki

    280 F. Supp. 3d 9 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 22, 2017

    Plummer were clearly qualified for the position. And while Ms. … While it is ultimately up to the jury to decide the weight of this evidence, this evidence quite clearly calls into question the veracity of Dr.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Carter v. George Washington University

    180 F. Supp. 2d 97 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 20, 2001

    A 47 year-old, African-American woman, the plaintiff is clearly a member of the two protected classes at issue: race and age. … The plaintiff also demonstrates that she was qualified for the position of Executive Director.

    Cited 44 timesPublished
  • Jones v. Delaney

    District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 21, 2009

    Congress has not waived the federal government's sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional torts, and therefore the United States is immune from a damages suit for a constitutional tort. See F.D.IC v. … "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Canady v. Providence Hospital

    942 F. Supp. 11 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 2, 1996

    Before addressing privilege and immunity, however, it is worth considering whether the elements of the tort were established. 11. Alfred A Altimont, Inc. v. … Clearly the plaintiff had the expectancy of a business relationship with surgical patients, and clearly both Dr. Simmons and the hospital knew of that expectancy.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Toensing v. United States Department of Justice

    999 F. Supp. 2d 50 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 14, 2013

    Whether its immunity from discovery is absolute or qualified, a protected document cannot be said to be subject to ‘routine’ disclosure.” Grolier, 462 U.S. at 28. … A sealed court filing that “discussed the grand jury investigation in detail” would clearly “tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation.” See Hodge, 703 F.3d at 580.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Transitional Hospitals Corp. of Louisiana, Inc. v. Shalala

    40 F. Supp. 2d 6 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 25, 1999

    In San Bernardino, the court upheld a HHS regulation that established when a hospital qualified as a “sole community hospital,” which would result in an exemption from the limits imposed by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility … Clearly, if the hospitals thought that they could self-certify, there would be no need for a retroactive exemption from PPS.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Kozup v. Georgetown University

    663 F. Supp. 1048 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 7, 1987

    Curran, Lawrence, et al., Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, 310 New Eng. … Thus, the facts and dates clearly preclude plaintiffs' success on a theory of negli *1057 gence as to ARC’S failure to screen out high risk donors.

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • Kaul v. Federation of State Medical Boards

    District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 1, 2020

    Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), established that state and municipal authorities are immune from federal antitrust lawsuits for actions taken pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy that, when legislated, had foreseeable … However, unlike Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, Parker immunity requires that an actor be carrying out a clearly articulated state policy and that actor be “actively supervised by the State.” N.C.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n

    829 F. Supp. 420 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 30, 1993

    The immunity provided under Noerr-Pennington is qualified by a so-called “sham exception.” … Under the sham exception, otherwise protected activity does not qualify for Noerr-Pennington immunity “if it is a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • N'jai v. U.S. Department of Education

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2021

    A state is immune from federal suits brought by the state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state unless the state waives its sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates that immunity. See Jones v. … “To establish [specific] personal jurisdiction . . .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Griffin v. United States Parole Commission

    47 F. Supp. 2d 12 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 1999

    The record firmly established that the cause of action asserted in this case arose on or shortly after July 23, 1992. … The record clearly establishes that the FBI did have “evidence of’ plaintiffs involvement in eight bank robberies. The Parole Commission had before it a statement that such “evidence” existed.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Desert Sunlight 250, LLC v. Lew

    169 F. Supp. 3d 91 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 11, 2016

    Thus, on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Adams v. … Cir. 1995), the Tucker Act both waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity and confers jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims for certain types of monetary suits against the United States, Fisher v.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Cruz-Roldan v. Nagurka

    246 F. Supp. 3d 155 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 31, 2017

    Although Braa’y 7 is well-settled constitutional law of the type that can defeat the qualified immunity that Nagurka enjoys when facing § 1983 claims, plaintiff has not suffered any constitutional injury from a Braa’y violation … Defendant asserts he is protected by the “common interest” privilege and that the facts on the face of the Complaint establish that he is entitled to that privilege.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Coulibaly v. Kerry

    213 F. Supp. 3d 93 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2016

    Coulibaly must establish that a waiver of sovereign immunity applies. … Hmimiche . . . clear[ly] received preferential treatment from [Director] Blake and [LTS] Fyfe as he was clearly and evidently not qualified as a French [l]anguage instructor.”); De Launay-Fogg Aff. ¶ Q6, EEO Investigation

    Cited 57 timesPublished
  • Steuart Petroleum Co. v. United States

    438 F. Supp. 527 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 12, 1977

    Shaffer, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 371 , 424 F.2d 859 (1970) provides explicit authority for the view that the doctrines of standing, sovereign immunity and exhaustion of administrative remedies pose no barriers to judicial intervention … Hence a business does not qualify as a “regular dealer” in petroleum unless a majority of sales are made to the private sector.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • CITY OF MOUNDRIDGE, KS. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

    471 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 9, 2007

    Defendant ConocoPhillips also contends that the NPC is immune from federal antitrust laws because the NPC is a federal instrumentality and NPC's immunity should be extended to defendants. … Therefore, defendants are not immune from antitrust liability on that basis. 8 .

    Cited 28 timesPublished
  • Gage v. State of New Jersey

    District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2019

    Because not all of the Defendants are residents of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia cannot qualify as a proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). … “Few doctrines were more established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Cleavinger v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.