Case law

Borden, Inc. v. United States

23 Ct. Int'l Trade 372 · United States Court of International Trade · Jun 4, 1999

Commerce also defined which significant price differences would qualify as a pattern. … Nor has Borden argued that a test for downward skewness would or could not establish the "pattern" required by the statute.

Saudi Iron and Steel Co.(Hadeed) v. United States

675 F. Supp. 1362 · United States Court of International Trade · Nov 27, 1987

The domestic producers say Commerce could not use the SIDF loan to construct a composite benchmark because Hadeed could not qualify for an SIDF loan. … Although Commerce found that the SIDF was established “to provide loans to small- and medium-sized private industries,” it also found that the SIDF “can make loans for up to 15 years to any licensed company in Saudi Arabia

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. United States

21 Ct. Int'l Trade 11 · United States Court of International Trade · Jan 8, 1997

Moreover, this Court notes legal precedent clearly supports defendant’s position. In Mitsuboshi Belting Ltd v. … Section 353.31 establishes time limits for the submission of factual information and states “[t]he Secretary will not consider in the final determination or the final results, or retain in the record of the proceeding, any

Far Eastern Textile Ltd. v. United States International Trade Commission

25 Ct. Int'l Trade 999 · United States Court of International Trade · Aug 14, 2001

Data that were ultimately unverifiable were clearly distinguished in the Final Report. See Final Report at VI-11 to 13. … Second, Far Eastern ignores the use of the qualifier “generally” with respect to the latter parts of the definition.

LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. United States

985 F. Supp. 95 · United States Court of International Trade · Jul 25, 1997

Krupp argues that evaluated under this methodology established by Commerce, “the German Government-funded portion of Article 56(2)(b) aid clearly is not eountervailable” because “the Article 56(2)(b) program provides benefits … Defendant explains, rather “substantial evidence in the record clearly establishes that when the GOG passed the [May 3] Rules in 1988, it relieved [Fried. Krupp] of the obligation under [Fried.

Aristocraft of America, LLC v. United States

269 F. Supp. 3d 1316 · United States Court of International Trade · Sep 28, 2017

export value of $1 (to take a round number) would contain “inputs and raw materials” that were subject to VAT at the rate of 17% applicable to those inputs and raw materials, and the exportation of the hanger would have qualified … Court No. 15-00307    Page 20     addressed) because the Doing Business report did not clearly identify or break-down which costs were associated with which documents

Jinan Yipin Corp., Ltd. v. United States

800 F. Supp. 2d 1226 · United States Court of International Trade · Sep 26, 2011

The Remand Determination dismisses the agency’s established preference for domestic data with a facile two sentences: With regard to the preference for domestic prices, the Court qualified that preference … However, it does not follow that the agency’s choice between Indian import data and domestic price quotes is immune from judicial review.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States

580 F. Supp. 2d 1330 · United States Court of International Trade · Sep 29, 2008

More importantly, however, he sets out clearly, the general practices in which he and his team are trained: [I]mport specialists are instructed to stay current on information relating to their work, and providing a copy … unambiguous notice. l_<L The Lolkus Declaration is relevant to the core question here,w and is made upon personal knowledge, it is properly submitted under CIT Rule 56(c), and to the extent it might represent hearsay, it would qualify

Skf USA Inc. v. United States

94 F. Supp. 2d 1351 · United States Court of International Trade · Mar 22, 2000

Cir. 1996) (holding that "a regulation cannot override a clearly stated statutory enactment”) (citing Brush v. Office of Personnel Management, 982 F.2d 1554, 1560 (Fed. … Merchandise of the “same general class or kind” as the subject merchandise ([§ 1677(16)(C)]) will qualify as the “foreign like product” in cases where either the identical or the similar merchandise is not

Peer Bearing Co.—Changshan v. United States

128 F. Supp. 3d 1304 · United States Court of International Trade · Dec 21, 2015

The court added that, by the Department’s own admission, Commerce had no quantitative threshold for what qualifies as a “significant” level of investment. Id. … Timken’s argument is unpersuasive because the Second Remand Redetermination clearly is supported by substantial evidence.

