Case law

Romo v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. CA2/3

California Court of Appeal · Jan 29, 2021

establish causation as a matter of law.” … This court may find error in the trial court’s admission of expert testimony “ ‘only if the witness “ ‘clearly lacks qualification as an expert.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (People v.

MacDonald v. Gourley

125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 15, 2003

Weaving back and forth within one's own lane, without specific facts to establish that the weaving was pronounced or went on for some substantial distance, is not sufficient to establish probable cause.'" … The court found there was no statutory penalty or consequence which clearly reflected a legislative intent to deprive the Board of further jurisdiction over an employee's appeal and thereby invalidate future action whenever

People v. Brown CA1/2

California Court of Appeal · Dec 8, 2015

[I]t’s clearly involving the same parties, the same witnesses. … To demonstrate that a denial of severance was reversible error, defendant must ‘ “clearly establish that there [was] a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.” ’ [Citation.]

People v. Medrano CA1/1

California Court of Appeal · Dec 29, 2025

“criminal conduct” was “escalating,” his past performance on probation was unsatisfactory, and while he requested help with substance abuse, he “had the opportunity on probation previously to seek out help,” which had “clearly … “To establish abuse, the defendant bears the burden” to show the court’s decision “was, under the circumstances, arbitrary, capricious, or exceeding the bounds of reason.” (Ibid.)

L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp.

California Court of Appeal · Nov 17, 2020

Appellants understand this to mean that the JOC only establishes a relationship which lacks any specifics and simply establishes that the parties will agree to specifics in the future. … Appellants ridicule this idea, but provide no legal authority or record citations to show that the proposals would not qualify.

Gray & Jimenez v. Jewish Federation of Palm Springs

243 Cal. App. 4th 892 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 8, 2016

Gray’s tactics in filing amended accountings that continued to defy the court’s orders and to which Jewish Federation had to file objections certainly qualifies under section 17211, subdivision (b). … Further, no evidence established Jimenez was aware that Gray possessed records that would assist with the accounting.

County of Sonoma v. Superior Court

173 Cal. App. 4th 322 · California Court of Appeal · Apr 24, 2009

The court explained that the language of section 1, subdivision (b) clearly provides that “the county, not the state, not someone else, shall provide for the compensation of its employees.” … Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1086 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 742 P.2d 1290 ] [noting “ ‘qualified and destructive legislative function’ ” of gubernatorial veto].)

Central Heights Improvement Co. v. Memorial Parks, Inc.

40 Cal. App. 2d 591 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 14, 1940

Glouner, one of the respondents, an exclusive one hundred and twenty day option to purchase twenty acres of its land for the further sum of $38,000 to establish a memorial park thereon. … The evidence clearly supports such finding.

Smith v. Selma Community Hospital

164 Cal. App. 4th 1478 · California Court of Appeal · Jul 21, 2008

Also, in certain circumstances, participants in a professional review are immune from liability for damages. (Id., § 11111(a).) … The judicial review committee’s statements clearly articulated its finding on the issue of fact identified by the statute and Bylaws.

Ultramar, Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District

17 Cal. App. 4th 689 · California Court of Appeal · Jul 30, 1993

To qualify for certification, an agency’s regulatory program must be governed by regulations which, inter alia, require that no project will be approved if there are feasible alternatives or mitigation measures available … Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” *702 AQMD asserts that neither Ultramar nor any

People v. Bourland

247 Cal. App. 2d 76 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 8, 1966

Defendant replied: "I don't know of any alternative, your Honor." [1] The defendant was clearly entitled to counsel. … In the fall of 1964, about a month before the first sale by defendant, the officer established an acquaintance with one Mills and made purchases of narcotics from him.

Coast National Insurance Co. v. Klinefelter CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · Jan 7, 2025

[a] qualified acceptance is a new proposal.” (Civ. Code, § 1585.) … The most obvious inference is that the party denies liability but, at the very least, one clearly disputes liability. Accordingly, this response is not an unqualified acceptance of the offer.

Lemus v. Abdeljawad CA4/2

California Court of Appeal · Sep 8, 2021

Since default was entered the same date it was requested, the entry of default can clearly be attributed to surprise or excusable neglect. … It does not seem to matter if the particular circumstances qualify as fraudulent or mistaken in the strict sense.” (In re Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342; see Falahati v.

People v. Bourland

247 Cal. App. 2d 76 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 8, 1966

Defendant replied: “I don’t know of any alternative, your Honor. ” The defendant was clearly entitled to counsel. … In the fall of 1964, about a month before the first sale by defendant, the officer established an acquaintance with one Mills and made purchases of narcotics from him.

Absher v. AutoZone, Inc.

164 Cal. App. 4th 332 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 26, 2008

Even if, as plaintiff urges, the phrase “credit card transaction” is read in isolation, it does not clearly and unambiguously (see People v. … From plaintiff’s perspective, the placement of the commas indicates that the qualifying phrase “as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment” applies only to “require,” not to “request.”

Storck v. Edelstein CA4/2

California Court of Appeal · Sep 15, 2022

As a result, Edelstein is absolutely immune from any tort claim arising from the abstract of judgment other than malicious prosecution. (See ibid.) … Storck does not cite, nor can we locate, any other authority that suggests Edelstein’s litigation privilege immunity ended when the trial court vacated the default judgment.

Bady v. Detwiler

127 Cal. App. 2d 321 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 10, 1954

Clearly the liability is for injuries to property of any character, real or personal. Separated from the first place of its occurrence by only fifteen words it is used again. … There is nothing to qualify the word either in the act or in the decisions applying it. Traffic signals are not excepted. To hold they were would be to torture the plain wording of the statute.

People v. Cervantes

California Court of Appeal · Apr 10, 2017

Clear intent, clearly expressed, is decisive. … Null (Iowa 2013) 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Null) [52.5 years is de facto life sentence even though evidence ―does not clearly establish that [the defendant‘s] prison term is beyond his life expectancy,‖ but rather may ―come within

Melom v. City of Madera

183 Cal. App. 4th 41 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 24, 2010

These cases also talk about the square footage of supercenters, but if there is a minimum amount of square footage required for a retail establishment to qualify as a supercenter, neither the Bakersfield Citizens and American … “[C]ourts should afford great weight to the Guidelines except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v.

McCann v. Municipal Court

221 Cal. App. 3d 527 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 19, 1990

Misconstruing two cases and ignoring the applicable statute, contemnor concludes that “only an actual interruption will qualify as the basis for a contempt.” … Unexplained delay does not establish good cause for a continuance. (See People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790-791 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 693 P.2d 778 ].)