Case law

Owen v. Board of Directors of Washington City Orphan Asylum

888 A.2d 255 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 22, 2005

Thus, the Trustees cannot immunize their conduct under the terms of the VPA. The Act affords immunity to those “acting within the scope of [their] responsibilities in the nonprofit organization.” … As such, immunity is not available to the Trustees under D.C.Code § 29-301.113. 17 .

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Public Service Commission

486 A.2d 682 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 1984

The record clearly establishes the economic desirability of conversion, and we agree that PEPCO should have begun its evaluation far sooner. … WMA-TA’s immunity remains inviolate. C.

Karriem v. Gray

623 A.2d 112 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 6, 1993

Jordan, 918 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir.1990) (allegation of discrimination: qualified immunity where police entered private home pursuant to a facially valid search warrant; a plaintiff must assert specific “facts supporting … Even if the government should have cited § 508.4, any mistake was not material because the text of the letter clearly explained appellant’s position and what he had to do to get his license back. See Mannan v.

Thomas v. United States

914 A.2d 1 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 2006

We agree with amicus that “it is difficult to imagine a statement more clearly testimonial.” Brief of Amicus Curiae at 5. … Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are. [Citations omitted.]

Crescent Properties v. Inabinet

897 A.2d 782 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 20, 2006

Crescent Properties argues that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. … Neither of these findings was clearly erroneous. There was testimony that, following her hospitalization, Ms. Inabinet’s daughter had never returned to Ms.

Tovar v. Regan Zambri Long, PLLC

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 27, 2024

Tovar could not  6 meet his burden of establishing that Regan’s alleged error proximately caused him injury. Mr. … Judgmental Immunity Mr. Tovar contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the judgmental immunity doctrine.

Dankman v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics

443 A.2d 507 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 13, 1981

registered qualified elector. … registered qualified elector.

Brown v. United States

864 A.2d 996 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 6, 2005

In the ensuing discussion, the court voiced uncertainty about the basis of Sandra Brown’s Fifth Amendment privilege because it had not been clearly communicated. Mrs. Brown’s attorney then said that Mrs. … “The right of a defendant to establish a defense by presenting his own witnesses is a fundamental element of due process of law.” United States v. Simmons, 216 U.S.App.

District of Columbia v. Gallagher

734 A.2d 1087 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 29, 1999

Mayor shall comply with any qualifying court order that is issued prior to the employee’s retirement,” while section l-3003(e) provides that “[t]he May- or shall comply with any qualifying court order that is issued after … Other parts of the Act clearly show that the Council know how to use mandatory (or prohibitory) language when it so desired.

Joyner v. Estate of Johnson

36 A.3d 851 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 9, 2012

At trial, Jacob Thomas was qualified as an expert witness over appellant’s objection. … In short, appellant does not satisfy his heavy burden of showing that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous or unsupported by the evidence at trial. See Hinton, 917 A.2d at 101 .

Miller v. American Coalition of Citizens With Disabilities, Inc.

485 A.2d 186 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 1984

Appellant clearly alleges "surmountable barrier” discrimination, since she argues on appeal that ACCD failed to provide "reasonable accommodation.” 8 . … In Prewitt , the court held that, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, this regulation shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer to establish an inability to accommodate the handicapped

McFarland v. George Washington University

935 A.2d 337 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 8, 2007

Goldin, 62 F.Supp.2d 118, 127 (D.D.C.1999) (plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for a job upgrade, so summary judgment was appropriate). Even if we assume that Mr. … McFarland was much better qualified than Ms. Hunter.

District of Columbia v. Walker

689 A.2d 40 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 1997

The District argues that the evidence did not establish that the MPD officers in this case were grossly negligent with reference to that standard. Mr. … Walker did not make a sufficient showing either to establish a national standard of care for training or to prove proximate cause.

Ingber v. Ross

479 A.2d 1256 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 1984

Clearly, the statements by Dr. Ingber to a patient enjoyed a qualified privilege because Dr. … Ross are clearly slander per se. The trial court found that Dr. Ingber’s statements imputed to Dr.

1420 Park Road Parking, Inc. v. Consolidated Mutual Insurance

168 A.2d 900 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 30, 1961

In this suit for damages the trial court ruled that appellant qualified as a bailee for hire in the operation of its business, and as such was bound to absolve itself of responsibility for the loss. … Clearly, the relationship of bailment is not established by this fact; the determining factor is the exercise, of control.

Morgan v. Foretich

528 A.2d 425 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1987

“Noncompliance cannot be justified by seeking to establish that the judgment was improvident. Rather, justification is established only upon a showing of inability to perform or substantial performance.” Bolden v. … Morgan contends that the trial court’s findings with regard to the abuse issue were clearly erroneous.

Sidur v. Thall

31 A.2d 873 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 11, 1943

The proposed cross-examination had no relation to any issue in the present case and was clearly a collateral matter. … “The test of whether a fact inquired of in cross-examination is collateral is this: Would the cross-examining party be entitled to prove it as part of his case, tending to establish his plea ?”

Cheryl Rivera v. Jack Lew

99 A.3d 269 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 11, 2014

In fact, the Plan‟s Designation of Beneficiary form clearly states that . . . the beneficiary designation does not affect the rights of any survivors who may qualify for annuity benefits.” … Death, like retirement, establishes the demarcation line. Under federal law, posthumous orders purporting to amend a settlement agreement were expressly rendered unenforceable by a 1986 amendment of the U.S.

Hively v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

681 A.2d 1158 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 22, 1996

Therefore, we will defer to the decision of DOES regarding the construction of the terms of the Act unless it is clearly erroneous. D. … Based on these statutory principles, the petitioner argues that being disabled for the preceding year qualifies as “continuously” disabled.

Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr

616 A.2d 1254 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 30, 1992

This evidence was more than adequate to establish Mr. Moyni-han’s qualifications as an expert witness in the fields in which he qualified. … Some of the opinions of the expert were clearly admissible, and therefore there was no prejudice to appellant in this case. 4 . In 1977, Mrs.