Case law

Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Interior

826 F.2d 43 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 14, 1987

We of course agree that this provision is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that must be strictly construed. Shaw, 106 S.Ct. at 2963 . … To select the $150 hourly rate it used, the district court relied on the schedule of fees for the Washington area established by the district court in Laffey v.

Norfolk & Washington Steamboat Co. v. Davis

12 App. D.C. 306 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 8, 1898

The onus of proof, of course, was upon the plaintiff to establish the fact of the publication of the letter containing the libel declared on, and that the letter was written and published under such circumstances as to render … These restrictive and qualifying instructions, when read in connection with'the general instruction upon the subject of damages, would seem to have guarded the rights of the defendant amply.

12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified Carrier Registration Plan Bd.

282 F. Supp. 3d 190 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 18, 2017

Therefore, Plaintiffs have established that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their Sunshine Act claim. 2. … It does not clearly establish any website activity by District residents.

National Labor Relations Board v. The Gateway Theatre Corporation D/B/A Senator Theatre, Capitol Hill Cinemas

818 F.2d 971 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 27, 1987

On June 16, 1983, Gateway management met with representatives of Local 224 of the Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Protective Union (the “Union”), seeking to make arrangements to obtain the services of qualified projectionists … It is well established that, under District of Columbia law, an employee is terminable at will in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary. See Minihan v.

The Washington Post Company v. Eugene J. Keogh

365 F.2d 965 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 28, 1966

The affidavit, however, is clearly inadmissible and appears to have been treated as such by the District Court. 7 *971 Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., requires that “[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal … The costliness of this process would especially deter less established publishers from taking chances and, since columns such as Pearson’s are highly popular attractions, competition with publishers who can afford to verify

American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen (Two Cases)

186 F.2d 529 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 26, 1949

We need not pass upon the technical distinction between “center of the course” and “center of the airway,” because, even adopting appellant’s theory, the evidence clearly establishes a deliberate violation of the safety regulation … The flight plan, drawn up, approved, and partially executed by appellant’s admittedly experienced and otherwise qualified personnel, indicates that the “course intended to be flown” by this plane from Pulaski to Tri-City

Graceba Total Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, Ad Hoc Ivds Coalition, Intervenors

115 F.3d 1038 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 20, 1997

Although Graceba won the two licenses for which it competed, it did not qualify for a bidding credit because it was neither minority- nor woman-owned. … Because parties may supplement their pleadings in pending proceedings with agency approval, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.45 (c), 1.106(f), the Commission clearly had the discretion to entertain Graeeba’s belated petition.

Hutchins v. Hutchins

48 App. D.C. 495 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 31, 1919

It is difficult for a physician who, as in this instance, acquired his knowledge from professional contact with his patient, under any circumstances to qualify as a witness within the statute to express an opinion as to the … court considers the previous ruling to be the law of this ease, in view of the fact that the caveator was restricted by it; and, since such restriction was imposed at the instance and insistence of the caveatees, they are clearly

United States v. Shah, Shashi

453 F.3d 520 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 11, 2006

Thus, even if we assume arguendo that Shah’s involvement with Cruz alone was insufficient to trigger  7 § 3B1.1(c), the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, which is the standard … This sets a defendant’s base offense level at 38 “if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), and the offense of conviction establishes

Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

872 F.2d 438 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 7, 1989

As the agency’s brief to this court states: “New tight formation gas” qualifying under Section 103(b)(2) which was committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on April 20,1977, and which would not otherwise qualify for … FERC’s brief to this court states that there should be few cases where gas that is qualified under Section 107(c)(5) has not been qualified for a deregulated status for which it is eligible---- [implementation of NGPA deregulation

American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency

862 F.3d 50 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 7, 2017

Second, it establishes that spent catalysts — which were ineligible for exclusions under the 2008 Rule — could qualify for the exemptions in the 2015 regulation. Id. at 1,738/1. … We cannot clearly infer what EPA would have done absent that exclusion.

Empire State Highway Transportation Association, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Board and United States of America, American Export Lines, Intervenors

291 F.2d 336 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 27, 1961

23, 1955, under section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, set forth in the margin. 1 It is seen from the terms of section 15 that action taken in concert by members of a conference under an approved section 15 agreement is immunized … That they shall establish, publish and maintain tariffs containing just and reasonable rates, charges, classifications, rules, regulations and practices with respect to such services — the first such tariff to be established

Daniel F. Guinan, D/B/A Guinan Realty Company v. Federal Communications Commission, Louis Adelman, Intervenor

297 F.2d 782 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 7, 1961

At the time of designation, Adelman was found to be legally, financially, and technically qualified to construct and operate his proposed station. … In other words, this is just the sort of problem which the Commission was established to determine.

Robert H. Michel v. Donnald K. Anderson

14 F.3d 623 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 25, 1994

O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 , 104 S.Ct. 91 , 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983), establishes that congressmen asserting such a claim, have suffered an Article III injury. … The district court, it will be recalled, thought the House rule would have violated Article I if it had not been qualified by the revote provision, because it would have “invested the delegates with legislative power.”

Parmelee v. United States

113 F.2d 729 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 14, 1940

The only question before us is whether the book “Nudism in Modern Life” is obscene, in the light of the applicable standard intended to be established by the statute. … It is impossible to eliminate the sense *733 stimulus, or to establish a system *f societal usage in which indecency shall be impossible.

Drg Funding Corporation v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

76 F.3d 1212 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 20, 1996

But even if the prior decision conclusively establishes that DRG’s judgment is against the United States for purposes of limits on garnishment arising out of sovereign immunity doctrines, that would fail to establish that … See 5 U.S.C. § 103 (identifying government corporations); 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (a)(2)(A) (establishing Ginnie Mae as a “body corporate” without capital stock within HUD).

McCurley v. National Savings & Trust Co.

258 F. 154 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 5, 1919

Appellant, if she would succeed here, must establish error affirmatively. Cliquot’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 140 , 18 L. Ed. 116 ; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 522 , 5 Sup. Ct. 1014, 29 L. … The question clearly referred to the Dickerson contract, for up to that time there was no mention of any other, and was proper cross-examination.

Linda Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States of America

904 F.2d 719 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 13, 1990

That the "procedure" established by the Regulations is suitable to Lilliput is equally beyond doubt. … Congress clearly intended by the FTCA to create a system through which meritorious claims would be paid.

United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Eichberg

14 F.2d 248 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 1, 1926

They have suggested the argument that it was so far put in place of the sovereign as to share the immunity of the sovereign from suit otherwise than as the sovereign allows. … In general, the United States cannot be sued for a tort; but its immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc., Intervenors

117 F.3d 1485 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 11, 1997

The CDUC ordered CL&P to pay the municipal rate, as the statute clearly commands. … American Electric Power, 461 U.S. 402, 406 , 103 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 76 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) (PURPA and implementing regulations “requirfe] a utility to purchase electricity from a [qualified facility] at a rate equal to the