Case law

Board of Directors v. Board of Trustees

798 A.2d 1068 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 23, 2002

We review the underlying factual determinations under the clearly erroneous standard. See Gaetan v. Weber, 729 A.2d 895, 897 (D.C.1999). … may continue in office, discharging the duties of the same, until the second Tuesday in October next, at which time, and on the same day in each year thereafter, said corporation, by those who from their by-laws may be qualified

In Re SS

821 A.2d 353 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 17, 2003

The great-aunt also took S.S. to Children's Hospital. [7] Suzanne Levin, M.D., a board-certified pediatrician at Children's Hospital, was qualified without objection as an expert on pediatrics and child abuse. Dr. … United States, 710 A.2d 866 , 868 n. 3 (D.C.1998) (quoting Yee ). [14] The judge also found the evidence sufficient to establish that S.S.

United States v. Debruhl

993 A.2d 571 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 2010

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, did not disagree with this conclusion but instead noted the limited impact this would have because "the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches … Chanthasowcat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir.2003) ("[T]he good faith exception established by United States v.

Thomas v. United States

50 A.3d 458 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Apr 12, 2012

In Stogner , the Court thought that the California law in question clearly fell within the second of Justice Chase’s categories. … [and] [t]he State makes no contract with criminals ... that they shall have immunity from punishment if not prosecuted within the statutory period.” Id. at 62.

Matter of JAG

443 A.2d 13 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 8, 1982

Although this testimony established that J.A.G. "could" attend "UDC" or the "D. C. … Clearly, his status was indeed aftercare.

In Re IJ

906 A.2d 249 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 17, 2006

Moreover, we have on occasion said that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, "custody is clearly more than seizure alone." … See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (concluding in a habeas petition of state court conviction that state court's failure to consider the suspect's age is not "an unreasonable application of clearly established

Winston Manual Perez Hernandez v. US (Opinion)

207 A.3d 594 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 9, 2019

Tarawallie’s eye or eyes. 6 The defense also established that the beer bottle Mr. … Our jurisdiction might be well-served by a statutory scheme that more clearly defines and distinguishes between inchoate “assaults” and crimes where completed physical contact causes injury.

IN RE TA.L. IN RE A.L. IN PETITION OF R.W. & A.W. IN RE PETITION OF E.A.A.H. AND T.L.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 8, 2016

CFSA also did not make any attempts to contact E.A. and qualify her as a kinship placement. … The trial court stated that it gave “weighty consideration” to the biological parents’ preference for E.A. to adopt A.L. and Ta.L., but that evidence presented at trial clearly established that the children’s primary attachments

Bost v. United States

178 A.3d 1156 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 15, 2018

This does not require “that the information within the statement be clearly corroborated” but “only that there be corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement itself.” … On this record, those findings are not clearly erroneous.

In re J.W.

837 A.2d 40 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 4, 2003

In this case, appellant’s culpability has been established beyond a reasonable doubt by his conviction of sexually abusing the child’s sibling. … Code § 16-2301 (9)(A)(v) ( Supp. 2003)); see generally In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771 , 778 n. 10 (D.C. 1990) (concluding that biological half-siblings qualify as "siblings” under § 16-2301(9)(E)). .

Murray v. Motorola, Inc.

982 A.2d 764 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 10, 2009

Riegel and its predecessors effectively foreclose plaintiffs’ argument that a lawsuit for damages is immune from preemption altogether because it "do[es] not seek ... to impose new or different technical standards” and merely … Some thirty years later, the Supreme Court observed that federal regulation of certain "technical matters” of radio communication is "clearly exclusive.” Head v. N.M.

Speight v. United States

569 A.2d 124 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Nov 28, 1989

Abandoning that approach, as it must, the plurality relies on an equally faulty ground that because a statutory scheme has a rational basis it is’ immune from constitutional due process attack even when an individual defendant … Our position is consistent with the general rule established vis-a-vis the analogous situation of repeat offender statutes.

Miller v. United States

14 A.3d 1094 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 3, 2011

At trial, after invoking his privilege against self-incrimination and receiving immunity for his testimony before the grand jury, Lindsey testified that his evidence before that body had all been a lie. … Whether the defendant has established a violation by the government of its obligations under Brady presents a mixed question of fact and law.

Paz Cruz v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 3, 2017

Cruz asserted that he would ―voluntarily‖ submit to ―treatment for chronic alcoholism,‖ and asked the court to ―conduct a civil hearing‖ to determine whether he qualified for alcoholism treatment in lieu of prosecution … It might be that the trial court thought the PSA officer‘s representation established that Mr. Cruz did not want alcoholism treatment. Given, however, that the trial court did not state that it was rejecting Mr.

DC Dept. of Public Works v. DC Office of Human Rights & Jeffrey Dickerson

195 A.3d 483 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 18, 2018

establishe[d] a pattern of conduct within DPW’s [Parking Services Administration (“PSA”)] by Mr. … But courts should be “hesitan[t] to engage in judicial micromanagement of business practices by second-guessing employers’ decisions about which of several qualified employees will work on a particular assignment.”

People's Counsel v. Public Service Commission

474 A.2d 1274 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Mar 28, 1984

Although DCAPA § 1-1508 clearly falls in the second category, it is critical to an understanding of this case to review the manner in which courts have dealt with the first, as well as the second, method of restricting review … The preclusion provision of § 1-1508 was not intended to immunize from review agency action that otherwise would be reviewable; the fact the action is announced in the context of dismissing a declaratory order petition is

District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste of Maryland, Inc.

758 A.2d 1 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 10, 2000

Hines, 439 A.2d 496 , *8 506-07 (D.C.1981)) (“adopting] a two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Carson v. … “[I]f the ultimate use of the revenue benefits the general public then the charge will qualify as a ‘tax,’ while if the benefits are more narrowly circumscribed then the charge will more likely qualify as a ‘fee.’ ” Valero

In Re Ukwu

926 A.2d 1106 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 2007

The Hearing Committee appears to have accepted Respondent’s explanations, at least to the extent that the Committee concluded that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent had intentionally … The Hearing Committee qualified its finding by noting that "[c]ontradictorily, Mr.

Banks v. Hoffman

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 7, 2023

Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (“‘[B]aseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.’” (quoting Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)). … The Superior Court reasoned that the Report “clearly addresses [appellants’] performance of their official duties,” but appellants assert that they did their work on the PENS Task Force during their free time as volunteers

Richardson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance

826 A.2d 310 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 12, 2003

On the basis of these representations, nearly every state, including Ohio, allowed the introduction of this new, qualified pollution exclusion.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id. … These clauses were clearly intended to exculpate insurance companies from liability for massive environmental cleanups required by CERCLA and similar legislation. See generally Jeffrey W.