Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
8,912 results
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Young v. United States Department of Labor
District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 16, 2018
jurisdiction because they are challenging HHS’s decision to apply the standard for determining a SEC—“a finding that it is not ‘feasible’ to perform a dose estimate with ‘sufficient accuracy’”—to individuals who do not qualify … But after laying out the facts the complaint does not clearly state what legal claims plaintiffs wish to bring. See Fed. R. Civ.
Cited 0 timesPublishedGoodwin v. Syrian Arab Republic
District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 8, 2025
to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s terrorism exception. … To determine whether an act qualifies as torture under the TVPA—and through it, the FSIA—the Court must assess (1) the severity of the pain and suffering intended and actually inflicted on the victim and (2) the purpose
Cited 0 timesPublished847 F. Supp. 2d 41 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 9, 2012
If so, the Court must then evaluate whether Plaintiff adequately complied with the requirement or otherwise qualifies for an exception in the statute. A. … Because the United States is generally immune from suit, the Court must construe waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly – strictly applying any conditions Congress has imposed. See, e.g., Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Cited 3 timesPublished30 F. Supp. 2d 52 · District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 15, 1998
Freeman’s civil action in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond action qualifies as a § 1915(g) dismissal is that a dismissal may qualify as a strike as long as it is entered in any court that is located within the United … The federal defendants’ ipse dixit statement is frivolous and results from a clearly erroneous reading of § 1915(g).
Cited 4 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Mar 29, 2011
Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, Pate v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2003), and because it is Dr. Gandhi’s burden to show that he is entitled to such immunity, In re Gaither ex rel. … To establish a D.C.
Cited 0 timesPublished304 F. Supp. 1271 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 21, 1969
It is true that if plaintiff in this action is forced as a defendant in the Court of General Sessions to establish his immunity from suit, he must undergo the expenses of defending a suit which *1274 might have been unnecessary … Section 2679(d) clearly indicates that even after the Attorney General has issued a certification and the case has been removed to the District Court, that court, upon a motion for remand, may consider whether the defendant
Cited 5 timesPublishedBorrell v. Naval Facilities Engineering Command
District Court, District of Columbia · May 11, 2020
§ 1101 et seq., . . . established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees.” Mot. at 4 (quoting Elgin v. … The Rehabilitation Act requires that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
Cited 0 timesPublished525 F. Supp. 604 · District Court, District of Columbia · Oct 23, 1981
Accordingly, even a general waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress does not authorize an award of attorneys’ fees unless Congress has clearly indicated that it should. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. … Similarly, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars an award of liquidated damages unless Congress has clearly indicated that liquidated damages may be recovered and their amount.
Cited 17 timesPublished480 F. Supp. 2d 60 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 20, 2007
The statute likewise instructs courts to *69 locate the definitions for the types of qualifying conduct in specific sources. … What the Court must instead do is implement the “policy decision” and “value judgment” that the political branches made when they stripped state sponsors of terrorism of sovereign immunity for conduct that was likewise clearly
Cited 4 timesPublished951 F. Supp. 2d 201 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 1, 2013
. § 1983 – waive the government’s immunity to this action. … statute and ignore established case authority.”
Cited 21 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Sep 30, 2024
Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on the basis of qualified immunity. Mot. at 1. … immunity.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAzima v. Rak Investment Authority
District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 30, 2018
The emails that Azima has submitted clearly demonstrate that he functioned as one of the “middle men, the messengers” (7/23/16–7/25/16 Email Chain, Ex. … State Immunity Act of 1978, c. 33, § 2(6).
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, District of Columbia · Jun 21, 2017
{What is] the impact of such failure on Section 203 (c) immunity.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 5, Bemiert, No. 1116-cv-02283-'1`FH. … Furthermore, holding Google liable for establishing standards and guidelines would ultimately create a powerful disincentive for service providers to establish any standards or ever decide to remove objectionable content,
Cited 0 timesPublished290 F. Supp. 2d 108 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 4, 2003
In a FSIA case, after the defendant has produced prima facie evidence supporting its entitlement to immunity, “the burden of going forward ... shift[s] to the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the foreign state … In this case, plaintiff does not dispute that defendants have established, prima facie, their immunity under the FSIA. To avoid dismissal,- plaintiff invokes the “commercial activity” exception in § 1605(a)(2).
Cited 9 timesPublishedHoai v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia
539 F. Supp. 2d 432 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 28, 2008
. ¶¶ 16-22 (alleging that D.C. municipal courts have an “official policy,” in violation of the Constitution, that “a judge ... cannot possibly have worked a manifest injustice when ... decisions that are clearly wrong become … Legal Standard The Court may dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only if it appears, assuming the alleged facts to be true and drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, that plaintiffs cannot establish
Cited 15 timesPublishedWorkagegnehu v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 11, 2019
The Burkhart Court did not address whether WMATA’s internal policies qualify as a “statute, regulation, or policy” as required under the first step of the sovereign immunity test, and subsequent D.C. … Supp. 2d at 38 (holding that a bus operator who did not follow WMATA’s safety rules did not qualify for sovereign immunity).
Cited 0 timesPublishedVenezuela US Srl v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 9, 2025
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), “a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks … However, “[t]he public policy defense under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention is to be construed narrowly and is available only where an arbitration award ‘tends clearly to undermine the public interest, the public
Cited 0 timesPublishedReiff v. United States of America
107 F. Supp. 3d 83 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 3, 2015
It is well established that “[c]ourts must construe pro se filings liberally.” Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Haines v. … This is clearly a claim “arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax.”
Cited 3 timesPublishedAlemu v. Department of for Hire Vehicles
District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 21, 2018
DFHV further argues that Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims fail because they do not establish antitrust standing and because DFHV is immune to antitrust liability. See id. at 15–20. Mr. … Sub-state governmental entities are immune from antitrust liability so long as they act “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation” that is “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.”
Cited 0 timesPublished942 F. Supp. 621 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 18, 1996
Nassim and the IFC to fall within the exception of the § 1605(a)(5) waiver of immunity, it *627 must be established that Mr. Nassim’s actions constituted a “discretionary function” within the meaning of the FSIA. … That statement notwithstanding, it is well-established that the D.C. Workers’ Compensation Act does not preempt an employee’s common law tort claims under these circumstances. See Underwood v.
Reversed on other grounds by Margot Rendall-Speranza v. Edward A. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913 (1997)Cited 5 timesPublished
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