Case law

Knapp v. City of Newport Beach

186 Cal. App. 2d 669 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 23, 1960

Public Officers’ Immunity The ruling of the trial court refusing to receive further evidence on Knapp’s complaint charging conspiracy was correct. … This purpose was clearly within the scope of the official duties of Officers and City, and falls squarely within the governmental immunity rule already firmly established by the decisions in this state. (Hardy v.

McMahon v. Superior Court

130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 7, 2003

The order set a trial date of April 14, 2003, and established dates and deadlines for various pretrial matters. … “Accordingly, the activities of one branch of government are not immune from regulation or oversight by another branch. [Citation.] One branch may take actions that significantly affect another branch. [Citations.]

Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi

160 Cal. App. 3d 620 · California Court of Appeal · Oct 1, 1984

If for a wider purpose, the Sadeghi verification of the complaint would seem clearly insufficient. The notary public area is blank. … Sadeghi, probably qualifies as a declaration under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, subdivision (b).

Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co.

52 Cal. App. 4th 1036 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 18, 1997

Finally, Braun insists that even if respondents could make out a prima facie case under section 425.16, she would be able to counter that case with her own showing of facts establishing a probability of prevailing at trial … Under the first clause of section 425.16, subdivision (e), the qualifying act is any statement or writing made before a legislative, executive or judicial proceeding.

People v. Avent CA3

California Court of Appeal · Dec 30, 2025

It is well established that a defendant’s statements in a parole risk assessment report and testimony at a parole hearing fall within the ambit of “new or additional evidence.” (People v. … And the Legislature “could have directed that qualifying offenders receive a new trial by a new jury on the critical factual questions” yet did not do so. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 297.)

Hayes v. O'Marr

81 Cal. App. 210 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 5, 1927

R. 78, 216 Pac. 1004 ], where the court said:“ It is well established that a code section does not prescribe any form in which an acknowledgment or promise sufficient to lift, the ban of the statute of limitations shall be … But the law cannot imply an unqualified promise where the promise is clearly qualified by a statement relating to facts which are to exist before the promise will become direct and positive. The judgment is affirmed.

Black v. Department of Mental Health

100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 · California Court of Appeal · Sep 11, 2000

“Thus, the ADA and its attendant regulations clearly define unnecessary segregation as a form of illegal discrimination against the disabled.” ( 46 F.3d at p. 333 , fn. omitted.) … It was, instead, merely identifying the outer limits of a state’s duties under the integration mandate, not establishing new ones.

Valdez v. Federal Mutual Insurance

272 Cal. App. 2d 223 · California Court of Appeal · Apr 23, 1969

It is established, as a corollary to the rule of liberal construction to promote the objectives of the Legislature, that any exception or exclusion must be strictly construed. In Mission Ins. Co. v. … The court noted, “It is true that plaintiffs were not parties to the insurance contract but they are clearly members of a class for whom the benefits of the Uninsured Motorist Law are intended to apply.

Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Edmund A. Gray Co.

9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 486 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 23, 2004

Thus, Proposition 65 establishes a series of shifting burdens. In the first instance, a plaintiff must show that a discharge has occurred. … Clearly not.

O'Farrell v. City of San Diego CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · Jun 27, 2024

The court concluded the City had succeeded in establishing design immunity. … The trial court found the City succeeded in establishing all three elements of design immunity as a matter of law.

American Mutual Liability Insurance v. Chicago-Los Angeles Building Corp.

88 Cal. App. 300 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 11, 1928

If the acknowledgment or admission is qualified and not absolute, or if there is but an admission that something is due without specifying how much, there is no account stated, nor does an account stated exist if there is … It clearly appears that no account was stated. The judgment is reversed. Works, P. J., and Craig, J., concurred.

Hughes v. City of Torrance

77 Cal. App. 2d 272 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 13, 1946

The power of the Legislature to regulate cities and towns is a power inherent in a sovereign state and is within the sphere of proper legislative activities unless clearly inhibited by the Constitution. … The procedure in such situations is clearly established. When an appeal is taken on the judgment roll alone the appellant is in no position to dispute the fact that competent proof was admitted to prove the facts found.

In Re Josue G.

131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 27, 2003

He was in good health, up-to-date on his immunizations, and developing normally. … its conclusion that Josue was not likely to be adopted was its finding that he was closely bonded with his foster parents, who, in the court's view, would be too old by the time Josue becomes a teenager to be considered qualified

Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles

2 Cal. App. 4th 809 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 14, 1992

that the test apparatus was in proper working order, the test was properly administered and the operator competent and qualified. … Given the “emphatic” mandate of Government Code section 11513 against sole reliance on hearsay evidence (Daniels, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 538 ) and the fact that the test result was clearly the critical piece of evidence establishing

Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc.

131 Cal. App. 3d 386 · California Court of Appeal · Apr 30, 1982

Beam moved for summary judgment, asserting the privileges of Civil Code section 47, subdivisions 2 and 3. [3] The trial court held the communication subject to the qualified privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision … Block were clearly foreseeable and in fact foreseen by Mr. Beam." Plaintiff relies upon cases which place foreseeability as the "key component necessary to establish liability." ( Weirum v.

Banks v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY AND CTY. OF SF

120 Cal. App. 2d 1 · California Court of Appeal · Aug 26, 1953

No attempt has been made to provide accommodations for all qualified families. The supply of units is limited. … These observations in the Shelley case are quite significant: “We have noted that previous decisions of this Court have established the proposition that judicial action is not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth

In Re Marriage of Padgett

172 Cal. App. 4th 830 · California Court of Appeal · Mar 25, 2009

Tise established that a state court domestic relations order may be qualified even after a participant's death, `[b]ecause a QDRO only renders enforceable an already-existing interest.' [ Tise, supra, ] 234 F.3d at 421. … Hamilton framed the "pivotal question" as "whether the dissolution order `clearly contains the information specified in the statute that a plan administrator would need to make an informed decision.'

People v. Schmitz

7 Cal. App. 330 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 9, 1908

Buef, if you are not now giving your testimony under the expectation of immunity— complete immunity?” … The word “unlawful,” as used in this statute, qualifies the word “injury,” alone.

Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co.

29 Cal. App. 4th 1620 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 9, 1994

Finding that Dye Creek owed no duty to plaintiffs because plaintiffs had not set forth any basis to establish that duty, the trial court granted Dye Creek a summary judgment. We reverse. … Larson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 407 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 445 ], Civil Code section 1714 applies “ ‘unless public policy clearly requires that an exception be made.’ ” ( 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 410 , quoting Lipson v.

Ferguson v. Ferguson

58 Cal. App. 2d 811 · California Court of Appeal · May 26, 1943

It is clear that if respondents were purchasers for value and without notice, taking their title through the decree of distribution which constitutes a muniment of title immune to collateral attack, they cannot be charged … The distinction, with cases in support thereof, is clearly stated in Pellerito v.