Case law

Federov v. United States

580 A.2d 600 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 6, 1990

To support a defense of selective prosecution, both of these propositions must be clearly and separately established. Attorney General of the United States v. … Other Issues Both trial judges apparently accepted the view that, because appellants had violated the law, the communicative nature of their conduct did not immunize them from prosecution.

In Re Allen

27 A.3d 1178 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 8, 2011

that respondent’s actions were not so much motivated by a desire for personal gain as by psychological disturbances .... ”); In re Kent, 467 A.2d 982, 984 (D.C.1983) (“[T]he unusual facts and circumstances of this case clearly … We do not mean to indicate that an attorney’s stress qualifies as an exceptional circumstance in every disciplinary proceeding.

Panutat, LLC v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board

75 A.3d 269 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 19, 2013

Although Intervenors' counsel argued that such evidence was "clearly relevant,” the Board’s Interim Chair ruled that "what happens with the Shadow Room ... is irrelevant.” … Panu-tat’s counsel did comment that evidence "disregarded in the original order, is certainly available for the Board’s consideration now,” but he at least arguably qualified that statement by saying that he wanted to afford

Walter Blair, II v. DC & Thaddeus Modlin, Jr.

190 A.3d 212 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 2018

Miller & Long Co., 763 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. 2000).  16 the “public duty doctrine” to immunize Officer Modlin from liability for alleged simple and gross negligence that resulted … it is not sufficient for the expert to explain what he or she would have done under similar circumstances, or to declare that the District violated the national standard of care.” 69 To the contrary, “the expert must clearly

Howard University v. Roberts-Williams

37 A.3d 896 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 23, 2012

The trial court clearly was familiar with this court’s decision in Allworth, supra, which reiterated the caution against the court’s involvement in university promotions and tenure, but which nevertheless recognized that … Over the objection of Howard, the Honorable Leonard Braman, who presided over the trial in this case, qualified Professor Jennings as an expert in “the process and procedures regarding tenure.”

Washington v. United States

884 A.2d 1080 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 19, 2005

Jacqueline Lee, deputy chief medical examiner for the District, who qualified as an expert in forensic pathology, testified that Anderson’s death was a homicide caused by a gunshot wound to the head. … Under that standard, this court will reverse only if the defendant’s substantial rights were so clearly prejudiced as to jeopardize the fairness of the trial. Hunter v.

Nova University v. Educational Institution Licensure Commission

483 A.2d 1172 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 9, 1984

granting any such license may require satisfactory evidence: (1) That in the case of ... an incorporated institution, a majority of the trustees, directors, or managers of said institution are persons of good repute and qualified … A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.

In re J.W.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 2, 2021

Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 1995) (evidence of alleged conspirators’ other joint criminal activity was “clearly probative of the close nature of their relationship”).  20 … We therefore must vacate the judgment unless the District can establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. EMPLOYMENT SERVS.

929 A.2d 865 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 2007

While this standard is clearly one that provides great deference to the agency's determination, if we cannot find support in the record for the findings that are the basis for the agency's determination, then we must reverse … This court has held that the burden is on the employer to prove that work for which the claimant was qualified was in fact available, see Washington Post, 675 A.2d at 41 , but the evidence in the record is that petitioner

Price v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

41 A.3d 526 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 12, 2012

Section 10(b) establishes a six-month limitations period for seeking National Labor Relations Board review of an unfair-labor-practice charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b). … Other courts have explained the point somewhat more clearly: Because "the general rule [is] that an employee is bound by the result of grievance or arbitration remedial procedures provided in a collective-bargaining agreement

Miller v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review

294 A.2d 365 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 31, 1972

The majority complain there are no established standards for denying a license. I think standards are established by D.C. … In effect he testified he reviewed petitioner's record and in his considered judgment petitioner was not qualified for the type of license he sought.

Office of People's Counsel v. Public Service Commission

797 A.2d 719 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 2, 2002

Verizon argued that “only the smallest businesses would qualify” for residential rates even if the Commission were to approve its proposed amendment because such rates would continue to be available only when the primary … OPC argues that the record before the Commission contains no evidence establishing that home-based business customers in fact use their telephones for primarily domestic purposes.

Mallof v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board

43 A.3d 916 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 17, 2012

See D.C.Code §§ 25-762(a) (2001) (explaining that prior to making interior or exterior changes, an establishment must obtain approval from the Board), 25-404(a) (2001) (requiring that before an establishment can make a substantial … See D.C.Code § 25-446(c) (explaining that once the Board determines that the voluntary agreement complies with the applicable laws and the applicant otherwise qualifies for licensing, it must approve the establishment’s license

Outlaw v. United States

632 A.2d 408 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 21, 1993

More than two centuries later, Blackstone’s successor commentators have expanded his enumeration: Illustrative of the acts which qualify, assuming the presence of the other requirements, are harboring and concealing the felon … The first consisted of Noah’s alleged acts of intimidation of Walter Jones and perhaps of others; the government apparently contends, although it has not clearly so stated, that these acts were designed to silence potential

In Re Clarke

684 A.2d 1276 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 7, 1996

Because of respondent’s assertions that “the doctor was not a high priority,” and that he [respondent] was “under some financial duress,” combined with his failure to maintain adequate records, his misappropriation was clearly … Therefore, respondent’s lack of prior disciplinary history, his financial distress, and his cooperation with Bar Counsel do not qualify as mitigating factors sufficient to justify departure from the sanction of disbarment

In Re SK

564 A.2d 1382 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 13, 1989

Douglas Tebor, who conducted an emergency psychiatric evaluation of S.K. at Children's Hospital, was qualified as an expert in psychiatry. … I do not think any of the judge's evidentiary findings were clearly erroneous.

Fateh v. Rich

481 A.2d 464 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 24, 1984

The Fatehs’ trial counsel moved to strike this testimony because it was opinion testimony offered by a witness who had not been qualified as an expert. … The seller, moreover, must establish at trial both the contract price and the market price at the time of the buyer’s breach in order to establish the measure of damages.

Andrew Johnson v. District of Columbia Public Schools

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 2018

In our view, the record indisputably establishes that Mr. Johnson did not voluntarily retire. Rather, he was involuntarily separated and was granted benefits accordingly. … Johnson as being precluded from reliance on that provision to support his clearly articulated contention that he did not voluntarily retire.

Johnson v. United States

701 A.2d 1085 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 9, 1997

“The principle that a juror is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter, loses much of its pertinency when that same juror has declared himself of two minds ...” Hill v. … The evidence was admissible, on cross-examination, to establish bias on the part of Hamilton who had on two previous occasions provided alibis to Johnson. See Samuels v.

Shelton v. United States

721 A.2d 603 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 24, 1998

Elizabeths Hospital for-treatment pursuant to the Sexual Psychopath Act (“SPA”) D.C.Code § 22-3503, et seq., after he had pleaded guilty to criminal offenses but before he was sentenced, qualifies for credit against his sentence … The statute established educational credits; meritorious credits; jail time and parole credits. It also established limits on the category of persons who are deemed eligible to receive good time *613 credits.