Case law

Edward Spannaus v. U.S. Department of Justice

824 F.2d 52 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 21, 1987

United States, 594 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam), which clearly recognized the distinction. Nor do the facts of Dettmann signal a departure from well-settled law. … Nor can we read the New York district court's offhand remark — that plaintiff is "free to file a new FOIA action for the ... documents," J.A. at 59 — to overrule established law, much less law that it never expressly considered

United States v. Walter E. Ashe, United States of America v. Walter E. Ashe

478 F.2d 661 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 26, 1973

Of course the judge clearly charges it is the jury’s role to make the determination. … Paul Weis-berg, who did qualify as a psychiatric expert, that appellant was not suffering from mental illness. Dr.

Dong, Margaret v. Smithsonian Inst

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 17, 1997

It is plain that the Smithsonian is not an establishment in the executive branch. … Thus Congress evidently viewed the four specified classes as examples of "establishments in the executive branch," so that an entity clearly outside the executive branch would not qualify even if it could otherwise be

Mohamed Habib and Middle East Services v. Raytheon Company and Raytheon Services Company

616 F.2d 1204 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Feb 25, 1980

On May 17, 1971, three days after the Abdallah contract was signed, Rayserve, MES and Habib entered into a contract (the “Habib contract”) under which Habib agreed to “identify” and “qualify” a “Saudi Sponsor/Agent”, to provide … Recent cases in this Circuit indicate that we must be satisfied that the moving party has clearly established the appropriateness of summary judgment before affirming. See, e. g., United States v.

In Re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan

427 F.3d 981 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 30, 2003

As we have in the past, we note that because this attorneys’ fee provision “constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity it is to be strictly construed.” … We have in the past listed four nonexhaustive circumstances sufficient to qualify for attorney fees award in the face of the “but for” requirement: 1.

United States v. Jackson, Tarry

415 F.3d 88 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 22, 2005

The Government invokes the so-called “automobile exception” established by the Court in Carroll v. … This position is clearly untenable under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Minority Employees at Nasa (Mean), Diane A. Moore v. James M. Beggs, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Minority Employees at Nasa (Mean), Gloria Taliaferro v. James M. Beggs, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Minority Employees at Nasa (Mean), Rose Mary Ferguson v. James M. Beggs, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

723 F.2d 958 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 20, 1983

Statistical and other comparative information is clearly "relevant to the claim" of an individual plaintiff in a Title VII case. … We cannot say that his findings, based on the evidence before him, were clearly erroneous. But the effect of the discovery order was to deny Ms.

D.C. Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, Corp.

925 F.3d 481 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 28, 2019

HealthCare Alliance, a locally funded program that provides medical coverage for uninsured District residents who do not qualify for Medicaid. … See 42 C.F.R. §§ 438.4(a), 438.5(b) (defining “actuarially sound capitation rates” and establishing rate development standards).

Organogenesis Inc. v. Sebelius

41 F. Supp. 3d 14 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 6, 2014

Circuit has previously interpreted this provision to “clearly preclude judicial review of the Secretary’s adjustments to prospective payment amounts.” Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 112 (D.C.Cir.2004). … not qualify as a SCOD, 42 U.S.C. § 1395Z (t)(12)(A) precludes this Court’s review.

United States v. Al-Imam

382 F. Supp. 3d 51 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 16, 2019

"qualified person" requirement. … Nor do the cases Al-Imam cites establish the proposition he advances. It is true that in United States v. Estrella , 72 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (tbl.), the D.C.

Merlaud v. National Metropolitan Bank

84 F.2d 238 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Apr 6, 1936

The defendant National Metropolitan Bank was duly appointed and qualified as executor. … The court below dismissed the bill, being of the view “that the agreement upon which the bill is based is clearly champertous in its nature, and that it would be against public *240 policy for the Court to lend its aid to

United States v. Jose L. M. Pardo, United States of America v. Cecil P. Tate, United States of America v. Sixto R. Mendoza, United States of America v. Paul A. Goodwin

636 F.2d 535 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 11, 1980

From this, a jury clearly could have concluded that Mendoza knew what was in the bag and was in a position to exercise some control over it. … This court reversed Monroe's firearm conviction, finding the facts insufficient to establish constructive possession.

Gassenheimer v. United States

26 App. D.C. 432 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jan 4, 1906

Evidence clearly insufficient to establish the independent fact which alone justifies its admission often has, as has been said before, a very injurious effect upon the defendant, who is entitled to an unprejudiced consideration … its conclusion ought clearly to have prevailed.

Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of the Zam.

299 F. Supp. 3d 160 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Mar 8, 2018

On April 11, 2014, the Court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction based on plaintiff's failure to perfect service on defendant in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( … And even if the letter could qualify as "protected activity," no reasonable juror could infer retaliation based on the letter.

Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal Communications Commission, Missouri State Conference of Branches of the Naacp, Intervenors

154 F.3d 494 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 15, 1998

The processing guidelines, for their part, clearly do not require that a station exercise a racial hiring preference, but only set the conditions under which some further inquiry into a station’s hiring practices might occur … As the Supreme Court noted in establishing this framework, “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie ease of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 .

Liquid Carbonic Industries Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

29 F.3d 697 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jul 22, 1994

Despite the questions, we have reaffirmed the holding in CAS' I: “EPCA clearly removes the judicial authority to create prudential barriers by granting review of agency action to those “who may be adversely affected.’ ” Competitive … Prudential standing limits apply to parties seeking to establish standing based on a violation of PURPA.

Las Vegas Valley Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission

589 F.2d 594 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Oct 26, 1978

(Valley) disputes the Commission’s conclusion that it was not financially qualified for the license. We affirm the FCC’s order as to Western, but remand for further proceedings as to Valley’s application. I. … But in this situation, KORK’s contract with the network, the Commission’s 1970 statement, and the Commission’s rule all clearly barred clipping.

United States v. George Vernon Hansen

772 F.2d 940 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Aug 30, 1985

Its “sweeping ... language,” id., clearly embraces the omissions on Hansen’s EIGA forms. … Good faith reliance upon advice of counsel would establish a defense against § 1001, see United States v.

United States v. Duane Colbert Edwards, United States of America v. Vonda Michelle Dortch

98 F.3d 1364 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Dec 20, 1996

for certain drug offenses if the defendant qualifies for the “safety valve.” … We review the district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and we accord “due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”

David Linder v. National Security Agency

94 F.3d 693 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Sep 6, 1996

As part of discovery, the Linders served third-party subpoenas duces tecum on several U.S. government agencies, including the National Security Agency (“NSA”), seeking information that would help establish their claims in … The court has broad discretion in determining whether a subpoena is unduly burdensome, and a decision to quash will be reversed only if it is “clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.”