Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Lasley v. Georgetown University

    688 A.2d 1381 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 1997

    United States, 718 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 , 105 S.Ct. 84 , 83 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (plaintiff failed to show that her immunological reaction to a swine flu inoculation caused the auto-immune … The following exchange during the District Court trial clearly illustrates the insufficiency of Lasley’s proposed inference of causation from comparative risks alone: PLAINTIFF: Let me ask you [Dr.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • In Re Ryan

    670 A.2d 375 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 29, 1996

    enables an alien to obtain permanent resident status through an application to federal labor and immigration agencies, supported by evidence that the applicant has an opportunity for a job which cannot readily be filled by qualified … Disciplinary Violations The standard of review in disciplinary cases is well established.

    Cited 56 timesPublished
  • United States v. Sedgwick

    345 A.2d 465 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1975

    It is from this dismissal that the government has appealed, saying that the trial court clearly misconstrued the Brady case, supra, and its progeny, by declaring a pretrial duty on the part of the prosecution to have released … Mississippi seem to support the view that a ruling based on a “reasonable but erroneous belief” that a trial should not be allowed to proceed does not establish a valid double jeopardy plea in the absence of any judicial

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Towles v. United States

    496 A.2d 560 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 25, 1985

    It seems to me, therefore, that upon retrial of a felony murder charge when the first jury has acquitted of second degree murder, the second jury can properly consider a second degree murder charge only if there is a clearly … The state of mind that was viewed at common law as constituting "malice" was established by the intent to commit the felony.

    Vacated by Towles v. United States, 497 A.2d 793 (1985)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Williams v. United States

    859 A.2d 130 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 2004

    Competency Williams argues that the trial court’s determination that H.T. was competent to testify was clearly erroneous. The determination of competency rests within the trial court’s discretion, Galindo v. … There can be no doubt that a sexual assault qualifies as serious occurrence. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 689 A.2d 1 (D.C.1996).

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Klayman v. Board on Professional Responsibility

    District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 17, 2025

    Klayman requests in his complaint is that the Superior Court dismiss the disciplinary proceeding in its entirety, which clearly implicates the outcome of his case. Second, Mr. … Bar Rules—which, inter alia, establish the Board on Professional Responsibility, D.C. Bar R.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • In Re Weekes

    990 A.2d 470 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 11, 2010

    Weekes about the § 14(g) affidavit, he clearly is not in the same posture as the respondents in Gardner and Susman, supra. Nor is Mr. … Weekes established no bank account with funds belonging to HM over which he was the sole signatory.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Washington Post v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

    852 A.2d 909 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 3, 2004

    Upon that minimal showing, the statutory presumption “operates to establish a causal connection between the disability and the work-related event, activity, or requirement,” such that the disability is compensable. Id. … "In light of the nature of claimant’s job which clearly places a strain on one’s knees,” the examiner reasoned, "claimant cannot be penalized for his decision to work and not seek treatment....

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Myers v. Gaither

    232 A.2d 577 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 10, 1967

    Clearly § 98 was relevant and should have been admitted. … If the District of Columbia law is applicable in the present case, the trial judge clearly erred in refusing to permit the jury to consider this theory of liability.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Brizill v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics

    911 A.2d 1212 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2006

    As registered qualified voters, appellants filed their complaint challenging the VLT Gambling Initiative on May 22, 2006. … However, these very same activities are prohibited by section 1175 of the Johnson Act, which clearly applies to the District of Columbia. 6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (a).

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. United States

    641 A.2d 454 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 4, 1994

    The parties also agree that, to establish entitlement to conditional release, appellant must meet the standard of Hough v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 271 F.2d 458 (1959). … Nonetheless, this court concluded, in words applicable here, that “[t]he judge’s remarks about why it was important for appellant to [remain in] the Hospital and [resume treatment] clearly reveal the judge’s view that there

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Castillo v. United States

    75 A.3d 157 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 2013

    In response to appellant’s objection, the government argued that “this is clearly an excited utterance.... [because Officer Durham] stated [that E.M.] was hysterical. … United States, 859 A.2d 130, 140 (D.C.2004) (“There can be no doubt that a sexual assault qualifies as [a] serious occurrence.”).

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Richardson v. United States

    8 A.3d 1245 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 2, 2010

    United States, 871 A.2d 1199, 1201-02 (D.C.2005), and thus we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial judge’s rejection of alleged newly discovered evidence offered to prove “actual innocence.” … We held that because he never approached the witness about testifying, and could have attempted to broker immunity for the witness, he did not exercise reasonable diligence. Id.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Sarda v. Sarda

    153 A.2d 305 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 7, 1959

    A qualified psychiatrist testified that the husband became his patient on January 20, 1958; that' he treated him on an average of once a week until the first of June when he was .obliged to suspend treatments temporarily … He explained *307 very clearly that the basis of the husband’s impotency was psychogenic.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • KAMONTE J. LESHER v. UNITED STATES

    149 A.3d 519 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 1, 2016

    The Court held that “§ 857(d) establishes objective standards for determining what constitutes drug paraphernalia [,]” rejecting the argument that § 857(d) establishes “a subjective-intent requirement on the part of the defendant … Clearly, the legislature knew how to condition a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia on proof of presence of a controlled substance if it meant to do so.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Sepulveda-Hambor v. District of Columbia

    885 A.2d 303 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 20, 2005

    On appeal, this court held that to qualify for sealing after a matter has proceeded to trial, a “movant must meet an even higher standard than when prosecution terminates before trial.” Id. at 938 . … The trial court’s findings clearly establish probable cause, since at the very least the trial court made clear that the officer was acting in good faith and believed that his order to pull over was being thwarted.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Prince Jones v. United States

    168 A.3d 703 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 21, 2017

    Williams before she was immunized, and is also speculative: It is plausible — indeed, likely — that both the grant of immunity and fact that Ms. … Jones identifies as fruits of the poisonous tree in this appeal clearly fall within these categories, and the government could not have reasonably doubted that Mr. Jones intended to have them suppressed.

    Cited 24 timesPublished
  • JAMES J. DORSEY v. UNITED STATES

    154 A.3d 106 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 23, 2017

    The court reasoned that then-Officer Campanalle was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit because he had arrested individuals for unlawful entry even though (as he acknowledged in his deposition in the case) he had … basis and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.’”

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Ford v. United States

    487 A.2d 580 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 31, 1984

    The government’s case was presented primarily through Ronnie Harris and William Hill, who testified under grants of immunity. … In addition to the fact that their testimony was given under a grant of immunity, it was brought out that both men had shot at Ford and had firebombed Ford’s house.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Melendez v. United States

    10 A.3d 147 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 23, 2010

    Counsel: The fact that he defied a court order I think is relevan[t] when he is someone who is testifying under a grant of immunity. Court: I don’t think so. What’s next[?] … Furthermore, counsel never clearly explained how the proposed inquiry would show that Luna was biased in favor of the government.

    Cited 5 timesPublished

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