Case law

District of Columbia v. American Federation of Government Employees

619 A.2d 77 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 15, 1993

of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. … The Supreme Court concluded that "whilst the District may, in a sense, be called a State, it is such in a very qualified sense.” Id 6 . Kendall v. United States ex rel.

DeVita v. District of Columbia

74 A.3d 714 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 5, 2013

what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” … This opportunity to win by default hardly qualifies as a valued component of procedural fairness.

National Medical Ass'n v. District of Columbia

611 A.2d 53 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 28, 1992

Because of our holding that the NMA real property in question does not qualify under any other exemption provision in section 47-1002, perforce it cannot qualify under this special exemption for the administrative headquarters … Contrary to what the government has suggested, properties may conceivably qualify under multiple "types or categories of exempt purposes." 9 DCMR 322.1(b) (providing that the property shall qualify "for at least one (1) of

Connors, Fiscina, Swartz & Zimmerly v. Rees

599 A.2d 47 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 1991

Finding that Swartz neither believed nor had any reasonable basis to believe these statements, the trial judge concluded that Swartz was not protected by a qualified privilege to make them. … The trial court’s conclusion that it was not Swartz’s misconduct that caused CFSZ’s clients to leave CFSZ is a finding of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See District of Columbia v.

Laumer v. United States

409 A.2d 190 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 5, 1979

Whether Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicate the Trustworthiness of the Statement Having established that the declar-ant is unavailable, a defendant who seeks the admission of a declaration against penal interest … Moreover, a statement rendered under a grant of immunity presents similar weaknesses. See United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir.1977) (statement made under offer of immunity lessens reliability).

Eason v. United States

687 A.2d 922 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 19, 1996

The government clearly stated that Campbell would testify about his analysis of the crime scene based on his experience and training as a homicide detective. … Presumably defense counsel thought the District Court would never qualify the officer as an expert, but the court did qualify him.

Shomaker v. George Washington University

669 A.2d 1291 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1995

To establish pain and suffering, Mr. Sho-maker and his oncologist, Dr. … Appellant argues that the jury award was inadequate and inconsistent in light of the record which, she maintains, clearly established pain and suffering and a higher amount of economic damages.

Dauphin v. Key

11 D.C. 203 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 23, 1880

For the greater security of valuable mail-matter, the Postmaster-General may establish a uniform system *204 of registration. … Congress has the express power to establish post offices and post roads.

Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Samperton & Nolan

374 A.2d 284 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 5, 1977

The order of consolidation was clearly a proper exercise of the court’s discretion. II. … Once a prima facie case has been established liability may still be avoided if the defendant can establish that his conduct was legally justified or privileged. Deoudes v. G.B. Macke Corporation, D.C.

Jung v. George Washington University

875 A.2d 95 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 26, 2005

He contends that both of these witnesses are qualified to testify in the areas for which proffered. … He argues that since the University considered him qualified to sit on the dissertation committee, it follows that he was qualified to sit on the lower level comprehensive examination committee.

Carpenter v. District Unemployment Compensation Board

409 A.2d 175 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 13, 1979

Ordinarily a leaving will be presumed to be involuntary on the part of the claimant unless the facts clearly indicate otherwise. … Where it appears that the leaving was voluntary, the burden of proof shall be on the claimant to establish good cause.

Henry J. Kaufman & Associates, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

503 A.2d 684 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 24, 1986

The employer has filed a petition for review, contending that the record clearly established misconduct, consisting of such behavior as chronic tardiness, refusal to cooperate with co-workers, and falsification of records … On this basis, petitioner argues that misconduct was clearly demon *686 strated and therefore the agency decision should be set aside.

Christmas v. United States

314 A.2d 473 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 1, 1974

The notion that an object which might contain illicit drugs is immune from on-the-spot inspection is not supported by decisions in this jurisdiction. See Wise v. … Hence the Backstrom case is clearly distinguishable from the one before us. . See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).

Hahn v. University of the District of Columbia

789 A.2d 1252 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 17, 2002

The Luden’s doctrine is well established, and we adhere to it in this case. … Hahn was qualified to teach in any other department. 8 Further complicating the matter is the fact that Dr.

Thorne v. United States

55 A.3d 873 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 15, 2012

Thorne’s Orders of Appointment coupled with his admission establishes that he was not on duty or acting within the scope of his duties at the time of his arrest, he plainly does not qualify for this exemption. III. … Thome, however, because it did not address, much less clearly establish, that regulation of the possession of a weapon outside of the home is unconstitutional.

Cleary v. Group Health Association

691 A.2d 148 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 27, 1997

Greenberg, 354 Pa.Super. 346 , 511 A.2d 1371, 1378 (1986) (“only a physician is qualified to determine whether a risk exists and the likelihood of occurrence”). Cf. Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. … While the second step of this determination of materiality clearly does not require expert testimony, the first step almost as clearly does. [] only a physician is qualified to determine whether a risk exists and the likelihood

Carpenter v. United States

475 A.2d 369 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 21, 1984

D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1983 Supp.). 1 On appeal, Bullock, Carpenter and Jefferson argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the substance seized was a Schedule I narcotic. … Although salts of opium are listed in Schedule III, the Schedule I listing includes salts of heroin and is clearly the one that more specifically applies to the seized substance.

In Re Sibley

990 A.2d 483 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 11, 2010

To the contrary, the Court acknowledged that when a finder of fact adopts proposed findings of fact verbatim, the findings may be disturbed only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. … From this, respondent argues that the Florida judges were not immune from being questioned under oath about what they relied upon in sanctioning respondent.

District of Columbia v. Flagg

42 App. D.C. 73 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 6, 1914

Experience has demonstrated that, however learned in the law he may be, and however conscientious he may be, a judge, being removed from the practical affairs of life, is less qualified to determine questions of fact than … as suggested in the case just cited, where the court would be justified in refusing to permit such a witness to testify, but it is the exception to the rule, and should be exercised only in an extreme case, and where it clearly

Bloomberg, Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Tax & Revenue

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 21, 2026

For tax years 2012-17, BLP self- certified as a Qualified High Technology Company (QHTC). See D.C. … “The plain meaning of a statute may not be controlling, however, when there is a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.”