Case law

Bedney v. United States

684 A.2d 759 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 1996

R. 11(c), (d), (f), and whether Morris qualified for the addict exception. … The record does not reflect any “corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id. at 200 .

Harris v. United States

834 A.2d 106 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 23, 2003

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (holding that officers have only a qualified immunity for their decisions to seek warrants, in part because an affiant should “reflect, before submitting … a request for a[n arrest] warrant, upon whether he has a reasonable basis for believing that his affidavit establishes probable cause”).

Fields v. United States

466 A.2d 822 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 11, 1983

Appellant’s first theory is that the Monroe/Farrell rule represented such an application of established precedents to new facts, and hence no true retroactivity question confronts us. We disagree. … The Court further qualified its holding by stating that Johnson governed only cases not clearly controlled by existing retroactivity precedents.

Calhoun v. WACKENHUT SERVICES

904 A.2d 343 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 20, 2006

See D.C.Code § 51-lll(b) (2001) (establishing ten-day time limit for administrative appeal from initial determination awarding or denying unemployment benefits). We reverse and remand for consideration of the merits. I. … Moreover, in the colloquy summarized above, the DOES clerk clearly offered Mr. Calhoun that option. However, so far as the record provided by OAH reveals, Mr.

In re Samad

51 A.3d 486 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 5, 2012

Respondent never verified that information with Judge Cushenberry’s court, notwithstanding that the judge clearly set November 19 as a trial date. … Samad must establish his fitness to practice law pursuant to D.C. Bar R.

Burton v. United States

657 A.2d 741 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 12, 1994

Warrant-less searches are per se unreasonable, subject “to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. … Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that "[n]othing in Schneckloth suggests ... that a consent which waives Fourth Amendment rights cannot be limited, qualified or withdrawn”); 3 Wayne R.

Paul Zukerberg v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics

97 A.3d 1064 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 21, 2014

Bill No. 20-134, the Elected Attorney General Implementation and Legal Service Establishment Amendment Act of 2013 (―the 2013 Act‖). … For its part, the Council and the BOE contend that the language of the 2010 Charter Amendment is unambiguously open-ended and clearly authorizes the election of an Attorney General at any time beyond January 1, 2014, on

B.R.L.F. v. Zuniga

200 A.3d 770 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 2, 2019

s reunification with his mother in Guatemala would be "viable." 3 Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court to enter judgment that B.E.L.S. qualifies to petition for SIJ status. I. … threatened B.E.L.S. seems more than a little strained, but because B.E.L.S appeared personally before the court and we have no more than the written record to scrutinize, we cannot say that the trial court's finding was clearly

Richman Towers Tenants'ass'n, Inc. v. Richman Towers LLC.

17 A.3d 590 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 14, 2011

We have established that the transfer of “a special interest falling short of complete ownership” does not qualify as a “sale” [citing Twin Towers and West End Tenants ]. … It had never entered into any agreement, aside from those related to the 2004 transaction for which it was established.

Turner v. Dist. of Columbia

210 A.3d 156 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 2019

The court appropriately disavows the ALJ's apparent view that merely writing a letter stating that an award is accepted suffices to qualify as acceptance of the award for purposes of § 32-1530(b), even if no payment is actually … Moreover, WMATA acted in accordance with its clearly stated position, making no payments pursuant to the recommended award.

McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co., Inc.

547 A.2d 172 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 2, 1988

(i) First, a protective order clearly has the “practical effect” of an injunction in that it enjoins the tenant to pay a specified amount in lieu of rent, at given intervals, in a particular manner (generally, into the registry … It is well established that where a given order is of ambiguous identity, it is appropriate for the appellate court to categorize die order for purposes of granting or denying interlocutory appeal.

Smallwood v. United States

407 A.2d 675 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 1979

The court, after hearing testimony from the psychiatrist (who was qualified as an expert witness), opined that it does seem to me Mr. Smallwood’s failure to appear is voluntary. … [and] if a defendant at liberty remains away during his trial the court may proceed provided it is clearly established that his absence is voluntary.

Wonson v. United States

144 A.3d 1 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 14, 2016

Turning to the particular facts of this case, the government clearly failed to establish by a reasonable probability that it had maintained an unbroken chain of custody over the proffered ballistics material. … United States, 897 A.2d 796, 801 (D.C.2006), and In re D.S., 747 A.2d 1182, 1187 (D.C.2000), superficially support the government's argument because these sentences omit the critical qualifier, employed by the Supreme Court

Steuart Investment Co. v. Meyer Group, Ltd.

61 A.3d 1227 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 7, 2013

Turning to the second requirement of the test for establishing an implied-in-fact contract, much of the same evidence that establishes the first element also demonstrates that Steuart was on notice that The Meyer Group was … qualified for prejudgment interest pursuant to D.C.Code § 15-108.

Foreman v. United States

633 A.2d 792 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 18, 1993

The government is not required to establish guilt beyond all doubt, or to a mathematical certainty or a scientific certainty. … In itself, the qualifier “deep rooted” connotes “established” or “settled” (as, for example, when the Supreme Court speaks of a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” Ohio v.

Block v. Ford Motor Credit Company

286 A.2d 228 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 17, 1972

We are unable to say that the trial court’s conclusion based upon the undisputed evidence was clearly erroneous. … Art. 95B, § 9-206 (1), enjoys the same immunity to a buyer’s defenses as does the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

James v. United States

514 A.2d 793 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 8, 1986

Therefore Williams’ prior conviction of threats does not qualify for admission under D.C. Code § 14-305 (b)(l)(A) or (B). Cf Akers v. … United States, 337 A.2d 772, 776 (D.C.1975) (Congressional sponsors “clearly intended that offenses to be excluded [from the statute] are primarily those resulting from passion and short temper.” (quoting Durant v.

In Re Melton

565 A.2d 635 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 6, 1989

They are hearsay and as such are not admissible to establish the truth of the matters asserted by them. … Byrd qualified. [8] Mr.

1010 Potomac Associates v. Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.

485 A.2d 199 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 20, 1984

of contract interpretation: Analytically, of course, the question of what the parties intended is clearly a question of fact. … Clearly, it is only the character of the use, viz., for "offices" and not for some other purpose, that is restricted by Paragraph 3. 11 .

Hessey v. Burden

615 A.2d 562 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1992

City of Miami Beach, 96 So.2d 550, 551 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1957) (“An election should not be held if the ordinance proposed was clearly invalid on its face”). … An initiative proposing to establish an official religion in the District of Columbia, for example, would be patently unconstitutional.