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  • JOHN DOE1 v. REED

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 22, 2009

    A dis- trict court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Am. … It does not prevent the peti- tion signers from signing the petitions or from otherwise lawfully qualify- ing their referendum for a vote.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Dereck Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc.

    725 F.3d 1170 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 7, 2013

    Scream Icon is nonetheless clearly identifiable in the middle of the screen throughout the video. … But regardless of the meaning of the original, it clearly says nothing about religion.

    Cited 39 timesPublished
  • Marla James v. The City of Costa Mesa

    684 F.3d 825 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 21, 2012

    The CSA directly addresses whether medical marijuana use constitutes illegal use of drugs, and clearly states that such use is unlawful. . … Because we conclude that the plaintiffs are not qualified individuals with a disability protected by the ADA, we do not reach Costa Mesa’s alternative argument that the ADA does not require accommodation of a qualified individual's

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • United States v. Arenas

    340 F. App'x 384 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 30, 2009

    Whether a defendant qualifies as a minor participant-is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1282 (9th Cir.2006). … In the absence of any persuasive argument that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Arenas’ involvement in the offense was not minor, she has not carried her burden of establishing entitlement to a minor participant

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Alvarado Community Hospital v. Shalala

    155 F.3d 1115 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 11, 1998

    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held with respect to the Act that “it cannot be clearly determined that Congress intended the Secretary to recalculate outlier payments after final payment data became … experts, on the other hand, state that the preliminary data clearly indicated outlier payments were going to fall below their projected amounts.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Emmanuel Mejia v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General

    298 F.3d 873 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 2, 2002

    Once more, the BIA inexplicably did not consider the crucial elements of Mejia’s claim that he qualified for asylum. … The BIA did not even “purport[ ] to engage in any substantive analysis” of this issue, although Mejia clearly presented it to the BIA and provided with his motion to re *880 open evidence going to the question the BIA had

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • Aaron L. Kolom and Serita Kolom v. United States

    791 F.2d 762 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 15, 1986

    The double taxation of Kolom’s sale of the stock options clearly meets each of the three criteria. … Specifically, it is argued: “[E]quitable recoupment constitutes only a defense to liability sought to be established in a timely action involving the transaction in question.

    Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990)Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Russel K. Williams, Et Ux. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

    795 F.2d 738 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 24, 1986

    The May 1984 State Department bulletin established that Williams’ priority date qualified him for the immediate issuance of an immigrant visa. At this point, Williams resembled Tantalus. … Denial was clearly appropriate if Williams did not establish a prima facie case for the underlying relief. E.g., id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 .

    Cited 37 timesPublished
  • Bundy v. United States District Court for the District of Nevada

    840 F.3d 1034 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 28, 2016

    “Clearly erroneous” is the standard we associate with reviewing findings of fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). … That finding is not clearly erroneous.

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Class v. City of Seattle

    955 F.2d 1268 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 4, 1992

    We review the district court’s factual determination that Chemical Bank adequately represented the interests of all Bondholders under the clearly erroneous standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Kruso v. … With these principles in mind, we find no legal impediment to a state’s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity for the limited purpose of taking part in the settlement proceedings despite otherwise interposing immunity

    Cited 333 timesPublished
  • Jamie Baddour v. Sean Hart

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 28, 2018

    The district court properly granted Officer Hart qualified immunity, and properly granted summary judgment on Baddour’s municipal liability and “stigma- plus” claims, because Baddour failed to raise a triable dispute as … issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation); City of Los Angeles v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • J. Jack Bras, Individually and Doing Business as J. Jack Bras & Associates v. California Public Utilities Commission

    59 F.3d 869 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 5, 1995

    The Code and Order are not immunized from scrutiny because they purport to establish “goals” rather than “quotas.” We look to the economic realities of the program rather than the label attached to it. … While the Code and Order do not expressly state that public utilities must adopt any particular programs such as bidding preferences or set-asides, they clearly have the practical effect of requiring them to do so.

    Cited 67 timesPublished
  • United States v. Reyes

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 18, 2009

    According to the district court, defense counsel should have sought immunity for the witnesses, and then proved, through their testimony, that the Finance Department did know about the scheme. … The SEC’s complaint against Canova clearly alleges that Canova did know that backdating was occurring. As a joint press release emphasized, the FBI, SEC, and U.S.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Arenas

    340 F. App'x 384 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 30, 2009

    Whether a defendant qualifies as a minor participant-is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1282 (9th Cir.2006). … In the absence of any persuasive argument that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Arenas’ involvement in the offense was not minor, she has not carried her burden of establishing entitlement to a minor participant

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • McKenzy Alfred v. Merrick Garland

    64 F.4th 1025 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 30, 2023

    Such knowing conduct is sufficient to establish generic intent. … Surely if Congress had meant to establish such a general regime of wholesale state-by-state exemption from the criminal alien provisions of the INA, it would have used language more clearly indicative of such an extraordinary

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson

    764 F.2d 581 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 24, 1985

    A mere listing of mitigation measures is insufficient to qualify as the reasoned discussion required by NEPA. See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d at 1096 . … This finding is not clearly erroneous. 5 IV.

    Reversed on other grounds by Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988)Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Warren v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept.

    111 F.3d 139 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 15, 1997

    In the context of determining qualified immunity for officers who use deadly force, the same reasonableness requirement that applies on the merits applies to the qualified immunity determination. Hopkins v. … The issue is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct here was lawful, given the clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. DeNieva v.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Thomas Richey v. D. Dahne

    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 25, 2018

    Dahne appeals, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity on both claims. … Neither our prior case law nor that of the Supreme Court has clearly established that merely refusing to accept a grievance for processing is a retaliatory adverse action.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States

    267 F.3d 1019 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 24, 2001

    Accordingly, Leisnoi brought an action in federal court against the United States under the Quiet Title Act, which waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for actions involving “a disputed title to real property … Consequently, Leisnoi did not need to demonstrate that its case was within the limitations period as part of establishing jurisdiction for its claim. .

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Culinary And Service Employees Union, Afl-Cio Local 555 v. Hawaii Employee Benefit Administration, Inc.

    688 F.2d 1228 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 27, 1982

    The complaint also alleged that the new union trustees were not qualified under the prudent investor standard of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(B), and the restrictions of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 501 (a), 504 … It is the filing of a notice of appeal that invokes our jurisdiction and establishes the issues to be addressed. Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1981).

    Cited 28 timesPublished

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