Case law

1901 Wyoming Avenue Cooperative Ass'n v. Lee

345 A.2d 456 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1975

In this connection the following remarks are also of interest: Analytically, of course, the question of what the parties intended is clearly a question of fact. But the courts have long called it a question of law. … The reason is not tliat it is a question of law in the literal sense, for it is a question of fact in the literal sense, but the reason is that the judge is better qualified than the jury to interpret the written language

Taylor v. United States

662 A.2d 1368 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 3, 1995

Thus, the government has failed to establish that appellant constructively possessed the seized weapons. III. … It is well settled that in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, ”[w]e are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous or not supported by the evidence.” Powell v.

Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Vel Rey Properties, Inc.

699 A.2d 416 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 11, 1997

Other types of nonfinal orders cannot be immune from that same revisory power. 7 In this case, neither party contends that the April order constituted the entry of a final, appealable judgment. … The court did not clearly explain why additional time for the election, as opposed to additional time for filing the motion for reconsideration, was denied. 6 .

Akhmetshin v. Browder

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 26, 2022

Akhmetshin, a D.C. resident, sought to establish personal jurisdiction over Mr. … Cir. 1983) (holding that  9 appearances in the District “made in an attempt to influence government action” and therefore “undoubtedly qualify[ing] as exercises in petitioning

Jacob Herring v. United States

169 A.3d 354 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 14, 2017

The April 2014 J&C order did not clearly reveal Judge Keary‘s choice between the two available options. … Furthermore, ―the record clearly reveal[ed] the intention of the sentencing judge to incarcerate, despite the court‘s bare mistaken reference to 5010(a).‖ Id.

Wanzer v. District of Columbia

580 A.2d 126 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 28, 1990

“Such a relationship can be established either by ‘direct contact or continuing contact between the victim and the governmental agency or official’ ... or by a statute that prescribes ‘mandatory acts clearly for the protection … After Ross was decided, the Michigan legislature revised the governmental immunity statute. See Peters v. Bay Fresh Start, Inc., 161 Mich.App. 491, 497 , 411 N.W.2d 463, 466 (1987).

District of Columbia v. Cato Institute

829 A.2d 237 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 24, 2003

On appeal, the District contends that Cato does not qualify for tax exemption of its real property taxes under this provision because (1) it is not a “public charity” and (2) its activities are not “principally in the District … While this focus tangentially impacts the District, the residents of the District are clearly not principally impacted by Cato’s work.

Morris v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

530 A.2d 683 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 24, 1987

Clearly if DOES does in fact interpret the Act as allowing only a dependent to make such a claim, the failure to prove dependency disposes of the issue. … (The DOES decision found that petitioners clearly were not dependents under the Act.) 6 . D.C.Code § 3-401(5)(B) (1986 Supp.). 7 .

Hewett v. Western Union Telegraph Co.

15 D.C. 424 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 8, 1886

For these reasons it seems that the resolution of 1863 can, in no sense, qualify the general power and right granted by the act of 1866. Now, what was that power? … The court will consider all the circumstances and exercise a careful discretion. “ This jurisdiction.is applied only where the right is clearly established; where no adequate compensation can be made in damages, and where

MARLON WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES

130 A.3d 343 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 21, 2016

Indeed, as one federal district court judge has observed, “[although the scholarly literature is extraordinarily critical” of toolmark pattern-matching, it appears that courts have made little effort to limit or qualify the … Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 89 A.3d 115, 126-27 (D.C.2014) (reviewing the elements of judicial estoppel and explaining inter alia that it will apply only if the party’s later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier

B. Frank Joy, L. L.C. v. Dist. of Columbia Sewer and Water Authority

213 A.3d 90 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 1, 2019

Whether or not providing access to these cables “enhance[d] [the] value, beauty or utility” of the intersection, it clearly “adapt[ed]” the intersection “for [a] new or further purpose[].” … (“There is established, as an independent authority of the District government, the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority.

Michael Caison v. Project Support Services

99 A.3d 243 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 11, 2014

The ALJ clearly stated at the beginning of Mr. Caison‘s unemployment compensation hearing, that the only issue before her at the hearing was whether or not Mr. Caison was an independent contractor. Mr. … [Once satisfying] the initial burden of proving that the services are performed by individuals for remuneration . . . , the burden shifts to the putative employer . . . that it qualifies for an exemption . . . .‖); Sky King

Green v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 23, 2024

That comment was not qualified in any way, and Detective Patterson did not explain to Mr. Green that if Mr. … The United States acknowledges that it cannot establish that the admission of Mr. Green’s statement into evidence was harmless. We agree, and we therefore vacate Mr.

Howard University v. Wilkins

22 A.3d 774 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2011

Clearly $1 in compensatory damages and $10 in punitive damages will not deter Howard from engaging in the kind of retaliatory behavior which the jury found in this case. … Wilkins’ opposition to Howard’s motion for summary judgment that would establish express or actual malice on Howard's part, or that Howard’s statement was "so excessive, intemperate, unreasonable, and abusive as to forbid

Dada v. Children's National Medical Center

715 A.2d 904 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 13, 1998

The trial court was clearly correct in ruling that the appellee was entitled to summary judgment in light of appellant’s failure to establish either the applicable standard of care in this medical malpractice case or any … Accordingly, pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 6(b), in order to qualify for the relief she sought, it will be also incumbent upon appellant to satisfy the trial court that appellant’s failure to act in timely fashion was due to

Stoner v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen's Retirement & Relief Board

368 A.2d 524 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 14, 1977

6 As the concept of qualifying disabilities (i. e., “injury or disease”) includes psychological impairments, it is obvious that relief in such cases is potentially available under either subsection of § 4-527. … Moreover, we do not wish to leave the impression that the requisite causation of a psychological disability necessarily is established by a showing of no more than a service-related trauma acting upon a particular personality

Crews v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 10, 2021

She was qualified and appointed on October 4, 2021, to perform judicial duties as a Senior Judge and will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a date to be determined after her successor is appointed and qualifies. … States, 115 A.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. 2015).  14 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

Bowyer v. United States

422 A.2d 973 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 6, 1980

According to the court, such an enactment would clearly change the defendant's situation to his disadvantage and, therefore, was violative of the ex post facto clause. Id. at 29 . In Dixon v. … The court recognized that a change which deprived the accused of any defense, modified the element of proof, or denied him of any substantial immunity which he previously had, would be an ex post facto law. Id. at 97 .

In Re Bach

966 A.2d 350 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 2009

Judge Burgess clearly was skeptical of this claim and said as much. Before the Hearing Committee, however, Respondent offered no evidence to support that claim. … These concessions clearly and convincingly establish a violation by Respondent of Rule 1.5(a). * * * IV.

Lowman v. United States

632 A.2d 88 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1993

To establish aiding and abetting, the prosecution was obliged to prove that Ms. … Lowman, a first offender, qualified for the "addict exception,” Dupree, supra, 583 A.2d at 1002-03 , and did not receive a mandatory minimum sentence.