Case law

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  • Hill v. United States

    541 A.2d 1285 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 31, 1988

    Cesaro, though not qualified as an expert in drag trafficking, testified that drag suspects often leave the scene of a drag transaction after a sale in order to evade arrest. … Hill’s arguments fall far short of establishing plain error. With respect to item (1), Officer Ce-saro was competent to testify about the general practice of the police department of which he himself was a member.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • Speights v. 800 Water Street, Inc.

    4 A.3d 471 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 2010

    “Where there are no eyewitnesses to an accident and the cause thereof cannot be established by direct proof, then the facts which can be established circumstantially may justify an inference by the jury that negligent conditions … We note that this jurisdiction also recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule for admissions by an agent or servant of a party-opponent, and that the waiter's statement, "I didn't see you,” may well have qualified under

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Hoodbhoy v. District of Columbia

    District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 22, 2022

    Second, a special relationship can be established, in the absence of direct or continuing contact, via a statute or regulation that “describe[s] a special duty to a particular class of individuals.” … We then qualified our holding in Klahr, stating that “we need not consider whether this court should create an exception to the public duty doctrine when dangerous patients or inmates escape from confinement.”

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Comford v. United States

    947 A.2d 1181 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 15, 2008

    Appellant claims the trial judge erred by admitting the evidence of his failure to respond to Holt’s implicitly incriminating questions without a sufficient threshold showing that his silence could qualify as an admission … Like appellant’s hearsay claim, his Rule 403 claim requires him to establish plain error.

    Cited 94 timesPublished
  • Matter of JMW

    411 A.2d 345 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 9, 1980

    the legal custody of a public or private agency authorized to care for the delinquent child; (3) commit him for medical, psychiatric or other treatment at an appropriate facility; (4) place him with a relative or other qualified … Not only did Judge Murphy acknowledge this fact, but Judge Pratt's disposition order of June 6 clearly indicates that appellant was committed to the custody of the SRA.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Jones v. United States

    27 A.3d 1130 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 1, 2011

    Consequently, he explained, “all I’m looking at right now is trying to sanitize the prejudicial impact, because I think it clearly has probative value.” … Recognizing that the ballistics evidence would otherwise have little meaning, Judge Satterfield was inclined to let the government “establish that a gun was fired ... during the course of this robbery ... without establishing

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Andrews v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement & Relief Board

    991 A.2d 763 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 18, 2010

    a remand is appropriate so that the *767 Board may consider in the first instance (1) whether to apply some other deadline, and, if the Board determines that petitioner’s claim is not time-barred, (2) whether petitioner qualifies … (explaining that legislative rules are “clearly within the ambit of the rule-making provisions of the DCAPA”). 15 *772 As we have previously observed, “[t]here are no rigid formulas for determining when an official action

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • ANTOINETTE BOLZ v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    149 A.3d 1130 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 8, 2016

    While “fires, accidents, wrecks, [and] explosions” qualify, “parades” are less obviously so categorized. … The assembly of the Occubarn, a 16 by 24 by 30 foot structure, in McPherson Square was clearly a nonroutine event with unpredictable consequences.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Hiligh v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

    935 A.2d 1070 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 8, 2007

    Federal Express argues that the *1075 Board erred in determining that the compensation rate should be Hiligh’s actual average weekly rate at the time he incurred his injury because the Act mandates that qualified claimants … The District of Columbia’s Act clearly states, without exception, “in case of disability total in character, but temporary in quality, 66 2/3% of the employee’s average weekly wages shab be paid.... ” D.C.Code § 32-1508(2

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • AMERICAN BUS ASS'N v. District of Columbia

    2 A.3d 203 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 19, 2010

    If the ultimate use of the revenue benefits the general public then the charge will qualify as a ‘tax,’ while if the benefits are more narrowly circumscribed, the charge will more likely qualify as a ‘fee.’ ” Id. at 12 (citations … District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 809 A.2d 1192 , 1197 n. 4 (D.C.2002) (“[Ojur decisions enable us to pretermit [a jurisdictional] issue where alternative grounds clearly dictate the correct resolution of the appeal

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc. v. Wilner

    760 A.2d 580 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 12, 2000

    In our view, Northrup’s claimed expertise in railroad matters cannot qualify him to decide whether the column is libelous. … Arguably, Northrup could be qualified as an expert witness and permitted to express opinions on the subject of his expertise.

    Cited 83 timesPublished
  • Aikman v. Kanda

    975 A.2d 152 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 25, 2009

    Campos was forced to qualify his opinion; and (2) that Dr. … Conte’s deposition and voir dire testimony did not qualify him to testify about the standard of care.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Suggs v. Lakritz Adler Management, L.L.C.

    933 A.2d 795 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 16, 2007

    This conclusion was clearly correct since the landlord — as the law then stood — had the right to terminate a tenancy at sufferance on thirty days’ notice, thereby achieving the right to possession. 3 Housing regulation violations … It is not challenged that Suggs’s apartment so qualifies.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Turner v. District of Columbia

    532 A.2d 662 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 28, 1987

    acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.’ ” Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1314 (citations omitted). … The Act provides that CPS “shall be administered by a full-time Chief who shall be qualified by reason of training and experience to further the purposes of this act.” D.C.Code § 6-2122(a) (1981).

    Cited 67 timesPublished
  • Coulter v. Gerald Family Care, P.C.

    964 A.2d 170 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 29, 2009

    Abel was qualified to testify on standard-of-care issues presents a somewhat closer question than did the same issue with respect to Dr. Woodyear. As our case law establishes, Dr. … The following colloquy ensued between Coulter’s counsel and the court: Coulter’s Counsel: There’s no ambush Your Honor— The Court: Oh, there clearly is, ... She’s says right here she’s not going to offer an opinion.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Roberts-Douglas v. Meares

    624 A.2d 405 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 3, 1992

    Indeed, the judge ruled that this information would have to be disclosed if the plaintiffs established liability. … The judge’s finding that no such intent was established was not clearly erroneous. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a). .

    Modified by Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 105 (1993)Cited 32 timesPublished
  • Howard v. United States

    867 A.2d 967 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 3, 2005

    United States, 684 A.2d 331 (D.C.1996) because: “The Court never asked the government if it would debrief or immunize the witnesses with prospective Fifth Amendment privileges”; and “it did not take the independent steps … Adams was out there in the group and clearly saw [D.D.] throw the weapon down and clearly saw that Mr. Howard did not.”

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • W.M. v. D.S.C.

    591 A.2d 837 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 21, 1991

    Wurzinger was only minimally qualified to testify as an expert in paternity testing and was unfamiliar with the laboratory used. … by the fact of marriage and may take some time to be established.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • District of Columbia v. Wilson

    721 A.2d 591 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 17, 1998

    the standard of care; the court found “no authority in support of [the District’s] contention that a qualified expert’s opinion can be undermined in this way”). … "The failure to object may be disregarded if the party’s position has previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain that a further objection would be unavailing.” Thoma v.

    Cited 42 timesPublished
  • Quin v. George Washington University

    407 A.2d 580 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 3, 1979

    As we stated: [ I]f a case involves the merits and performance of scientific treatment, complex medical procedures, or the exercise of professional skill and judgment, a jury will not be qualified to determine whether there … Thus, appellant’s evidence, if credited, established negligence in the surgical procedure as the cause of the injury. Compare Quick v.

    Cited 41 timesPublished

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