Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Carr v. Brown

    395 A.2d 79 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 24, 1978

    While in the present case the appellees’ statements and activities were entitled to some degree of immunity, appellant argues that the malice of appellees denies them the protection of any immunity. … We need not reach the issue of the extent of such immunity in light of our disposition of the appeal. 5 .

    Cited 60 timesPublished
  • Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc.

    472 A.2d 44 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 19, 1983

    In the present case, the alleged libelous statement is clearly an expression of opinion based on a full disclosure of facts in the leaflet, and thus deserving of constitutional protection. … The others, flowing generally from the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine, all deal with immunity from other kinds of civil liability, most of them suits involving alleged anti-trust violations.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Roberson v. District of Columbia Board of Higher Education

    359 A.2d 28 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 17, 1976

    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings that no adverse actions occurred and that no adverse action proceeding was necessary are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous … Spencer, D.C.App., 330 A.2d 250 , 251 n. 1 (1974), and the individual Board members are statutorily immune from liability for money damages under D.C.Code 1973, § 31-1602 (c).

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Ahmed v. District of Columbia Hackers License Appeal Board

    501 A.2d 415 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 1985

    Unfortunately, the Board’s decision fails to state how the facts, as found by the Board, establish a violation of section 350.7. … In Dankman, supra., this court rejected an agency’s interpretation of a clearly phrased regulation, holding that it “served to qualify the rule into oblivion” and was plainly erroneous. 443 A.2d at 514 .

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Critchell v. Critchell

    746 A.2d 282 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 10, 2000

    The protections afforded to spouses of plan participants are found in two ERISA provisions: 1) the qualified joint and qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (survivor annuity); and 2) the qualified domestic relations … “ERISA provides explicit requirements for a spouse's waiver of rights to the 'qualified joint and survivor annuity’ and the 'qualified preretirement survivor annuity’ in a qualified plan.” Rahn, 914 P.2d at 465 .

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia

    930 A.2d 930 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 12, 2007

    Where expert testimony is necessary, “the expert must clearly articulate and reference a standard of care by which *936 the defendant’s actions can be measured.” Clark v. … We will assume, without deciding, that where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of assault and battery and the officer invokes the qualified privilege as an affirmative defense, the officer bears the burdens of production

    Cited 99 timesPublished
  • Sheridan-Kalorama Neighborhood Council v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment

    411 A.2d 959 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 7, 1979

    It is an established maxim of review that an agency’s interpretation of its administrative regulations is to be given great deference and to be upheld unless clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. 5 See, … In support of this position, intervenors cite several sections of the regulations which supposedly “clearly establish” this interpretation.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • In re Nathaniel H.Speights

    District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2017

    Agreeing with the Hearing Committee‟s determination that respondent‟s errors and omissions clearly and convincingly demonstrate his violation of D.C. … Grenier was qualified to give opinions on the standard of care for lawyers in personal injury cases, and then (3) neither objecting to Mr.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Reynard Eaglin v. District of Columbia

    123 A.3d 953 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 27, 2015

    The record establishes, and Mr. … Rather, our cases make plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.”).

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • United States v. Lima

    424 A.2d 113 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 26, 1980

    establish certain requirements relative to identification.” … His conduct is not actionable for any deprivation under color of law of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. See Warner v.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • In re Nathaniel H.Speights

    District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 2017

    Agreeing with the Hearing Committee‟s determination that respondent‟s errors and omissions clearly and convincingly demonstrate his violation of D.C. … Grenier was qualified to give opinions on the standard of care for lawyers in personal injury cases, and then (3) neither objecting to Mr.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United Planning Organization v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights

    530 A.2d 674 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 19, 1987

    Briscoe were comparably qualified is not supported by substantial evidence. … Holloman was more qualified for the position.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Smith v. Swick & Shapiro, P.C.

    75 A.3d 898 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 5, 2013

    ,’ ‘substantially more qualified,’ or ‘significantly better qualified’ than the successful candidate.” … James, 315 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C.2004), which used the term “clearly superior,” as an analytical term. Id. at 116 .

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • American Machine Tool Distributors Ass'n v. National Permanent Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n

    464 A.2d 907 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 1983

    The evidence failed to establish that National Permanent’s employees had reason to know that AMTDA is a corporation. … So clearly you could not be rebutting their testimony, is that correct? [Tr. 1053-54] I said I have not ruled that Mr.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Oparaugo v. Watts

    884 A.2d 63 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 6, 2005

    Rather, he appears to have claimed that the burden was on ap-pellees to establish the law of Nigeria. … Appellant’s amended complaint clearly alleges the nature of the false and defamatory statement, the date of Mrs.

    Cited 164 timesPublished
  • Matthews v. District of Columbia

    387 A.2d 731 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 31, 1978

    State, supra, an action against correctional officials individually (the state had not waived sovereign immunity), the court held that there was no showing that ordinary negligence on the part of prison officials had permitted … Gaither, however, presents a situation that is clearly distinguishable from that in the present case.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Gray v. United States

    600 A.2d 367 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 24, 1991

    The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony; we will disturb the trial court’s ruling on appeal only if the ruling is “clearly erroneous.” Jones v. … He has been qualified as an expert on the sale and distribution of narcotics in the District of Columbia in numerous prior court proceedings.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • In Re Durosko Marital Trust

    862 A.2d 914 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 2, 2004

    However, Article 8 actually relates to the Family Trust, while Article 9 provides for the establishment of the Marital Trust, which Durosko stated was intended to be "an irrevocable qualified terminal interest property trust … Durosko argues that Articles 3 and 9 are impossible to perform because they purport to establish an irrevocable qualified terminal interest property (QTIP) trust which requires a surviving spouse as beneficiary, not the settlor

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Carter v. United States

    614 A.2d 913 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 18, 1992

    Location of the Observation Post In the District of Columbia it is well established that “the government has a qualified privilege to withhold the exact location of an observation post.” Thompson v. … Day had similarly failed to establish the requisite need to overcome the government’s qualified privilege.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • Brooking v. Lemon

    96 A.2d 849 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 21, 1953

    Under all the circumstances the question of malice was clearly one for the jury. 3. Appellant contends that he was entitled to an instructed verdict because probable cause was established as a matter of law. … Johnson, 25 App.D.C. 155 , where it was said, “The appellant relies upon the advice of counsel as establishing probable cause.

    Cited 4 timesPublished

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