Case law

Davis v. District of Columbia

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 2021

Reorganization Act of 1970 shall serve for a term of fifteen years, and upon completion of such term, such judge shall continue to serve until the judge’s successor is appointed and qualifies.”). … Omotoso said the cost method “over time . . . will clearly not reflect market values of properties driven largely by income generating potentials.” This, like Ms.

Mitchell v. United States

746 A.2d 877 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 2, 2000

However, that possibility without more did not render such legal and widely sold items sufficiently incriminating to establish probable cause. … We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous.” Lawrence v.

Marshall v. DC RENTAL HOUSING COM'N

533 A.2d 1271 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 2, 1987

While the decision indicates that it would be the landlord's burden to show all these factors existed such that the vacancy increase qualified as an exception to the rule that such increases be taken only from units in the … Daisy Marshall clearly alleged the following (1) "[t]he ceiling filed with the Rental Accommodations Office for my/our unit(s) is improper," (2) "[t]he rent increase was higher than the amount of increase which was allowed

Stansbury v. Inglehart

20 D.C. 134 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 19, 1889

Clearly, in such a case, there was nothing in his imputed function of protector that implied also a power to take that foundation away. … ; for he who enjoyed the infant’s estate was the properest person to educate and maintain him in his infancy; and also, in a political view, the lord was most concerned to give his tenant suitable education, in order to qualify

In Re Ml

28 A.3d 520 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 8, 2011

Ultimately, Magistrate Judge Nooter found that the government had established, *524 by a preponderance of the evidence, that M.L. was a neglected child within the meaning of both D.C.Code §§ 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) and (iii). … Unlike the record in Kendall, the record here clearly demonstrates that Dr. King and Dr.

Burn v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 20, 2020

Tops’s hearsay statements; the testimony clearly conveyed the substance of those statements to the jury. The government’s questions repeatedly indicated that Dr. … “If, in the opinion of the [Chief Medical Examiner], or the United States Attorney, further investigation as to the cause and manner of death is required,” then an OCME or other qualified forensic pathologist must perform

United States v. Harris

629 A.2d 481 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jul 29, 1993

With regard to the consent issue, the judge concluded that: (1) because of the conflicting testimony about how the police entered the apartment building, see supra note 2, the government had failed to establish that the police … To qualify as “hot pursuit," a warrantless entry must involve "immediate or continuous pursuit of the [suspect] from the scene of a crime,” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 , 104 S.Ct. at 2099 , although "an extended hue and cry in

In Re EH

718 A.2d 162 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 1, 1998

We conclude that the judge's dispositive findings were not clearly erroneous and that there was no error of law. Accordingly, we affirm. I. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS A. General background. … It is a power which a government dedicated to freedom for the individual should exercise with extreme care, and only where the evidence clearly establishes its necessity. Id. at 783.

Johnnie Coleman v. United States

202 A.3d 1127 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 7, 2019

F.C., 33 A.3d 403, 406–08 (D.C. 2011) (stating that a petitioner seeking a CPO need not establish a prior relationship with the respondent). … This creates a perverse “one free stalk” situation that is clearly not what the D.C.

Charles E. Mobley, Dante Carpenter, Gerald A. Thompkins v. United States

101 A.3d 406 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 16, 2014

We agree, and the trial testimony clearly shows that Officers Bishop and Sulla were in the line of fire with respect to shots fired.11 Furthermore, both Mr. Carpenter (who had a shoulder 11 Mr. … re Taylor, 75 A.3d 85, 100 (D.C. 2013)) (“[T]he alleged [instructional] error . . . concerns only one element of one of the charged offenses” and does not fall into the “‘limited class of constitutional errors [that] qualify

Jennings & Turner v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 26, 2026

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we review the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to … First, the parties are correct that a criminal case in federal district court does not qualify as an “official proceeding” under D.C.’s obstruction of justice statute.

Darren Cheeks v. United States

168 A.3d 691 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 7, 2017

The trial judge had correctly instructed that to establish the mens rea element of ASBI, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ―Mr. Plater and/or Mr. … The court‘s brief and non-specific response did not directly and clearly dispel this probable confusion about an essential element of the charged offense.

Hartridge v. United States

896 A.2d 198 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 23, 2006

Paris, or establish the murder of Mr. … The record shows that the government granted immunity to Ms. Boxley-Davis. Therefore, she was available for cross-examination by counsel for Mr. Ford.

Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council

327 A.2d 310 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 22, 1974

The valuation of a specific piece of property clearly involves adjudicative facts. The SRA, nevertheless, allows for de novo consideration of this issue in Superior Court. … Thus, while it establishes separate procedures for rulemaking (D.C.Code 1973, §§ *321 1-1505 to 1507) and contested cases (D.C.

Jean-Baptiste Bado v. US (en banc)

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 2018

The Court, however, declined to hold that all such offenses ―automatically qualif[y] as [] ‗petty‘ offense[s],‖ and established that the presumption can be overcome ―if [the accused] can demonstrate that any additional … Holder, 714 F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit focused on the fact that an unadmitted alien convicted of a deportable ―crime of moral turpitude‖ can qualify for a so-called ―petty offense exception‖ to removal,

Harris v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 7, 2021

Analysis Appellant argues that the trial court clearly erred in rejecting his Batson challenge for two “independently reversible reasons.” … We cannot say that the trial court “clearly err[ed]” in rejecting the Batson challenge to the strike of Juror 214. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477. 3.

Palmore v. United States

290 A.2d 573 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 28, 1972

We begin with the established proposition that Congress, at least with respect to courts in the District, is enabled by the District Clause (U.S.Const., art. … Thus, they would be immune from the “spot check” to enforce a requirement deemed necessary by Congress for public safety on the District’s highways.

United States v. Zackary Jackson

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 22, 2019

GPS monitoring is used to enforce curfews, establish prohibited/restricted areas, and assess and monitor offender movement in the community. … The release of parole supervision records to further a criminal investigation has been held to qualify as a routine use under the Privacy Act, see United States v.

Ingram v. United States

592 A.2d 992 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 1991

I think the evidence is clearly there to suggest that he planned it. … The evidence at trial established these facts, and nothing presented at trial suggested that the grand jury was not privy to them.

District of Columbia Public Schools v. District of Columbia Department of Employee Services

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 28, 2021

Karim filed a workers’ compensation claim with the public-sector workers’ compensation program—which we refer to simply as “the program”— established by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA). … Frazier clearly held the CMPA presents “no bar to ORM’s adoption” of rules divesting ALJs and the CRB of their prior authority to review schedule awards, and vesting that authority in ORM’s Chief Risk Officer and D.C.