Case law

Villa Pacific Building Co. v. Superior Court

233 Cal. App. 3d 8 · California Court of Appeal · Aug 8, 1991

But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” In our view, section 1714.10 was intended solely for the benefit of attorneys. … We do not think this is sufficient to qualify as a “public reason” within the meaning of section 3513.

Altizer v. Coachella Valley Conservation Com.

California Court of Appeal · Aug 23, 2023

Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1072, fn. 10.) 5 cannot be established or there is a complete defense to that cause of action. … here. 9 As the Commission emphasizes, the section of the cable fence Altizer collided with is unobscured and clearly observable (see Appendix A), particularly to anyone

Norman Williams Co. v. Rice

108 Cal. App. 3d 348 · California Court of Appeal · Jul 17, 1980

The licensed wholesalers may sell to any licensed retailer or wholesaler within Oklahoma, and may sell distilled spirits out of Oklahoma to “qualified persons.” (Id., § 521, subd. (e).) … Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, 445 U.S. 97 , the Supreme Court noted two standards for antitrust immunity.

People v. Ball CA6

California Court of Appeal · Apr 29, 2025

Ball does not contend that the prosecutor committed misconduct by declining to immunize the witnesses for improper reasons—e.g., to prevent the defense from introducing “clearly exculpatory” evidence. … ‘[O]fficial government records clearly describing a prior conviction presumptively establish that the conviction in fact occurred, assuming those records meet the threshold standards of admissibility.’ ” (Id. at p. 1066.)

Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco

168 Cal. App. 4th 992 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 26, 2008

In the final analysis, what is covered by the anti-SLAPP statute is clearly set forth in the plain unambiguous language of the statute itself, which we are called to interpret broadly. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) … Nor does she challenge the trial court’s determination that she failed to establish a probability of success on the merits. 8 Schaffer fails to establish that the court erred in granting respondents’ motion to strike.

Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank

5 Cal. App. 4th 234 · California Court of Appeal · Apr 8, 1992

[fjurther experimental studies are clearly warranted.” … Plaintiffs thus needed opinions from qualified experts to establish a prima facie case. (See Carson v.

Hassell v. Bird

247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 7, 2016

Thus, Yelp was aggrieved by the removal order for purposes of establishing standing. … Thus, “[t]here are three essential elements that a defendant must establish in order to claim section 230 immunity” from California tort liability. (Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804.)

Jeffrey H. v. Imai

85 Cal. App. 4th 345 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 8, 2000

The Moore decision established authoritatively that the litigation privilege applies to statements made in a private, contractual arbitration proceeding. … The litigation privilege, as enunciated in Silberg , clearly applies to claims of tortious invasion of privacy. The decision in Ribas v.

Mann v. Leasko

179 Cal. App. 2d 692 · California Court of Appeal · Apr 12, 1960

The determinative questions are: (1) whether appellant is a holder in due course and, as such, entitled to immunity from such personal defenses, and (2) whether there is any evidence in the record to support findings to the … This testimony was admitted subject to a motion to strike in the event that there was no evidence to establish notice or knowledge on the part of appellant.

People v. Rios

163 Cal. App. 3d 852 · California Court of Appeal · Jan 17, 1985

If his statements were properly edited to omit references *868 clearly implicating Rios for the murder they would be inadmissible as not being relevant. … Here, the district attorney introduced evidence establishing Ramos was liable for murder but was granted immunity on the murder charge in exchange for his testimony.

Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino

35 Cal. App. 4th 1654 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 23, 1995

Hope lacked experience as an FBO, but he told them not to worry because he would hire qualified people. On May 12, 1986, the County entered into a written agreement by which it leased land at Chino Airport to Mr. … This fact established the second element of the definition of an ‘independent contractor.’ [Citations.]

FTR International v. Bd. of Trustees of the Los Angeles Community College Dist. CA2/2

California Court of Appeal · Apr 7, 2015

Qualified Immunity. … The Trustees argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established indication that the discretionary decision to vote to debar the FTR Parties violated any constitutional rights.

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. County of Orange

117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 · California Court of Appeal · Feb 26, 2002

Looking at the above language, Hughes’s overhead property clearly falls within the categories of property contemplated. … The trial court found that title to overhead property, i.e., consumable supplies and material, and low-value office and plant equipment, vested in the Government and was thus immune from taxation.

Bullock v. City and County of San Francisco

221 Cal. App. 3d 1072 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 28, 1990

This can be seen most clearly by example. … Nor should anything in this opinion be construed to mean that the Ellis Act has in effect immunized plaintiff from otherwise valid provisions of the Conversion Ordinance and the ordinance establishing the North of Market

Roscoe Littlefield v. County of Humboldt

218 Cal. App. 4th 243 · California Court of Appeal · Jun 28, 2013

Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052 . . . states: „the status of [a] qualified patient does not confer an immunity from arrest. … “[T]he status of qualified patient does not confer an immunity from arrest.

Taylor v. City of Los Angeles

29 Cal. App. 2d 181 · California Court of Appeal · Nov 15, 1938

On such premise it is argued that “this appeal, then, is concerned mainly with the question whether the city was engaged in a governmental function and immune from liability for the negligent acts of its servants in overseeing … It is sufficient to note that under the facts alleged as above quoted from plaintiffs’ complaint, the case comes squarely within the rule established in City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Acc.

Devis v. Bank of America

77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238 · California Court of Appeal · Jul 28, 1998

We identify the issues framed by the pleadings and determine whether the moving party has established facts sufficient to negate the claim. … complete with a deposition notice from the Bank to the LAPD custodian of records, and a custodian of records declaration. 4 Although the Bank’s legal arguments are stated as though the motion were a demurrer, the motion is clearly

Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank

102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 5, 2000

The plaintiff must, in both cases, establish that he or she suffers from a disability covered by FEHA and that he or she is a qualified individual. … Jensen for the position because 1) she did not have the technical computer knowledge and skills required for this job nor the product knowledge; and 2) there were other candidates who were clearly more qualified for the position

Paramount General Hospital Co. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.

42 Cal. App. 3d 496 · California Court of Appeal · Oct 15, 1974

then carved out an exception, not justified by anything in the Act, under which it immunized the entire package because the services, clearly covered by the Act, were merely “ancillary” to the lease which it thought to be … The term “ordinary channels of trade” becomes relevant only in two situations: (1) To establish costs (§§ 17027, 17077); and, (2) To define certain irrelevant exclusions from the Act. (§ 17050, subds.

Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees' Retirement System

7 Cal. App. 5th 115 · California Court of Appeal · Dec 30, 2016

Thus, this airtime service 2 credit was unique in that it did not reflect the member’s actual service in qualifying employment. … Constitutional decisions “have never given a law which imposes unforeseen advantages or burdens on a contracting party constitutional immunity against change.” ’ [Citation.]”