Case law

Cárdenas v. Muangman

998 A.2d 303 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 17, 2010

Analysis of Appellants’ Expert’s Testimony Because the requirements for qualifying an expert to testify and assessing the qualified expert’s testimony for sufficiency overlap, they are susceptible to being confused. … apply District of Columbia law (and therefore allow Camacho’s claim to proceed) under the conflict of laws analysis used in that state. 10 The “potential interests of the jurisdictions involved,” Stutsman, 546 A.2d at 374, clearly

Carter v. United States

684 A.2d 331 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 1996

to the crucial defense witness involved who is shown to be the only witness who, if believed, would clearly establish a reasonable doubt on the defendant’s guilt. … If immunity of the crucial defense witness is then sought, the defendant must first establish to the trial court’s satisfaction that the proposed testimony is (a) material, (b) clearly exculpatory, (c) non-cumulative, and

Scales v. District of Columbia

973 A.2d 722 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 18, 2009

, ultimately holding that he was entitled to immunity because the allegations, taken as true, had “fail[ed] to establish that under the particular circumstances here [Officer] Young violated his clearly established Fomth … if the right was not clearly established at the time, the officer may still enjoy its protection.

Young v. Scales

873 A.2d 337 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 21, 2005

that a defendant had qualified immunity. … Thus, to overcome qualified immunity, the right allegedly violated “must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that

District of Columbia v. Evans

644 A.2d 1008 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 21, 1994

1988 liability, an officer’s acts must clearly violate a clearly established right. … Deliberately shooting someone without just cause clearly violates the Fourth Amendment, and thus would preclude qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.

Sabir v. District of Columbia

755 A.2d 449 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 22, 2000

Absent violation of “a clearly established right,”a police officer will not be subject to § 1983 liability. Id. at 1015. As the D.C. Circuit articulated the standard in Wardlaw v. … Generally, the review of a deniál of qualified immunity is a question of law — “whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.” Mitchell v.

Durso v. Taylor

624 A.2d 449 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 29, 1993

“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct … Qualified immunity: objective legal reasonableness. Even if Durso had violated Taylor’s right to due process, we hold that he had qualified immunity for his actions.

Fulwood v. Porter

639 A.2d 594 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 28, 1994

in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” … Roberts, 823 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir.1987) (“clearly established law” for immunity purposes is supervisor’s duty in the particular circumstances to train adequately).

District of Columbia v. Jackson

810 A.2d 388 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 14, 2002

that the officers acted beyond the reach of qualified immunity protection). … That "general proposition,” the.Supreme Court reiterated in Saucier, "is not enough” to resolve the immunity question; instead "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established in a more

Gordon v. District of Columbia

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 15, 2024

App. 1998)—are not binding, nor do they muddle the clearly established principles set forth above so as to support the District’s claim of qualified immunity. … proving that the defendant “violated clearly established rights” and is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Kaplan v. Pointer

501 A.2d 1269 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 18, 1985

. at 2701 (absolute immunity deemed “a functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office”), while Harlow held that a presidential aide was entitled only to a qualified immunity, 457 U.S. at 809-14, 102 S.Ct. … Forsyth, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (granting former Attorney General of the United States qualified rather than absolute immunity from suit for damages arising out of allegedly unconstitutional conduct

District of Columbia v. Minor

740 A.2d 523 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 1999

In suits for unlawful arrest brought under § 1983, qualified immunity shields police officers from liability if “ ‘a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and … The instruction given to the jury on qualified immunity stated: “Officer Kelsey is shielded from liability for civil damages as long as he did not intentionally, or with reckless disregard, violate clearly established statutory

Heard v. Johnson

810 A.2d 871 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 21, 2002

Immunity Claim 1. The Trustees Right to Assert This Immunity. … As such, the case would have fallen into a clearly delineated exception (discussed below) to a church’s First Amendment immunity from suit.

District of Columbia v. Thompson

570 A.2d 277 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 12, 1990

As we shall also detail further, mandatory and discretionary duties commonly give rise to absolute immunity whereas ministerial duties at best evoke a qualified immunity. … This means that official immunity will help appellants only if it is absolute; qualified immunity would afford no more protection than the malice-destructible, qualified privilege available to any employer.

Minch v. District of Columbia

952 A.2d 929 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 2008

Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (in the context of qualified immunity of a police officer, “[i]f no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is … If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”

Geraci v. Hamilton

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 5, 2026

at 875) (noting that principle has limits when applied to well-established implied immunities that nevertheless lack an explicit textual basis, e.g., qualified immunity or presidential immunity), vacated on other grounds … “When deciding whether a class of people qualify for immunity from suit,” the court reasoned, “we look for that intent to be expressed in an explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee of immunity.” Id.

McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor

3 A.3d 1132 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 2010

As the privilege is absolute, not qualified, and well established in our jurisdiction, we would anticipate few cases where the conduct of litigants and counsel will be influenced by the “small risk that the law will be misapplied … Attorney General’s claim of qualified immunity was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 4 .

Parker v. K & L Gates, LLP

76 A.3d 859 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 19, 2013

conduct at issue did not violate clearly established law. … creates law that governs the official’s behavior,” even where court also determines that official is entitled to immunity because unconstitutionality was not clearly established).

Zakka v. Palladium

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 2023

We agree with him; the derivative immunity is a qualified immunity that does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but only furnishes the defendant with an affirmative defense. … In fact, we can say on the record as it now stands that the State Department clearly did not so instruct.

Moss v. Stockard

580 A.2d 1011 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 25, 1990

It then noted that very few state courts had extended absolute immunity this far, but rather had reserved absolute immunity for only the highest officials and accorded lesser officials qualified immunity. … Thompson, supra, this court implicitly rejected a rank-based distinction that reserves absolute immunity only for high-level ranking executive officials, leaving inferior officers only qualified immunity.