Case law

J. H. Marshall & Associates, Inc. v. Burleson

313 A.2d 587 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 1973

However, the holding in that case is clearly limited. … “[A] lawyer should aid in establishing, as well as enforcing, standards of conduct adequate to protect the public by insuring that those who practice law are qualified to do so.”

Wint v. United States

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 15, 2022

We have never established a per se rule that any new fact introduced in rebuttal warrants surrebuttal as a matter of right. … Here, as the majority acknowledges, the government’s rebuttal clearly went beyond mere extraneous new facts and met the “new matter” threshold established in Gregory. See ante at 20-21. Mr.

District of Columbia v. Washington & Georgetown Railroad

12 D.C. 361 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 9, 1882

designed'to be-included It is equally true that courts, to arrive at the correct meaning of a statute, will examine its language throughout, and will import words from all portions of it, to qualify the meaning of the whole … But this principle cannot properly be held to embrace all suits brought by the District of Columbia, in view of the comprehensive language of the statutes establishing the form of government in force here.

Wolf v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment

397 A.2d 936 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 23, 1979

Judicial review with respect to those determinations is in general best made, we think, under the well established rule of deference to administrative expertise. … The failure of the BZA to identify the ANC as the source of the aforementioned concern *945 clearly did not prevent the Board from coming “to grips” with that concern in its findings.

Joya v. United States

53 A.3d 309 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 2012

28 Asking the jury to find that appellant encouraged or assisted the robbery in these ways would not be asking them to resolve factual issues that the first jury already resolved, 29 even *323 though such conduct might qualify … The trial judge clearly instructed the jury that it need not find that appellant "personally committed each of the acts that make up the crime.”

Chatmon v. United States

801 A.2d 92 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 27, 2002

The judge clearly was concerned not only by the gory photographs themselves, but also by the manner in which the prosecutor used them during closing and rebuttal. … But it was qualified with regard to hair ... and then [the jury] ... get[s] to hear that Mr. Chatmon got his hair cut. And I think that’s powerful evidence that harmed Mr.

Holderbaum v. POLICE & FIREFIGHTERS R&R BD.

579 A.2d 213 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 1990

In Wells, supra, while reaffirming that "[a] petitioner must ... establish disability from performing any job in the category [ i.e., in his grade or class] before qualifying for retirement," 459 A.2d at 138 , quoting Seabolt … the tape's contents. [4] As suggested above, a finding of malingering in 1985 would not, by itself, prove that petitioner was feigning the degree of his disability in the period immediately before his termination, but it clearly

Tydings v. Tydings

567 A.2d 886 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 13, 1989

Following a hearing, the trial court issued a judgment setting forth and applying the criteria established by this court's past decisions for the award of fees. … As the trial court recognized, this court's decisions have established a two-step inquiry in cases in which a fee is awarded: first, whether to award a fee, and if so, to whom.

Byers v. United States

649 A.2d 279 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 20, 1994

the court found no abuse of discretion in the Board’s holding that under the particular facts of the case, the testimony of an alleged co-conspirator, who had chosen to remain silent during earlier proceedings, failed to qualify … If appellant failed to object at trial, we reverse only “if the misconduct is so clearly prejudicial to [his] substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of [the] trial.” Id.; Sherrod v.

King v. Kidd

640 A.2d 656 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Aug 26, 1993

But this conclusion is clearly contrary to the law on intentional infliction of emotional distress as established by our decisions, as will now be explained. … I agree with the majority that the trial court clearly erred in submitting the case on appellant Lambert to the jury.

Jean-Baptiste Bado v. US (en banc)

186 A.3d 1243 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 2018

Holder , 714 F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit focused on the fact that an unadmitted alien convicted of a deportable "crime of moral turpitude" can qualify for a so-called "petty offense exception" to removal, … that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (c)(2) (2018) (providing for withholding of removal if the non-citizen establishes

Payne v. United States

516 A.2d 484 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 15, 1986

Application of these well-established principles requires that we reject appellants’ arguments. … “Kevin" was never identified conclusively, and his relationship to anyone else connected with the case was never established. 10 .

Union Market Neighbors v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and Foulger-Pratt Development, LLC

197 A.3d 1063 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 13, 2018

Although Congress did not establish our court under Article III of the Constitution, we generally apply the constitutional case or controversy requirement and the prudential standing prerequisites. … When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order.” Wisconsin-Newark Neighborhood Coal. v.

Dodek v. Cf 16 Corp.

537 A.2d 1086 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Feb 11, 1988

Analytically, of course, the question of what the parties intended is clearly a question of fact. But the courts have long called it a question of law. … Clearly, MBC and CF 16 could not simultaneously have been the "successor and assign" of the Dodek contracts.

In re Stephen T.Yelverton

105 A.3d 413 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Dec 24, 2014

We have said that “baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment Right to Petition.” In re Ditton, 980 A.2d 1170, 1173 n.3 (D.C. 2009) (quoting McDonald v. … Evidence is “clear and convincing” if it is sufficient to establish “a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Id. (quoting In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 358 (D.C. 2004)).

In re M.M.D.

662 A.2d 837 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1995

Section 16-312, which announces the “legal effects” of adoption, does not apply unless and until a petitioner qualifies for adoption under § 16-302, which prescribes “who may adopt.” … The court added that, by permitting adoption by an unmarried person, “the Legislature clearly sanctioned adoption into 'non-standard’ families.”

Campbell-Crane & Associates, Inc. v. Stamenkovic

44 A.3d 924 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 31, 2012

Campbell raised Stamenkovic’s salary to $45,034 after he informed her he could not qualify for refinancing because his income was too low. … See Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 907 (defining nominal damages as “a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages”

Welch v. United States

466 A.2d 829 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Sep 2, 1983

One of the specifically established exceptions to both the warrant and probable cause requirements is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. … Consent “must be proved by clear and positive testimony, and it must be established that there was no duress or coercion, actual or implied.

Drevenak v. Abendschein

773 A.2d 396 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 24, 2001

The trial judge credited the testimony of the defense experts, generally, because they were “more qualified....” … Lewis was a qualified expert,” and gave great weight to the fact that “he’d done total knee replacements about two or three thousand times and that he gets referrals from other surgeons of their patients.

Williams v. United States

884 A.2d 587 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Oct 13, 2005

abused its discretion by denying his motion to sever their trials, which was predicated on co-defendant Williams’s offer to provide exculpatory testimony on Smalls’s behalf, provided that, in so doing, he would be given immunity … And, clearly, if he were to say that, Mr. Smalls would want him to testify. But, those are not the only factors that the court is to take into account ....