Case law

People v. Rodriguez

55 Cal. 4th 1125 · California Supreme Court · Dec 27, 2012

felonious conduct that is willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted need not be gang related (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 55 ), it appears the Legislature purposefully used the phrase “by members of that gang” to qualify … , Scales stated, “we can perceive no reason why one who actively and knowingly works in the ranks of that organization, intending to contribute to the success of those specifically illegal activities, should be any more immune

People v. Luis

158 Cal. 185 · California Supreme Court · Aug 11, 1910

The evidence given was clearly sufficient to support the conclusion of the trial court in admitting evidence as to the statement itself. … That it was not to be con *197 sidered by them for any purpose they were clearly instructed by the court.

Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Market Street Railway Co.

132 Cal. 677 · California Supreme Court · May 15, 1901

In the section of the constitution quoted, the power is given to establish rates for passengers and freight. … Douglas, 104 Iowa, 536 , a very late case, it is said: “The words ‘railroad’ and ‘railway’ may undoubtedly be so used as to mean a street-railway, but by popular usage, when used without qualifying words, they are understood

De Merritt v. Weldon

154 Cal. 545 · California Supreme Court · Nov 20, 1908

It was one clearly within the power of the trustees to enact under their general power to appoint “such police and other subordinate officers as in their judgment may be required,” and with the single exception of the duty … by the trustees, but none had been established; and he was required to collect all town taxes and town licenses.

Satterfield v. Garmire

65 Cal. 2d 638 · California Supreme Court · Jan 31, 1967

He has since qualified, rendering the issue moot. The judgment is reversed. Traynor, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., * concurred. … Although it is difficult to rationalize the limitation of this rule to actions which are pending at death, the limitation is clearly stated.

City of Pasadena v. McAllaster

204 Cal. 267 · California Supreme Court · May 28, 1928

The order of April 28, 1927, adopted and established the boundaries of the assessment district, designated as acquisition and improvement district No. 2 of the City of Pasadena, which comprises the property to be benefited … This situation is clearly distinguishable from that presented in Stege v. City of Richmond, 194 Cal. 305 [ 228 Pac. 461 ], wherein no municipally-owned property was involved.

Journe v. Hewes

124 Cal. 244 · California Supreme Court · Apr 12, 1899

Freese duly qualified and became administrator of the estate of deceased, and so continued until January 7, 1895, when all -of the estate, including all claims against defendant, was distributed to plaintiffs; defendant occupied … Justice Strong. *251 I quote sufficiently to state appellant’s position clearly: “Privity of contract is doubtless essential in all cases.

Lake v. Superior Court

165 Cal. 182 · California Supreme Court · Mar 22, 1913

The relief sought was a decree establishing that Mary A. … Davis, 143 Cal. 673 , [ 77 Pac. 651 ], that judgment was immune from collateral attack under the doctrine of res adjudícala, and that therefore all that the injunctive decree in Lake v.

Martin v. Kentfield School District

35 Cal. 3d 294 · California Supreme Court · Dec 29, 1983

find — the District "was unable to find a qualified (competent) person" to fill it from its "regular staff." … That condition clearly implies that a school district has both the duty and authority to establish standards for determining the competency of an applicant for a specific position within the meaning of the statute.

Navellier v. Sletten

124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 · California Supreme Court · Aug 29, 2002

Thus, contrary to the protestations of plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument, the anti-SLAPP statute neither constitutes—nor enables courts to effect— any kind of “immunity” for breach of a release or of other types of contracts … Probability of Prevailing As noted, no cause of action qualifies as a SLAPP merely because the defendant’s actions conceptually fall within the ambit of the statute’s initial prong.

People v. Garcia

107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 · California Supreme Court · Jul 18, 2001

But, as we have explained, the instruction was incomplete in failing clearly to require actual knowledge of the registration requirement. … Prejudice Although the court did not clearly omit the actual knowledge requirement, its instructions were potentially misleading in this regard.

McClung v. Employment Development Department

20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 428 · California Supreme Court · Nov 4, 2004

As amended, section 12940, subdivision (j) clearly states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law. … Neither does the majority cite any authority establishing that retroactive application of the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j) would violate the Constitution.

People v. Beggs

178 Cal. 79 · California Supreme Court · Apr 2, 1918

No such qualifying words are used in other subdivisions of the section. … The absence of any qualifying words, such as are found in subdivision 1 of the section, *84 is significant.

In re Cabrera

California Supreme Court · Mar 2, 2023

This is so even if the evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of the judge-found fact. … He argues instead that the jury’s finding of serious bodily injury necessarily establishes great bodily injury.

Roberts v. Brian

6 Cal. 3d 1 · California Supreme Court · Nov 4, 1971

In title 22 California Administrative Code section 51215 the director *6 has established standards for nursing homes seeking to qualify for MediCal payments. Standards (C), (E), and (H) are pertinent to this case. … The record clearly shows that respondent did not formulate the present regulations with petitioner’s needs and disability in mind; nor are we certain that these regulations, even assuming their validity, establish the most

Briggs v. Superior Court

215 Cal. 336 · California Supreme Court · Mar 31, 1932

Our first inquiry is whether the bias or prejudice of Judge Collier has been established without substantial conflict in the evidence. None of the facts is in dispute. … He ruled that *346 Judge Tappaan was qualified. Defendants sought by prohibition to prevent Judge Tappaan from trying the ease. The writ was granted.

County of San Mateo v. Boss

3 Cal. 3d 962 · California Supreme Court · Jan 27, 1971

Nevertheless, we think the principles enunciated in Kirchner clearly apply to the instant case. … A person may qualify for aid to the aged and yet own real or personal property worth $1,200 (§ 11154) and real property of an assessed valuation as high as $5,000 (§ 11153).

Rusheen v. Cohen

37 Cal. 4th 1048 · California Supreme Court · Feb 23, 2006

“In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 425.16, subd. … Thus, “communications with ‘some relation’ to judicial proceedings” are “absolutely immune from tort liability” by the litigation privilege (Rubin v.

People v. Lucas

60 Cal. 4th 153 · California Supreme Court · Aug 21, 2014

Harris had qualified as a handwriting expert more than 1,000 times in his career. Clearly, Dr. … The jury was aware of Clark’s immunity agreement, and nothing in the language of CALJIC No. 2.20 precluded the jury’s consideration of Clark’s immunity as a type of “bias, interest, or other motive” in

People v. McCoy

25 Cal. 2d 177 · California Supreme Court · Nov 14, 1944

Thus the ultimate fact of the prevailing lighting *186 condition was correlated with an artificial element as to which said appellant’s expert witness was, of course, in nowise qualified to testify. … The fact that here the knife was exhibited in connection with a qualified threat would not preclude the appellant’s conviction as charged.