Case law

Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.

14 Cal. 4th 479 · California Supreme Court · Dec 16, 1996

The court observed that the situation was analogous to that in Ricks, stating: “We believe the situation here is analogous to the failure to qualify for tenure in Ricks. … It is not necessary or appropriate to employ the statute of limitations as a tool to obtain immunity from liability, in the absence of such an express agreement.

Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District

28 Cal. 2d 536 · California Supreme Court · Jun 26, 1946

So long as no more is involved than the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction.” (Thomas v. … The present case is clearly distinguishable from Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536 [ 127 P.2d 889 ].

Brown v. USA Taekwondo

California Supreme Court · Apr 1, 2021

Nally never squarely addressed the proper role of Rowland in its analysis, nor did it purport to qualify or limit the considerable body of case law explaining that Rowland is a guide to determining when to create exceptions … from duties otherwise established.

People v. M.M.

54 Cal. 4th 530 · California Supreme Court · Jun 28, 2012

A peace officer, for example, charged with ensuring the public‟s safety and enforcing the laws of the local governmental entity which employs him or her, is clearly entrusted with such a public duty. … Although “public officer” is not defined in the section, the Legislature has expressly designated other persons and public employees as public officers elsewhere in the Penal Code, persons who clearly do not hold a tenure

People v. La MacChia

41 Cal. 2d 738 · California Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1953

Those reasons could be no broader than those of any other witness qualified to state an opinion. … Clearly, therefore, a property owner and an expert witness are in a different position only insofar as their qualifications to testify rest upon different bases.

Weatherford v. City of San Rafael

218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394 · California Supreme Court · Jun 5, 2017

City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13 (Irwin), the language of section 526a explicitly indicates the Legislature’s intent to “limit the right to sue in this kind of case, for it clearly altered the common law, which … Weatherford argues that all forms of taxes assessed by state and local governments qualify so long as the plaintiff resides in the defendant locality.

Henck v. Lake Hemet Water Co.

9 Cal. 2d 136 · California Supreme Court · Jun 24, 1937

The provisions of section 3275 are necessarily qualified by the language of section 1492, so that generally in a case where time is made the essence of the agreement a party may not obtain relief under that section. … The general rule of equity is that time is not of the essence of the contract, unless it clearly appear from the terms of the contract, in the light of all the circumstances, that such was the intention of the parties.

Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space District

46 Cal. 4th 282 · California Supreme Court · May 14, 2009

[“[t]he qualifiers are important”].) To find use of the word “dedicated” in both statutes dispositive would thus be an overly superficial interpretation. … The proponents contend this bill would clearly establish this authority, eliminate the law’s existing ambiguity and, thus, avoid ‘future’ problems with legal interpretations.”

Eisley v. Mohan

31 Cal. 2d 637 · California Supreme Court · Apr 3, 1948

By later legislation the taxability of property sold to veterans in conformity with the authority granted by the people was clearly recognized. … The decision did not establish a rule of property, but held that the state agency was not properly taxable on its reversionary interest, and the assessment and levy made against the state agency were ordered canceled.

Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council

45 Cal. 2d 657 · California Supreme Court · Dec 2, 1955

Immunity from prosecution is accorded witnesses who are compelled to testify before the board. (Id., § 161.) … That is clearly the law. (Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [ 75 S.Ct. 480 , 99 L.Ed. 546 ]; Garner v.

In Re Johnson

75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878 · California Supreme Court · Oct 1, 1998

Relevant, therefore, was both evidence that would have qualified as "newly discovered" for purposes of a motion for new trial and evidence that, although not so qualifying, was known or could have been discovered by diligent … Clearly, however, the referee did not reject the testimony of petitioner's witnesses solely because they had suffered such convictions; the referee also relied on their lengthy delay in coming forward.

Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission

1 Cal. 2d 730 · California Supreme Court · Nov 1, 1934

On this important case, therefore, the latest decision appears to be influenced largely by the temporary and fortuitous change in the personnel of the justices qualified to pass upon it. … The testimony clearly shows that the company hires all three classes of messengers, but that after being hired, a messenger is placed in one of the classes, and is assigned to an office where his services can be effectively

McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications

12 Cal. 3d 512 · California Supreme Court · Sep 19, 1974

Clearly, these latter limitations have been persistently ignored by petitioner. … administration of justice, to be an insufficient basis for the imposition of a contempt sentence.) *536 Somewhat more difficult for us to resolve has been the question whether petitioner’s inefficiency in conducting court qualifies

Cassel v. Superior Court

51 Cal. 4th 113 · California Supreme Court · Jan 13, 2011

interpretation “would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend” (In re Michele D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 606 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 92 , 59 P.3d 164 ]), I believe, just barely, that the result here does not so qualify … Could the' attorney even then prevent disclosure so as to be immune from a malpractice action? I can imagine no valid policy reason for the Legislature to shield attorneys even in that situation.

California Motor Transport Co. v. Railroad Commission

30 Cal. 2d 184 · California Supreme Court · May 29, 1947

The last quoted sentence (added in 1941) is relied upon as a grant by the Legislature permitting the establishment of the route, here involved. … It did not clearly purport to do so, and to have done so by legislative fiat would be disruptive of the orderly procedure and plan of regulation by the commission.

A. G. Col Co. v. Superior Court

196 Cal. 604 · California Supreme Court · Aug 7, 1925

It is also a well-established rule that a receiver should not be appointed where a remedy less drastic in its nature and scope is available, and which will insure to the litigants adequate protection. … On the other hand, the assumed facts contained in the affidavits introduced by the defendants, together with the uncontra: dieted facts as testified to by witnesses, clearly demonstrated that the “information and belief”

Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena

1 Cal. 2d 87 · California Supreme Court · May 31, 1934

The annexation was accomplished by the affirmative vote of three of the four qualified voters in the area. … The principle is quite clearly stated in Marblehead Land Co. v.

Carson v. Facilities Development Co.

36 Cal. 3d 830 · California Supreme Court · Sep 13, 1984

The City contended that testimony from qualified experts was necessary to establish that the sign created an obstruction which constituted a “dangerous condition.” 6 None of the stated grounds supports the trial court’s grant … The case law clearly indicates that a jury could have inferred that the City had constructive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition created by the encroaching sign.

Elsner v. Uveges

22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530 · California Supreme Court · Dec 20, 2004

relating to Brock was probably intended to retain this partial state immunity. … They are typically used in such cases to establish a standard of care.

McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College District

45 Cal. 4th 88 · California Supreme Court · Oct 27, 2008

The worker had initially filed a workers’ compensation claim; after it was determined in administrative proceedings that the worker did not qualify as an employee, he promptly filed a tort action. … ‘The third prerequisite of good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff is less clearly defined in the cases. But in Addison v.