Case law

Twin Towers Plaza Tenants Ass'n v. Capitol Park Associates, L.P.

894 A.2d 1113 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 23, 2006

The Issue of Standing The trial court held that appellant did not qualify as a “tenant organization” because it had failed to demonstrate that it represented the majority of individual tenants in the two buildings and had … See D.C.Code § 42-3401.03(18) (defining “tenant organization”) and § 42-3404.11 (establishing registration requirement).

Hammond v. United States

880 A.2d 1066 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 11, 2005

The witness’ expression of generalized fear, which did not implicate Wright, was not error, and clearly not plain error. See id. … He contends (and the government appears to agree) that these statements could not be admitted under the coconspirator exception because they were not made during the conspiracy, and that they were too untrustworthy to qualify

Speyer v. Barry

588 A.2d 1147 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 29, 1991

The CONA was initially established to enable the District to become eligible for federal financial assistance. … These are the kinds of concerns, on the other hand, that the SHPDA is empowered and qualified to consider.

American University Park Citizens Ass'n v. Burka

400 A.2d 737 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 20, 1979

In the absence of an analogous statute of limitations, the party asserting the defense has the burden of establishing both elements. See Kosty v. … Appellants can only seek to stop a 195,420 square foot building instead of a 95,822 square foot building, which would be immune from challenge under this theory. 17 .

Ibn-Tamas v. United States

407 A.2d 626 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 15, 1979

We therefore confront the question whether the record clearly manifests a trial court ruling that Dr. … In Hearst II, however, the psycholinguistics methodology was challenged and held by the court to be insufficiently established to warrant admissibility.

In Re Sofaer

728 A.2d 625 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 1999

Libya was not a named party in the Civil Case, and HH & R thought that filing the specific license with the court might be construed as waiving the sovereign immunity of Libya from a lawsuit in the United States. … First, the factual contexts of Respondent’s government representation and private representation clearly overlap.

In re D.P.

122 A.3d 903 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 13, 2015

highest-level assault crime recognized in the District. 8 To obtain a conviction for aggravated assault, the government must prove ■that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim and must prove one of two qualifying … Inference is often necessary as “[i]t is the rare case where the defendant will clearly articulate his intent before he acts.” McKnight v. United States, 102 A.3d 284, 287-88 (D.C.2014) (citing Jones v.

Sebastian v. District of Columbia

636 A.2d 958 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 31, 1994

The court held that “[a]n examination of the relevant relationship here against the template of the common carrier exception and the rationales underlying it reveals that [the children’s center] clearly assumed a non-delegable … See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (excludes from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “[a]ny claim arising out of assault [or] battery5’).

Tuner v. DOES and WAMATA

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2019

The court appropriately disavows the ALJ’s apparent view that merely writing a letter stating that an award is accepted suffices to qualify as acceptance of the award for purposes of § 32-1530(b), even if no payment is … Moreover, WMATA acted in accordance with its clearly stated position, making no payments pursuant to the recommended award.

Gomez v. Independence Management of Delaware, Inc.

967 A.2d 1276 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 26, 2009

The tenants may qualify on other grounds as well, 15 but subsection (b) is worded in the disjunctive, and they need only fit within one of its six categories in order to trigger the presumption. … The present case clearly centers on a transaction involving real estate, but the CPPA protects the rights of consumers, see Ford v.

Temple v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission

536 A.2d 1024 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 1, 1987

By contrast, in qualifying for a voluntary vacancy increase, the landlord was required, among other things, to file an amended registration form. Id. § 3510.2. … All the damages in that decision accrued prior to registration and Temple clearly did not act in good faith prior to that time.

Turner v. United States

684 A.2d 313 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 1996

Legislative history, as interpreted through ease law, further establishes the identity of purpose with respect to the PPW and UF statutes. … Only qualified organizations or retired police officer(s) are eligible to receive a registration certificate, D.C.Code § 6-2311(a)(l)-(2).

Bridges v. Clark

59 A.3d 978 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 24, 2013

Clark clearly manifested his belief in the truth of those factual representations. 3. Although Mr. … That requirement, however, does not apply to prior inconsistent statements that qualify as adoptive admissions. See Chaabi v.

William McCorkle and Andre Clinkscale v. United States

100 A.3d 116 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 25, 2014

We have “broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. … In this case, the statement appellants sought to admit was not admissible unless it qualified as an exception to the rule against hearsay. See Chambers v.

Majerle Management Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission

866 A.2d 41 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 2004

Under the Act, "an owner ... or their agent” qualifies as a housing provider. D.C. Code § 42-3501.03 (2002) (former § 45-2503). Majerle is the only party taking the appeal. 9 . … The tenants claimed that the housing provider had established unlawful rent ceilings and was charging them unlawful rents during the years 1991-1994. Id.

Donnelly v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board

452 A.2d 364 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1982

“These criteria include: the location of the establishment ..., the availability of parking ..., the effect on local traffic conditions ..., the size of the establishment ..., the hours the establishment will remain open … Clearly, this unrebutted evidence was sufficient to support and rationally led to the Board’s conclusion regarding the fitness of Safeway’s officers, see Haight v.

Jimmerson v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.

663 A.2d 540 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 17, 1995

would govern the suit, and the other defendant was a Delaware corporation qualified to do business exclusively in Maryland. … Neurology Center, P.A., 557 A.2d 156 (D.C.1989), where we reversed dismissal on forum non conve-niens grounds because the defendants “did not meet the heavy burden of establishing compelling reasons and forum inconvenience

George v. Dade

769 A.2d 760 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 22, 2001

“Moreover, [b]e-cause it is in derogation of the common law *764 principle of sovereign immunity, section 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants.” Id. (quoting Gross v. … Recently, we concluded that § 12-309 does not apply to an independent water and sewer entity established by the Council of the District of Columbia. See Dingwall v.

Hessey v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics

601 A.2d 3 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 1991

Following ratification by a majority of the registered qualified electors on November 7, 1977, Congress approved the amendment to the Charter. H.R.Res.Con. 464, 92 Stat. 3868 (1978). … The Council’s ability to allocate revenues effectively and efficiently is clearly thwarted.

Matter of CLW

467 A.2d 706 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 1, 1983

Thus, it seems too clear for further discussion that, assuming again arguendo that the report was Brady material, appellant was clearly not prejudiced by the government's failure to disclose the material before trial. … The trial judge, as trier of both the law and facts, was uniquely qualified to assess the evidence and proceedings and make a judgment respecting the Brady issue and the effect, if any, of non-disclosure.