Case law

Turner v. District of Columbia

532 A.2d 662 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 28, 1987

acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.’ ” Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1314 (citations omitted). … The Act provides that CPS “shall be administered by a full-time Chief who shall be qualified by reason of training and experience to further the purposes of this act.” D.C.Code § 6-2122(a) (1981).

Committee of 100 on the Federal City v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs

571 A.2d 195 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 8, 1990

The owner further contended the day care services would meet “a clearly identified need for day care that is located in close proximity to the work place and will enhance the area’s appeal to prospective tenants.” … Since parking must be considered with every downtown project, see 11 D.C.M.R. 2101.1 (1987), it does not ordinarily qualify as an amenity of “special merit.” See MB Associates, supra, 456 A.2d at 386 .

Jackson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

979 A.2d 43 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 27, 2009

District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 852 A.2d 909 (D.C.2004), which holds that an employer meets its burden to rebut the presumption of causation when it proffers a qualified IME who, after examining the … Johnson’s report clearly indicates that petitioner’s desire to schedule knee replacement surgery was prompted by her fall on November 19, 2003. Dr.

Spock v. District of Columbia

283 A.2d 14 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 20, 1971

Cir., 447 F.2d 358 (decided July 23, 1971). 11 Clearly, law enforcement interests are and must be served by preserving records of arrest if for no other reason than to permit a determination whether and how to defend in the … In other words, Irani affirmatively established that he was mistakenly arrested.

In Re Kanu

5 A.3d 1 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 2010

Li also testified that Kanu told him that she would “train [him] how to tell [the] Immigration Office, how to convince them [that he was] qualified for [the religious worker visa].” … As the Board notes, “[t]he 1989 amendments to sections 2(b) and 8(a) of [Bar] Rule XI and Board Rule 2.10 clearly established a new enforcement procedure to compel compliance with Bar Counsel’s inquiries,” but it concedes

Quin v. George Washington University

407 A.2d 580 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 3, 1979

As we stated: [ I]f a case involves the merits and performance of scientific treatment, complex medical procedures, or the exercise of professional skill and judgment, a jury will not be qualified to determine whether there … Thus, appellant’s evidence, if credited, established negligence in the surgical procedure as the cause of the injury. Compare Quick v.

Roberts-Douglas v. Meares

624 A.2d 405 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 3, 1992

Indeed, the judge ruled that this information would have to be disclosed if the plaintiffs established liability. … The judge’s finding that no such intent was established was not clearly erroneous. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a). .

In re S.

579 A.2d 156 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 1990

I, the order of the state disciplinary board which triggered disciplinary action in the District stated that “[a] review of the records and evidence before the [state board] indicates clearly that [S.] was suffering from … He made clear that he did not feel qualified “to study [respondent’s] performance on the job,” and that “one’s colleagues would have a better understanding and perhaps make better judges of that.”

In Re C.S.

804 A.2d 307 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 1, 2002

Our juvenile justice laws merely require that “the Division [shall] direct that a pre-disposition study and report to the Division be made by the director of Social Services or a qualified agency designated by the Division … “When the trial court rules in such a proceeding within the limitations established by statutes, it is not our function to review that exercise of discretion.” In re L.J., supra, 546 A.2d at 435.

In Re Zakroff

934 A.2d 409 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 25, 2007

Licensed clinical social worker Paulette Hurwitz testified to her belief that Respondent’s depression “interfered with [his] ability to think clearly and the depression interfered with the analysis of whether taking money … the Bar and thus cannot show that a disciplinary sanction excludes him from a benefit for which he is otherwise qualified). 11 .

Varner v. District of Columbia

891 A.2d 260 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 2, 2006

Especially in circumstances in which, as in this case, the defendant is alleged to have failed to protect the plaintiff from harm, the expert must “clearly articulate and reference a standard of care by which the defendant … “There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception

Bahura v. S.E.W. Investors

754 A.2d 928 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 15, 2000

The District cites no authority in support of its contention that a qualified expert’s opinion can be undermined in this way. … In this case, however, the plaintiffs presented detailed evidence by well-qualified expert witnesses. If credited, their testimony was quite compelling.

In Re DG

583 A.2d 160 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 3, 1990

After six weeks without contact, the mother re-established ties with her children, and they were returned to her care. … The Fourth and Fifth Circuits held that the CWA gave the children causes of action, and that state officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the suits.

Williams v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 9, 2024

of all qualified white jurors. … Here, the jury’s decision clearly was rational.

In Re Bailey

883 A.2d 106 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 15, 2005

It simply establishes that Mr. Bailey is directed to pay for the medical services provided to Ms. Haile by Dr. … This last paragraph of the authorization clearly stated that Mr. Bailey agreed to withhold such monies owed to Dr. Garmon for his services from any settlements due to Ms.

RICHARD C. BARTEL v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION

128 A.3d 1043 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 24, 2015

Qualifying as a person entitled to enforcé an instrument does not establish a right to payment of the instrument. … Just as clearly, the summary judgment record shows that Mr. Bartel cannot satisfy the requirements of § 3-309.

Howard v. United States

663 A.2d 524 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 14, 1995

We have clearly stated that “the determination of a witness’ competence to testify lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and this court will not disturb the judge’s factual determination unless it is plainly … In order to qualify to serve as a juror in this jurisdiction, a person is required to be a resident of the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 11-1906(b)(1)(A) (1989).

Daniels v. United States

738 A.2d 240 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 26, 1999

The challenged evidence in this case clearly had substantial probative value. … The shell casings recovered at the scene established that the second gun was an AK-47 semi-automatic rifle.

Appeal of H.R.

581 A.2d 1141 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 1990

Noshpitz, an expert for H.R. qualified in child psychiatry but not qualified as an expert in adoption. Deposition testimony of H.R. and his wife was also admitted. Dr. … Accordingly, the "clearly erroneous” rule applies. Id. .The text of the form letter was as follows: Ms.

In Re Kraut

580 A.2d 1305 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 4, 1990

THE COURT: Your fee arrangements, because I don’t know whether he qualifies for free legal— MS. … Thus, we conclude that willful disobedience of a court order has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gorfkle, 444 A.2d at 939-40 .