Case law

Emma M. Govan v. Julie Ebner Brown

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 28, 2020

Ebner “clearly understood” the nature of the conversation. Ms. Brown testified to conversations that she had with Mr. Ebner in March, May, and October 2013 during which Mr. … Brown failed to establish that Mr. Ebner lacked testamentary capacity.

Patton v. United States

633 A.2d 800 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 22, 1993

This case resembles In re M.L.H., 399 A.2d 556 (D.C.1979), where “[t]he trial court ruled that the detective’s testimony [about what appellant’s mother had told him] qualified as one of the [recognized] exceptions [to the … Once an illegal seizure is established, the government bears the burden of proving “that the causal chain was sufficiently attenuated by an independent act to *817 dissipate the taint of the illegality.” Id.; Brown v.

INDIRA POOLA v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY

147 A.3d 267 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 29, 2016

It does not, however, establish that Dr. … Importantly, however, we observed that “the evidence at trial did not establish that all the property acquired by Dr.

Nathan P. Jackson v. United States

157 A.3d 1259 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 13, 2017

Did the Statute Clearly and Obviously Violate the Second Amendment? … It is questionable whether, if generalized, this is an accurate statement of the law—the majority relies on a truncated quotation from Joseph that leaves out two important qualifiers.

Heath v. United States

26 A.3d 266 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 21, 2011

Edwards did not remember seeing him there, and there is no evidence establishing that she did see him. Further, Dr. … Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir.2001) ("Because this evidence was critical to her ability to defend against the charge, we hold that the exclusion of this evidence violated petitioner’s clearly established constitutional

Eady v. United States

44 A.3d 257 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 24, 2012

Thus, the trial court’s premise that the jury had to find that appellant had a prior conviction was clearly erroneous. … Appellant also challenges his convictions on the grounds that: (1) admission of out-of-court statements made by appellant's mother to the investigating officers violated the Confrontation Clause and did not qualify for any

Goodall v. United States

686 A.2d 178 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 27, 1996

R. 8(a), joinder was clearly proper; all the counts arose out of the same act, namely Goodall’s alleged possession of the weapon and ammunition. … The second cautionary instruction, given during final instructions to the jury, also made explicit that the felony conviction could not be used to establish guilt “on any other counts.”

Corporate Accountability Lab v. Sambazon, Inc.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 14, 2025

Further, Sambazon claims that “by creating our own responsibly managed supply chain . . . we can establish a direct connection between our farmers and our consumers. . . . … Thus, the plaintiff in that case clearly alleged a relationship between herself and the defendant. Here, on the other hand, CAL did not allege that it had any relationship with Sambazon.

In re Paul S. Haar

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 24, 2022

Analysis Preliminarily, we address Disciplinary Counsel’s argument that the Board exceeded its authority and “followed a pattern established in recent disciplinary cases . . . … [but we] did not consider [his] testimony dishonest,” is undoubtedly a credibility assessment that should have been accorded deference, and the Board’s deference was at least qualified by its “reject[ion] of any suggestion

Khan v. Orbis Business Limited

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 18, 2020

“Likely To Succeed on the Merits”  15 Since appellees’ conduct qualifies for the protections of the Anti-SLAPP Act, the burden shifts to appellants to show “that the[ir] claim … While Subsection (c)(1) clearly and unambiguously requires that discovery proceedings be stayed once a special motion to dismiss is filed, the language of Subsection (c)(2) requires further analysis.

Steinke v. P5 Solutions, Inc.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 22, 2022

Steinke qualified as an “employee” under the Act during the relevant time period. … At that point, Steinke was clearly a dependent employee. This change in the parties’ relationship highlights the fact 9 Cf.

Council of School Officers v. Vaughn

553 A.2d 1222 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 31, 1989

Vaughn pointed to his limited role, having nothing to do with implementation or enforcement of the award, and maintained further that he was immune from suit. … The court added that an unconfirmed award may be a bar to a subsequent action, and is "clearly not a nullity." Id. at 85 n. 1, 166 A.2d at 270 n. 1. Emporium and the present case are obviously not on all fours.

Mayo v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 23, 2024

But the Court stressed that the use of force must be accompanied by the “objectively manifest[ed] . . . intent to restrain,” and that “[a]ccidental force will not qualify” as a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. at 317. … At most, the facts establish that GRU officers had an inchoate and unparticularized hunch that Mr. Mayo was carrying a weapon.

Johnston v. Hundley

987 A.2d 1123 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 28, 2010

. *1128 Turning to the underpinnings of the damages award, we are unable to conclude, as Johnston urges us, that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Johnston dragged his feet in selling the property. 4 The court … He relies on case law suggesting that "[l]he owner of ... land ... is generally held to be qualified to express his opinion of its value merely by virtue of his ownership.

Jackson v. United States

76 A.3d 920 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 26, 2013

Jackson, again prior to his convictions here, otherwise would have qualified for a registration and license, then the only reason Mr. … Jackson clearly was charged with committing a violent crime with the pistol, and the jury convicted him of all of the charges against him.

Neighbors for Responsive Government v. DC Bd. of Zoning & DC Dept. of General Services

195 A.3d 35 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 18, 2018

District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 334 A.2d 175, 178 n.10 (D.C. 1975) (“While agencies are not always bound to accept expert testimony over lay testimony, the opinions of qualified experts are not to be lightly … Our opinion upholding the Commission’s order cited its “correct reading and application of our case law, including Monaco, . . . which clearly stated that the Commission may be more flexible when it assesses a non-profit

School Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia

764 A.2d 798 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 4, 2001

Subchapter VII establishes the franchise tax for corporations and financial institutions; subchapter VIII establishes the franchise tax for unincorporated businesses. … to the same extent that would be allowable if the business were incorporated. 9 DCMR § 119.2 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., D.C.Code § 5-1404(a) (1994) (“Any incorporated or unincorporated business entity ... shall be qualified

Atchison & Bloomfield v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 19, 2021

Admission of the evidence would not have left the jurors to speculate that an (unidentified) third person (rather than appellants) was involved in the shooting; rather, it would have enabled jurors to recognize (perhaps more clearly … Bloomfield “in front of the location,” the detective was not an expert qualified to read the report, the jury was instructed to rely solely on the verified data presented through Ashley Fuller’s testimony, and the report

Holbrook v. District of Columbia

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 23, 2021

We note, however, that those federal authorities seem to have been abrogated by 2012 amendments to the federal Whistleblower Protection Act which clarify that reports to the wrongdoer herself may yet qualify as protected … That does not clearly convince us that Snow’s termination was independent of his protected conduct.

Katayoon Bereston v. UHS of Delaware, Inc. & District Hospital Partners, LP, d/b/a George Washington University Hospital

180 A.3d 95 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 8, 2018

Bereston‘s role was, in part, that of a compliance officer does not mean she was immune from questioning and critical evaluation of her 58 See, e.g., Simpson v. … For any new exception, Carl established two criteria: (1) a ―clear showing‖ that ―a new exception is needed,‖ derived from an ―identifiable policy . . .