Torrington Co. v. United States

146 F. Supp. 2d 845 · United States Court of International Trade · May 10, 2001

Congress also stated that because the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of situations which qualify as being outside the ordinary course of trade, “the Administration intends that Commerce will interpret 19 … . 3 While a minuscule percentage, such as a fraction of percent, might be such an overwhelming piece of additional evidence demonstrating that sales were outside of the ordinary course of trade that it would qualify

Thai I-Mei Frozen Foods Co., Ltd v. United States

477 F. Supp. 2d 1332 · United States Court of International Trade · Mar 12, 2007

The Court stated elsewhere in Geum Poong III that “[a]s it recognized in the second remand determination, Commerce clearly was permitted by the court to dispense with the profit cap if available data Court No. 05-00197 … Nevertheless, the court concludes that plaintiff has not met its burden of qualifying for a remand under which Commerce must calculate a profit cap or a facts available profit cap.

Fabuwood Cabinetry Corp. v. United States

469 F. Supp. 3d 1373 · United States Court of International Trade · Aug 19, 2020

“Commerce’s regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k) establish its analytical path for deciding whether certain imports are covered by the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty order.” Sunpreme Inc. v. … A scope is unambiguous if the terms of the scope “have a single clearly defined or stated meaning.” Id. at 1381 n.7 (internal quotations omitted).

United States v. UPS Customhouse Brokerage, Inc.

686 F. Supp. 2d 1337 · United States Court of International Trade · Jan 28, 2010

handled by employees of the broker; [9.] the extent to which the individually licensed Court No. 04-00650 Page 7 broker who qualifies … is a Court No. 04-00650 Page 8 mandatory term,” and thus “any interpretation of § 111.1 that does not require consideration of the listed factors is clearly

Tradewind Farms, Inc. v. United States

31 Ct. Int'l Trade 664 · United States Court of International Trade · Apr 30, 2007

Thus, if it hopes to succeed, plaintiff must establish that it has satisfied the additional requirements articulated in AUSRI 1(b), particularly the requirement that the actual use is intended at the time of importation … Put another way, Customs claims that plaintiff’s failure to file a declaration of intended use or to enter its merchandise under the agricultural actual use provision “is clearly fatal to its claim.”

Russ Berrie & Co. v. United States

329 F. Supp. 3d 1345 · United States Court of International Trade · Aug 30, 2018

Accordingly, none of these articles qualify for classification in subheading 9902.71.13, HTSUS, free of duty. … EN 90.17 clarifies that the heading covers “[s]tencils of a kind clearly identifiable as being specialised as drawing instruments.” EN 90.17 (emphasis removed).

Arbor Foods, Inc. v. United States

30 Ct. Int'l Trade 670 · United States Court of International Trade · May 17, 2006

The record clearly shows that when the blend is substituted for sugar and mixed with water to form a beverage like Kool Aid, the resulting beverage will have clumps of the powder blend that are uncharacteristic of Kool … Thus, Arbor has not demonstrated that the 1994 through 1996 entries qualified as treatments by Customs.

Alloy Piping Products, Inc. v. United States

28 Ct. Int'l Trade 1805 · United States Court of International Trade · Oct 28, 2004

- SPL's prayer that the underlying antidumping-duty order, pub- lished at 58 Fed.Reg. 33,250 (June 16, 1993), be revoked "on the basis of three years . . . of sales of fittings by [it] at not less than fair value, which qualifies … [C]ontrary to Ta Chen's claim that the intra-ware- house[14] expense was not a major omitted expense, the evidence on the record clearly indicates that Ta Chen failed to report a major expense.

XL Specialty Insurance v. United States

341 F. Supp. 2d 1251 · United States Court of International Trade · Jun 8, 2004

Surety is presently gathering the information and evidence necessary to establish our claims. … Under the statute, Plaintiff clearly bears the burden of setting forth the reasons and justifications for its objections to Customs’ decisions.

Filmtec Corp. v. United States

293 F. Supp. 2d 1364 · United States Court of International Trade · Nov 25, 2003

In GKD-USA, Inc., the Court found that there is no clearly stated Congressional intent as to the meaning of the phrase “straining cloth” as used in the tariff schedule, and construed it in accordance with … filtered mentioned; nor was it mentioned by Senator Durenberger in his remarks on proposing the original bill, by the Senate Report explaining the intent behind the provisions of the Customs and Trade Act 1990, of which the establishment