Case law

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  • Emmanuel Mejia v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General

    298 F.3d 873 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 2, 2002

    Once more, the BIA inexplicably did not consider the crucial elements of Mejia’s claim that he qualified for asylum. … The BIA did not even “purport[ ] to engage in any substantive analysis” of this issue, although Mejia clearly presented it to the BIA and provided with his motion to re *880 open evidence going to the question the BIA had

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • Aaron L. Kolom and Serita Kolom v. United States

    791 F.2d 762 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 15, 1986

    The double taxation of Kolom’s sale of the stock options clearly meets each of the three criteria. … Specifically, it is argued: “[E]quitable recoupment constitutes only a defense to liability sought to be established in a timely action involving the transaction in question.

    Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990)Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Nasser Mustapha Karouni v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General

    399 F.3d 1163 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 7, 2005

    “On account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” As noted in the preceding section, to qualify for asylum, Karouni must establish that the future persecution he fears … As a result, Karouni may qualify for asylum only by establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 . 10 .

    Cited 93 timesPublished
  • Jefferson v. Scribner

    225 F. App'x 452 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 14, 2007

    Applying the rules set forth by the Court prior to Crawford , we hold that the state court’s conclusion that Newell’s statements — uttered after he was shot by Jefferson and while he was still badly bleeding — qualified as … spontaneous statements that are reliable and satisfy the Confrontation Clause, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Roberto Hernandez-Escobar

    911 F.3d 952 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 20, 2018

    Instead, the court ruled, the evidence “establishe[d], beyond any reasonable doubt,” that the cash “constituted proceeds from [Roberto’s] narcotics trafficking.” 2 We may reverse this finding only if it is clearly erroneous—that … The court plausibly found Roberto’s interview statements “qualified and disingenuous” and “clearly calculated to ‘support’ his father’s claim without risking criminal liability or his own credit for cooperation

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Charles Hedlund v. Charles Ryan

    750 F.3d 793 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 24, 2014

    There is no clearly established law governing implied bias, and Hedlund has not shown that implied bias should apply here. There is no clearly established federal law regarding the issue of implied bias. … As we have previously recognized, this approach is not contrary to clearly established federal law. See Towery v.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Assigned Container Ship Claims, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd.

    784 F.2d 1420 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 18, 1986

    Lines’s petitions to MARAD are clearly within the purview of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. … Under these circumstances, absent a showing that the petition was a “sham,” petitioning MARAD was immune from antitrust liability.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Warren v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.

    111 F.3d 139 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 15, 1997

    In the context of determining qualified immunity for officers who use deadly force, the same reasonableness requirement that applies on the merits applies to the qualified immunity determination. Hopkins v. … The issue is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct here was lawful, given the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. DeNieva v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • People of California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. Environmental Protection Agency

    511 F.2d 963 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 13, 1975

    . § 1342 ] established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [hereinafter NPDES]. … Nowhere in the language of Section 402, establishing the NPDES, is there any suggestion that the Administrator may establish a dual permit system, administered in part by a state and in part by himself.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Table Bluff Reservation v. Philip Morris, Inc.

    256 F.3d 879 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 16, 2001

    . § 1981 , the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Thirteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). … The Hise court characterized this allegation as “frivolous,” because “plaintiffs clearly have no recognized property interest in paying a certain sum to a retailer to purchase a tobacco product.” Id.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Marla James v. The City of Costa Mesa

    684 F.3d 825 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 21, 2012

    The CSA directly addresses whether medical marijuana use constitutes illegal use of drugs, and clearly states that such use is unlawful. . … Because we conclude that the plaintiffs are not qualified individuals with a disability protected by the ADA, we do not reach Costa Mesa’s alternative argument that the ADA does not require accommodation of a qualified individual's

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Anderson v. Evans

    314 F.3d 1006 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 20, 2002

    This language was inserted into the Schedule after some IWC delegates questioned whether the Tribe qualified for the aboriginal subsistence quota. See Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir.2000). … Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 682 , 99 S.Ct. 3055 ("Although non-treaty fishermen might be subjected to any reasonable state fishing regulation serving any legitimate purpose, treaty fishermen are immune

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • In Re: Max R. Moses Marlene E. Moses, Debtors. Howard Ehrenberg, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, in Re: Max R. Moses Marlene E. Moses, Debtors. Southern California Permanente Medical Group v. Howard Ehrenberg, Chapter 7 Trustee

    167 F.3d 470 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 26, 1999

    The profit-sharing plan was established as a spendthrift trust and its benefits are payable only upon a participant's termination of employment, retirement, disability or death. … See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760 , 112 S.Ct. at 2248 , 119 L.Ed.2d 519 . 36 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" clearly included federal and state law.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Tsoi Sim v. United States

    116 F. 920 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 5, 1902

    D. 1901; and that when she was so found, as aforesaid, she was without the certificate of residence required by said acts; and she has not clearly established that by reason of accident, sickness, or other unavoidable cause … Gue Lim, supra, upon what method of legal reasoning can it be held that the •wife of an American citizen is not entitled to the same “rights, privileges, and immunities” under the law?

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • McKenzy Alfred v. Merrick Garland

    64 F.4th 1025 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 30, 2023

    Such knowing conduct is sufficient to establish generic intent. … Surely if Congress had meant to establish such a general regime of wholesale state-by-state exemption from the criminal alien provisions of the INA, it would have used language more clearly indicative of such an extraordinary

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Anthony Booth v. United States

    914 F.3d 1199 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 31, 2019

    UNITED STATES immunity for the entire time an injured party is a minor. … UNITED STATES 13 on the legislative history of § 2401 and the sources of subsections (a) and (b), Glenn concluded that Congress did not intend “that the sentence in [§ 2401(a)] qualified the limitation

    Cited 47 timesPublished
  • Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson

    764 F.2d 581 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 24, 1985

    A mere listing of mitigation measures is insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion required by NEPA. See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d at 1096 . … This finding is not clearly erroneous. 5 IV.

    Reversed on other grounds by Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Zaka Ullah v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

    73 F.3d 370 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 29, 1995

    The BIA consequently deferred to the IJ's adverse findings and determined that, because Ullah's testimony was not credible, he had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. … Thus, in determining that Ullah did not qualify for asylum or withholding of deportation, the BIA set out only general legal standards which failed to provide any evidence of an individualized review of Ullah's contentions

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Howard Ehrenberg, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group

    167 F.3d 470 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 26, 1999

    The profit-sharing plan was established as a spendthrift trust and its benefits are payable only upon a participant’s termination of employment, retirement, disability or death. … The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the phrase “applicable nonbankruptcy law” clearly included federal and state law. See id. at 757 , 112 S.Ct. at 2246 , 119 L.Ed.2d 519 .

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Eun Kyung Park v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

    252 F.3d 1018 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 5, 2001

    that: (1) the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Park’s last motion for a continuance; (2) the withdrawal of co-counsel before the final hearing did not prejudice Park’s case; and (3) Park’s “conviction record ... established … IIRIRA, however, clearly states, and we have so held, that the modified definition of “aggravated felony” applies retroactively to all defined offenses, regardless of the date of conviction.

    Overruled on other grounds by Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (2006)Cited 52 timesPublished

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