Case law

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  • Beebe v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

    129 F.3d 1283 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 28, 1997

    The Compact confers broad powers on WMATA to "[c]reate and abolish offices, employments and positions ... provide for the qualifi- cation, appointment, [and] removal ... of its ... employees, [and][e]stablish, in its discretion … Although Westfall places the burden of establishing immu- nity on the official, Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299, Beebe has failed even to allege that Bearinger and Kumar acted outside the scope of their official duties, Westfall's

    Overruled on other grounds by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)Cited 108 timesPublished
  • Saad Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud

    106 F.4th 1157 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 9, 2024

    -based Saudis could establish the minimum contacts necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. JA.330. … -based Saudis were clearly frivolous. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A] request for jurisdictional discovery cannot be based on mere conjecture or speculation.”).

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran

    646 F.3d 56 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 15, 2011

    In Roeder’s last action against Iran for damages, we held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. … With respect to whether Roeder’s current suit qualifies as a related action, § 1083(c)(3) is unclear. Section 1083(c)(3) refers to “an action” that “has been timely commenced” under the FSIA’s prior terrorism exception.

    Cited 16 timesPublished
  • Luise Light v. Isabel Wolf

    816 F.2d 746 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 17, 1987

    For “[t]he party on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establishing its validity when challenged; to do so, he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of … After all, federal officials sued for official actions have an opportunity to claim at least qualified immunity from suit, while federal officials sued for purely private actions do not. See Harlow v.

    Cited 167 timesPublished
  • In Re Raymond J. Donovan

    877 F.2d 982 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 20, 1989

    We must strictly construe a waiver of sovereign immunity. See, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 851 , 106 S.Ct. 2224, 2234 , 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986) (“[A] waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be lightly implied ...”) … F.2d 1574, 1576 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.”).

    Cited 123 timesPublished
  • Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n

    663 F.2d 253 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 12, 1981

    These findings are not clearly erroneous, and again we affirm. 3. … It is with respect to official immunity (an issue not involved here inasmuch as no public official is a defendant) that there is a well-established distinction between “legislative” and “administrative” functions.

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • Curtis Publishing Company v. Harry H. Vaughan

    278 F.2d 23 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 31, 1960

    We see no basis upon which we may substitute our view for that established by the jury’s verdict. … Vaughan’s counsel argued that the publisher had offered no evidence to establish an occasion for qualified privilege, but the-publisher’s attorney asserted he had not offered evidence “deliberately.”

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States of America

    721 F.2d 385 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 15, 1983

    Clearly, violation of the statute setting the procedures by which the CPSC is to promulgate regulations is not the kind of tort which Congress intended to cover when it enacted the FTCA. … The Supreme Court has determined that although qualified immunity is the rule for executive personnel, certain offices and functional roles are entitled to absolute immunity. Harlow v.

    Cited 59 timesPublished
  • Mary Bartlett, on Behalf of Josephine Neuman v. Otis R. Bowen, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services

    816 F.2d 695 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 31, 1987

    The Supreme Court’s decisions in Salfi and Ringer clearly establish that a challenge to the constitutionality of the Act is a claim that “arises under” the Act for the purposes of § 405(h). … Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971) (state welfare officials prohibited from denying benefits to otherwise qualified residents who were aliens).

    Cited 72 timesPublished
  • David E. Jones v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., in His Official Capacity as Secretary of Interior

    883 F.2d 1031 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 30, 1989

    Because we find EAJA to thus be facially clear regarding Jones’ entitlement to fees, we reject the Government’s allegations that it is somehow immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. … There can be no sovereign immunity where Congress has unambiguously consented to waive immunity from suit by statute here, through EAJA section 2412(d)(1)(A).

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Outward Continental North Pacific Freight Conference and Its Members v. Federal Maritime Commission and United States of America

    385 F.2d 981 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 26, 1967

    That case established that the specifications of General Order 9 were “reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of the Congressional objective [in Section 15] of providing the shipping conference with freely swinging doors … these procedures be described in a provision of the agreement. 7 Compulsory amendment of the agreement is a reasonable manner of ensuring that the conference has in fact adopted a policing system and that it is brought clearly

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Mwani, Odilla Mutaka v. Bin Ladin, Usama

    417 F.3d 1 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 5, 2005

    The district court correctly recognized, however, that service of process does not alone establish personal jurisdiction. … Nelson and Cicippio foreclose the plaintiffs’ argument that the transactions between the Taliban, Afghanistan’s former rulers, and al Qaeda, a terrorist organization, qualify as commercial activity.

    Cited 568 timesPublished
  • Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy, (Two Cases). Vietnam Veterans of America v. Secretary of the Navy

    843 F.2d 528 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 29, 1988

    Thus plaintiffs bringing such suits have no need of the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. … But the Laird Memorandum cannot qualify as such a change, and the plaintiffs are most explicit in repudiating any such view.

    Cited 94 timesPublished
  • Bart v. United States

    203 F.2d 45 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 15, 1953

    , he must have authority to grant complete immunity to the witness. … The direction to answer after an assertion of the privilege conveys immunity.

    Reversed on other grounds by Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955)Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Darrell Debrew v. Atwood

    792 F.3d 118 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 30, 2015

    Sovereign Immunity As the defendants point out, it is well established that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. … In his opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, DeBrew quoted § 702 and correctly explained that the “[w]aiver of Sovereign Immunity for equitable relief is established under the Administrative Procedure Act.”

    Cited 86 timesPublished
  • National Ass'n v. Civiletti

    609 F.2d 514 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 26, 1979

    Finney also relied on legislative history which focused directly on state liability and established unequivocally that Congress intended the Awards Act to waive state immunity. 98 S.Ct. at 2575-76 . … However, it is well established that Congress in waiving governmental immunity has the power to waive immunity entirely or to waive it for some purposes and retain it for others.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. The Republic of Guinea, United States of America, Intervenor

    693 F.2d 1094 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 27, 1983

    We are bound not to disturb a factual finding of the District Court unless it is clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). … Given that this point is now established for purposes of this litigation, we have no trouble holding that this particular ICSID agreement was not an agreement “to arbitration in another country” that waives sovereign immunity

    Cited 87 timesPublished
  • Deutsche Telekom, A.G. v. Republic of India

    Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 3, 2025

    We do not retreat from the holdings in Chevron and Stileks that express incorporation of the UNCITRAL rules can suffice to establish a clear and unmistakable delegation to arbitrators to conclusively resolve disputes about … For another, even if some precedent does clearly foreclose an asserted immunity, the foreign sovereign still might have a colorable basis for seeking further review by way of en banc or certiorari.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Willie Lee Stewart v. United States

    275 F.2d 617 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 30, 1960

    In passing upon that precise situation the Court said that when one waives his immunity by taking the stand, as Raffel had done on his second trial, he may not resume the immunity at will when cross-examination becomes inconvenient … His failure to testify on his previous trials does not qualify under that standard. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comment was prejudicial without being competent.

    Reversed on other grounds by Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961)Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Robert C. White v. Fraternal Order of Police

    909 F.2d 512 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 19, 1990

    Clearly, the decision whether to stay discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the district court judge. … Such special immunity is not lightly conferred ... as it protects deliberate lies told with intent to destroy reputation.

    Cited 206 timesPublished

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