Case law

Lee v. Dunbar

37 A.2d 178 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 14, 1944

Moreover, I think he did prove want of probable cause, and prove it clearly. … We cannot evade this duty; for unless we establish a right in the plaintiff we establish a privilege or immunity in the defendant.”

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. O'Neill

633 A.2d 834 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 8, 1994

The mere fact that an assault occurred on a bus is not enough to establish a breach of the standard of reasonable care, for a “common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers.” … Robbery where the use or threat to use force and/or violence is apparent or clearly indicated. 4. Physical harassment of passenger (s)/employee(s) by a gang (3 or more persons).

Savage v. Burgess

71 A.3d 718 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 25, 2013

Here, the trial court was clearly aware of both its discretionary power and this court’s previous rulings on expert testimony about the national standard of care in medical malpractice cases. … We attach no significance to either appellant’s failure to formally move to qualify Dr. Diamond as an expert or to attempt to question her further.

Barrera v. United States

599 A.2d 1119 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 27, 1991

Milton She-phard did, however, clearly testify that Barrera pulled him into Barrera’s apartment and “pulled [Milton’s] clothes off.” … because a qualified interpreter must be neutral and detached.

May v. River East at Grandview

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 12, 2024

The District has not invoked a sovereign-immunity defense in this case beyond Section 12-309, discussed below, either at trial or in this court, and we therefore do not address whether the District might have had a sovereign-immunity … Appellants contend that they were “clearly intended parties to the contractual agreements” between the developers and the District, but our precedent and the contractual language itself suggests otherwise.

In re F.N.B.

706 A.2d 28 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 29, 1998

On October 25, 1990, A.H.B. signed a stipulation in which she admitted that her residence was not a safe, clean, and proper living environment for F.N.B., that she failed to keep current with immunizations for the child, … At the hearing, the mother’s principal efforts were directed at establishing her present ability to care for F.N.B.

Joel Truitt Management v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights

646 A.2d 1007 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 25, 1994

Please provide certification from a qualified health authority that it is safe to enter your apartment, and that there is no danger of getting the disease and that the apartment is sanitary (no needles, etc. on which they … be prohibited by this chapter shall not be deemed unlawful if it can be established that such practice is not intentionally devised or operated to contravene the prohibitions of this chapter and can be justified by business

McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins

686 A.2d 567 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 23, 1996

Expert testimony Hawkins presented numerous witnesses, qualified as experts in various fields of medicine, to support her case. Dr. … Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 *571 F.Supp. 238, 245 (D.D.C.1986) (elements justifying punitive damages in D.C. must be "clearly established,” which in the context of product liability actions, is equated with the clear and

Hubbard v. Stetson

10 D.C. 113 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 1, 1881

This kind of proof is admissible, but it ought clearly to show that the contract did not express the intention of the parties. The testimony, we think, *117 is inadequate to establish the fact of a loan. … circumstance in the case, aside from what the complainant has said, that is entitled to any weight; but the court cannot attach such an importance to an acknowledgment, coming from a single witness, and which may have been qualified

Hairston v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 2021

She was qualified and appointed on October 4, 2021, to perform judicial duties as a Senior Judge and will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a date to be determined after her successor is appointed and qualifies. … The court was also made aware that  18 the government sought expedited approval to obtain statutory immunity for Petty so that appellant could call her as a witness. 9

In re J. W. Y.

363 A.2d 674 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 1976

Ricks related details of the assault in a manner which clearly portrayed the occurrence of penetration. Cf. Wheeler v. … Under the statutory scheme the grant of immunity rests in the sound discretion of the executive branch of the government. 13 See Earl v.

Stroman v. United States

606 A.2d 767 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 17, 1992

Stroman contends that the trial judge erred in finding that there was an insufficient nexus between the offense committed and appellant’s addiction to qualify for the addict exception. … Clearly, a trial judge possesses “wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed....” Butler v.

Moorehead v. District of Columbia

747 A.2d 138 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 2000

They certainly do not establish that the District had control over SPO Brown in the circumstances presented here. … established, a question of law arises for the court.”

Mesa v. United States

875 A.2d 79 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 12, 2005

for by the Act has never been established. … Mesa’s argument that because the Office of Interpreter Services, authorized in D.C.Code § 2-1911 (2001), 6 has not been established, *90 no qualified interpreter could be provided, and hence, his motion to suppress his statements

Kuhn v. Cissel

409 A.2d 182 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 4, 1979

However, we find § 6-1875 clearly applicable to the facts of this case. … The rule established by S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., supra , is fairly simple and straightforward.

In re R.E.S.

19 A.3d 785 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 19, 2011

Either they did not qualify for placement, did not establish a relationship with [D.T.], did not maintain contact with [D.F.’s] attorney, or did not proceed to permanency. … He has never provided care for D.T., and it is not clear that he is qualified to make a decision about her best interests.

In Re Slattery

767 A.2d 203 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 25, 2001

In disbarring Ruffalo, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that “one who believes that it is proper to employ and pay another to work against the interests of his regular employer is not qualified to be a member of the Ohio … Although the Hearing Committee made a finding that Slattery was a fiduciary of the John Barry Division on the Account, the Board made no such finding because the Hearing Committee's findings did not clearly establish who

In Re Hadzi-Antich

497 A.2d 1062 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 1985

Additionally, competition for academic positions assumes that preference will be given to the most qualified persons, as determined largely by their credentials. … The Board’s recommendation for public censure, based on the circumstances, is clearly excessive. An informal admonition is, in my opinion, a more appropriate sanction.

Adler v. Abramson

728 A.2d 86 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 8, 1999

National Produce Co., 573 A.2d 365, 372 (D.C.1990) (citation omitted); only if that evidence was “clearly apposite to the new issue but not to other matters specified in the pleadings” could WSLP be found to have had adequate … staff salaries, it did so always within the framework of its challenge to Munson’s salary as that of a claimed “executive.” 8 Even if Gibson Dunn intended *92 to raise the broader double-billing issue, its evidence was not “clearly

In Re Estate of Munawar

981 A.2d 584 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 17, 2009

for financing on her own, but then discovered she could qualify on her own and attended the closing by herself. … Nonetheless, there is a "presumption that a deed is what it purports to be on its face, and one who seeks to establish the contrary has the burden of doing so by clear and convincing evidence." Smart v.