Case law

Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp.

849 A.2d 951 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 13, 2004

Under all the circumstances, therefore, we can perceive no vagueness, let alone vagueness attributable to the tenant, and the trial court clearly erred in finding otherwise. … Indeed, persuasive case law firmly establishes that lay persons—while not competent to offer specific diagnoses— can be qualified to testify generally as to whether a person is suffering from mental illness. 31 No more than

JEAN-BAPTISTE BADO v. UNITED STATES

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 16, 2015

Code § 22-3010.01 (a) (establishing a penalty for an adult who engaged in “sexually suggestive conduct” with a minor) and D.C. … The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction qualify as “additional statutory penalties” that transform a petty offense into a serious one.

Cofield v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 15, 2023

Appellants’ competitive areas were established by the administrative order requesting RIF authorization at OCP. … The regulations also require that a qualifying employee be “entered automatically on the reemployment priority list immediately after it has been determined that the employee is to be adversely affected by a reduction

Daniels v. United States

613 A.2d 342 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 24, 1992

In its proffer, the government must show the trial court that the evidence that it proposes to present during the trial would, if believed, clearly and convincingly establish that the uncharged crime occurred and the defendants … clearly and convincingly, as in this ease, it is then “generally conceded,” as we do here, “that the prejudicial effect may be outweighed by the probative value.”

In re Estate of Shorter

444 A.2d 954 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 12, 1982

Martin contends that § 20-334 does not establish a mandatory order of preference, but instead serves as a guideline and is subject to the court’s discretion. … Appel-lee had no constitutional or procedural right to have counsel appointed for her during the hearing. 8 Furthermore, the court’s finding that appellee decided to appear without counsel was not clearly erroneous upon the

McElhone v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n

2 App. D.C. 397 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 1894

The matter alleged in the declaration, supposed to have the effect of waiving the forfeiture, and of re-establishing the contract, can clearly have no such effect. … S., 37 , such limitation is a condition qualifying the right of action, and not a mere limitation on the remedy. The expiration of the time limited by the contract extinguishes the right.

Eaton v. Brown

20 App. D.C. 453 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 4, 1902

But wills cannot be established upon mere speculation that parties did not mean what they said. … a conditional will, his intention to do so must appear clearly.

1303 Clifton Street, LLC v. District of Columbia

39 A.3d 25 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 8, 2012

For example, the owner of a vacant warehouse who wishes to convert his or her building into loft condominiums would qualify for this exemption. … We generally consider three factors in deciding whether to apply judicial estoppel: First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position.

Jones v. Fondufe

908 A.2d 1161 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 5, 2006

The rule clearly establishes four “factors that a trial *1163 court must consider in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to intervene,” McPherson v. Dist. of Columbia Hous. … The statutes pertaining to an action for wrongful death, however, clearly contemplate that any recovery is not an asset of the estate, see Strother v.

Am. MacH. Tool Dist. v. Nat. Perm. Fed. Sav.

464 A.2d 907 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 1983

The evidence failed to establish that National Permanent's employees had reason to know that AMTDA is a corporation. … So clearly you could not be rebutting their testimony, is that correct? [Tr. 1053-54] I said I have not ruled that Mr.

Kingsbury v. United States

520 A.2d 686 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 21, 1987

Defense counsel restated his position that juror number 4 was not qualified, and moved for mistrial. … This interpretation is unsupportable, however, in light of the clearly evidenced preference for uniformity of jury rights in the District of Columbia. Cf. Sweet v.

Wooden v. United States

6 A.3d 833 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 28, 2010

law “clearly supported” 8 the judge’s CDW instruction to the jury. … Clearly, this is not at all the home-defense scenario contemplated in Heller. 47 Not long ago in Sims v.

Kim Long Ko v. United States

722 A.2d 830 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 1998

Ko’s principal contention on appeal is that the interpreters were not properly qualified and that some of them lacked the requisite impartiality. … The Interpreter Act also establishes an “Office of Interpreter Services” (now the OCIS), which is required, inter alia, to set standards and qualifications for interpreters, to maintain a current list of qualified interpreters

Clark v. District of Columbia

708 A.2d 632 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 18, 1997

appellant had failed to prove that KF.’s suicide attempt proximately caused his death, and that appellant’s expert, who was the director of the unit regulating juvenile detention facilities in New Jersey, was not professionally qualified … “Rather, the expert must clearly articulate and reference a standard of care by which the defendant’s actions can be measured.” Id. (emphasis added).

Teasley v. United States

899 A.2d 124 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 25, 2006

The judge stated that she was “satisfied that [complainant’s statements] had the in-dicia of reliability” necessary to qualify them as excited utterances because complainant “used profanity, when he does not ordinarily use … A trial court may admit a statement as an excited utterance if a party presenting the statement establishes the existence of the following three elements: “(1) a startling event which causes a state of nervous excitement

Estate of Patterson v. Sharek

924 A.2d 1005 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 17, 2007

Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411 , 1431 n. 7 (8th Cir.1987) (“failure immediately to appeal the rejection of a qualified-immunity defense does not bar raising it on appeal after trial”); Drayer v. … Regarding appellants’ claim to *1012 adverse possession of the 25-foot-long area in dispute, we will “set aside the trial judge’s findings as to adversity only if they are clearly erroneous and without evidence to support

VILEAN STEVENS & IKE PROPHET v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

150 A.3d 307 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 15, 2016

Appellants contend that the OEA was required to consider the “intent and procedures used” in the RIF, factors that they assert show that the DOH RIF “was clearly intended to be conducted under the [general] RIF statute … for veterans preference under this chapter, and (2) Three years for an employee who qualified for residency preference under this chapter.

Welch v. United States

689 A.2d 1 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 25, 1996

We have established a three-prong test to determine whether statements qualify as an excited or spontaneous utterance: (1) a startling event which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, ( … Gibson’s statements qualified for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. In his Memorandum and Order of July 7,1992, the motion judge concluded that Ms. Gibson’s statements qualified for the exception.

Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Standard Meat Co.

288 A.2d 243 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 6, 1972

These cases are clearly unique in that the instrumentality concerned is self-contained; that is, a capped glass bottle containing an effervescent or carbonated liquid capable of generating considerable pressure. … The tractor had been leased to Standard by Avis under a “full maintenance” agreement whereby Avis furnished the tractor and all the maintenance and Standard furnished a qualified driver.

Haidak v. Corso

841 A.2d 316 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 29, 2004

The court was also clearly concerned with the orderliness and efficiency of the trial. Dr. Hurwitz initially testified on July 23, and, on July 26, Dr. Haidak requested permission to recall him. Dr. … You’re going to have to take him down the rest of the road here to qualify him. You’ve not done that....