Case law

Pancoastal Petroleum, Limited v. Stewart Udall, Secretary of Interior

348 F.2d 805 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 6, 1965

Section 4(a) of the Proclamation authorized the Secretary of the Interior to •establish an interdepartmental Appeals Board to consider petitions by persons ■affected by the regulations. … That case involved _ an entirely different context — immunity from State taxation. That case involved an American purchaser of goods, who was acquiring title and dictating the movement into the United States.

Amador County v. United States Department of the Interior

772 F.3d 901 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 2, 2014

We then “turn[ed] to the merits” of the suit, ie., whether the Tribe’s land qualifies as “Indian land” under the IGRA. Id. at 383 . … A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.

Biscoe v. Arlington County

738 F.2d 1352 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 6, 1984

We believe the actions at issue were clearly ministerial and operational, as those terms are defined by the District courts, and that neither Officer Kyle nor the County was immune from suit under local law. … This is especially so where, as here, the officer is constrained both by regulations and clearly established policy and standards, about which experts can, and have testified.

United States v. Charles W. Ramsey

165 F.3d 980 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 2, 1999

Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783-84 (9th Cir.1981) (DEA agent not qualified as expert but his expert testimony on drug trade was upheld in light of his experience). … Yet a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003 is clearly “[something of value” given “for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation,” 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2).

FG Hemisphere Associates, LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo

447 F.3d 835 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 19, 2006

The context of the language underscores its force; we used it to explain our decision to give the foreign government an extra chance to establish its jurisdictional immunity under FSIA—even after having just found no substantial … basis for immunity. 811 F.2d at 1551.

Simons v. Bellinger

643 F.2d 774 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Nov 6, 1980

Goodwin, supra, is subject to a qualified immunity. … Under a qualified immunity, the "good faith" of the defendant Committee members would clearly be a material fact in dispute and we would have to reverse the judgment of the trial court.

El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates

496 F.3d 658 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 27, 2007

I The facts below summarize the district court’s detailed findings after a bench trial, which we set aside only if clearly erroneous. See El-Hadad v. Embassy of U.A.E., No. 96-1943, 2006 WL 826098 (D.D.C. … That is enough under our “clearly erroneous” standard of review. FED . R. CIV . P. 52(a).

Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd v. Federal Republic of Nigeria

112 F.4th 1054 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 9, 2024

We have jurisdiction because a denial of sovereign immunity qualifies for interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. El–Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 216 F.3d 29, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2000). … We also declined to construe the reservation as limiting the Convention to disputes arising from acts that would qualify as commercial for immunity purposes. See id. at 104–05.

Stabil LLC v. Russian Federation

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 13, 2026

Cir. 2021) (explaining that foreign states are “generally immune” under the FSIA, but that the Act “also established various exceptions” (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605)); see also Permanent Mission of India to the United … But not every agreement qualifies.

Rochon, Donald v. Gonzales, Alberto

438 F.3d 1211 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 28, 2006

We conclude the Congress clearly has waived sovereign immunity from claims of retaliation. Section 2000e-16(a) prohibits the executive departments from discriminating in personnel actions. … Nor did the Supreme Court in any way qualify its observation in Morton v.

Ricky Mark Graham v. David P. Davis

880 F.2d 1414 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 1, 1989

Finally, we note that both Cauley and Davis moved for a directed verdict on qualified immunity grounds and also requested a jury instruction regarding the defense of qualified immunity. … The district court ruled that qualified immunity did not apply in this case. While Cauley does not raise this issue on appeal, he may be entitled to a defense of qualified immunity on remand. See Graham v.

Janicker v. George Washington University

94 F.R.D. 648 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 29, 1982

The fact that a defendant anticipates the contingency of litigation resulting from an accident or event does not automatically qualify an “in house” report as work product. … A more or less routine investigation of a possibly resistible claim is not sufficient to immunize an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business.

Chevron Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador

795 F.3d 200 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 4, 2015

“[T]his is only a burden of production; the burden of persuasion rests with the foreign sovereign claiming immunity, which must establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. … The statute requires the District Court to satisfy itself that the party challenging immunity has presented prima facie evidence of an agreement between the parties and that the sovereign asserting immunity has failed to

Alemu v. Dep't of For-Hire Vehicles

327 F. Supp. 3d 29 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 21, 2018

DFHV further argues that Plaintiffs' antitrust claims fail because they do not establish antitrust standing and because DFHV is immune to antitrust liability. See id. at 15-20. Mr. … Sub-state governmental entities are immune from antitrust liability so long as they act "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation" that is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed."

Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran

896 F.3d 501 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 20, 2018

Unless Congress "clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional," we generally treat the limitation as non-jurisdictional. Arbaugh v. … The act-of-war exception thus does not qualify as a threshold issue that may be considered before establishing the court's jurisdiction.

Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 5, 2025

Russia asserted sovereign immunity and argued that none of the FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity applied. … Ct. 480 (2025) (“The FSIA’s text makes clear that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, and the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction always rests with the party asserting jurisdiction.”).

In Re Oliver L. North (Clair E. George Fee Application)

62 F.3d 1434 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 21, 1994

An indictment establishes probable cause that the accused has committed a crime. Guilt can be established only by a much higher standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. … Padelford qualified under the terms of a statute and a pardon that promised restoration of his property if he took a prescribed oath.

Azima v. RAK Inv. Auth.

305 F. Supp. 3d 149 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 30, 2018

The emails that Azima has submitted clearly demonstrate that he functioned as one of the "middle men, the messengers" (7/23/16-7/25/16 Email Chain, Ex. B to Pl.' … This is not to say that Azima's complaint could not have more clearly pled the allegations relating to the direct effect prong.

Eli Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran

94 F.4th 1053 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 8, 2024

Cir. 2022), and a default judgment qualifies for payment through the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20144(b)(2)(B), 20144(j)(4). … Cir. 2012) (“The FSIA established a broad grant of immunity for foreign sovereigns that can only be abrogated by one of the statute’s narrowly drawn exceptions.”).

Slack v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.

325 F. Supp. 3d 146 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 30, 2018

Because Congress did not clearly declare its intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it passed the FCA, it has not conferred jurisdiction on the Court to hear Ms. Slack's FCA claim. … Finally, as noted above, WMATA's contract with the FTA does not clearly convey rights to third parties.