Case law

Cooper v. Berzin

621 A.2d 395 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 9, 1993

It is clearly not the Graham v. Roberts situation. I certainly don’t think you can extrapolate from Graham v. … The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish all elements of her damages.

American Studies Association v. Bronner

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 2021

of success on the merits” to defeat the motion. 45 itself clearly demonstrate that whatever interpretation is given to the facts the plaintiff does not have a claim that is legally redressible.”) … Committee Report on the bill to have been intended). 82 But at the suggestion of the ACLU, 83 the Council removed the part of the definition encompassing “any other conduct” and replaced it with narrower language more clearly

Davis v. United States

564 A.2d 31 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 5, 1989

Be that as it may, we start with the following established harmless error principles. … Automatic reversal for a constitutional error was required, for example, upon the exclusion of a qualified prospective juror from a capital jury.

District of Columbia v. Bethel

567 A.2d 1331 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 5, 1990

II The District claims that Bethel did not establish the proper standard of care. It contends that Mr. … The District cites no authority in support of its contention that a qualified expert’s opinion can be undermined in this way.

In Re Bach

966 A.2d 350 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 2009

Judge Burgess clearly was skeptical of this claim and said as much. Before the Hearing Committee, however, Respondent offered no evidence to support that claim. … These concessions clearly and convincingly establish a violation by Respondent of Rule 1.5(a). * * * IV.

Smith v. United States

666 A.2d 1216 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 31, 1995

We find no basis to conclude that the trial court applied the wrong standard in considering the first element for establishing an excited utterance. … We cannot say that the court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. 9 .

Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia

433 A.2d 1075 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 20, 1981

Other deeds which the District of Columbia does exempt from the recordation tax do not indicate that this case qualifies for a similar exemption. … Code § 58-54 (1974) (corporate liquidations that qualify under Sections 331, 332, 333, or 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954); W.Va.

Prisco v. Stroup

3 A.3d 316 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 2, 2010

Prisco established that, between February 2006 and March 2008, she submitted over one hundred job applications and secured eight job interviews. … Stroup was not qualified to testify as an expert on the relevant job market, credited him as someone who has “extensive experience hiring attorneys for his firm.”

Cormier v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authority

84 A.3d 492 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 3, 2013

Each side presented a duly qualified expert to testify about the prevalence and cause of the leaks. Appellants’ expert, Dr. … The trial court’s finding that causation had not been proved was not clearly erroneous. III.

Ferreira v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

531 A.2d 651 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1987

To qualify for benefits, a claimant must sustain an “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.” D.C.Code § 36-301(12) (1981). … While the precise meaning of the “human frame” definition of “accidental injury” is undeniably elusive, it clearly encompasses two concepts.

Roosevelt Whitfield v. United States

99 A.3d 650 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 18, 2014

Because our decision on the suppression motion is dispositive to appellant‟s appeal, we do not reach the question raised by appellant as to whether  10 an otherwise qualified law-abiding … In the criminal context at least, “[i]t is well-established that criminal statutes should be strictly construed and that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant (i.e., the Rule of Lenity).” Belay v.

Gonzalez v. United States

697 A.2d 819 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 10, 1997

Detective Culver was qualified as an expert on methods of drug distribution and on police procedures used for handling and safeguarding narcotics evidence. … Moreover, even if this testimony did exceed permissible bounds, it clearly did not result in prejudice to Gonzalez, let alone substantial prejudice.

Ransom v. United States

932 A.2d 510 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 2007

at 1020 (“Inasmuch as the substance of the ex parte communications and their effect on juror impartiality are questions of historical fact, ... we must accept the trial court’s findings thereon unless those findings are clearly … As we noted in Hill , “[o]ur review is deferential because the question of prejudice turns substantially on the judge’s appraisal of the juror’s demeanor, and is therefore one about which the trial judge is especially qualified

Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc.

483 A.2d 1192 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 14, 1984

Judge Doyle erred in rejecting the prior determination that the contract was ambiguous, which Judge Morrison’s decision had established as the law of the case. 10 III. … Similarly, the California Supreme Court has stated: A tort may grow out of or be coincident with a contract, and the existence of a contractual relationship does not immunize a tortfeasor from tort liability for his wrongful

Hudson v. Ashley

411 A.2d 963 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 17, 1980

clearly understood. … If Cook was liable for the meats furnished after the arrangement with Welch was made, then clearly Welch’s liability could not be an original one.

Murphy v. McCloud

650 A.2d 202 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 1, 1994

failed to claim, until after the decedent’s death, a relationship with the decedent which would qualify her to participate in the estate. … Clayborne, 623 A.2d 1190, 1192 (D.C.1993) (holding that the standard under § 17-305(a) is equivalent to the "clearly erroneous” standard). .

Kywone D. Pelzer v. United States

166 A.3d 956 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 17, 2017

Mitchum, it clearly would not have had the requisite evidence to conclude that a startling event had occurred. Mr. Mitchum gave no indication that his powers of reflection were suspended. … Mitchum explained the purpose of his call, i.e., that he had reported a mugging to police 12 The government acknowledges that ―[t]here is no fixed time requirement for a statement to qualify as an excited

Greenfield v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 10, 2025

The trial court qualified Brown as an expert witness who could testify to the “appearance” and “odor” of PCP. … “A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a few specific and well-established exceptions.” Ellison v.

Clements v. United States

669 A.2d 1271 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 1995

Moreover, because we conclude that the medical entries referring to Hackney’s alertness qualify under the business records exception, they were admissible without the accompanying testimony of the individuals who conducted … Where no objection has been made at trial to a prosecutor’s remarks, we will not reverse absent a showing of plain error, i.e., error "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity

Lanton v. United States

779 A.2d 895 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 16, 2001

Johnson similarly alleged that the wife “was clearly the aggressor and *902 baiting him to fight her.” … It may be that, if a hearing had been held, trial counsel could have elaborated on the facts disclosed in his affidavit and established that his performance satisfied the standards established by Strickland and its progeny