Case law

Bassiri v. Xerox Corp.

463 F.3d 927 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 11, 2006

We will not upset that established definition unless compelled to do so. … As the Supreme Court noted in Morash, “[t]he precise coverage of ERISA is not clearly set forth in the Act.” 490 U.S. at 113.

United States v. Pool

621 F.3d 1213 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 14, 2010

See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837 (“the DNA profile derived from the defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record of the defendant’s identity — otherwise personal information in which the qualified offender can claim no … right of privacy once lawfully convicted of a qualifying offense (indeed, once lawfully arrested and booked into state custody).”); Jones v.

Evans v. United States Department of Interior

604 F.3d 1120 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 13, 2010

Moreover, Samish itself establishes that recognition rul- ings or adjudication can have no effect in the establishment of treaty rights of the recognized tribe. … Mere distaste for Snohomish recognition does not qualify for intervention as “an interest relating to the prop- erty or transaction that is the subject of the action, . . . so situ- ated that disposing of the action may as

SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intern. Corp.

617 F.3d 1072 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 16, 2010

In light of the above, the district court’s decision was neither “clearly unreasonable” nor inequitable. … [7] Rule 144 establishes several explicit safe harbors that qualify for the Section 4(1) exemption.

Jerry Davis v. Department of Corrections

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 24, 2023

First Amendment right was clearly established. … Butz and Pollard argue they are entitled to qualified immunity, but whether qualified immunity applies here depends on a jury’s resolution of factual issues.

United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca

655 F.3d 915 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 11, 2011

PENAL CODE § 261.5(a), does not qualify categorically as “statutory rape” because it establishes eighteen rather than sixteen as the age of consent. Rodriguez-Guzman, 506 F.3d at 746 . … Both cases clearly express approval for applying the modified categorical approach to convictions under divisible statutes.

RINCON BAND OF LUISENO MISSION v. Schwarzenegger

602 F.3d 1019 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 20, 2010

No one disputes that requir- ing a tribe to waive its sovereign immunity from state taxation in order to obtain a compact is clearly contrary to IGRA. … Instead, it exercises its authority to negotiate, which IGRA clearly permits.” Id.

United States v. Cottrell

333 F. App'x 213 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 8, 2009

Evidence established that Cottrell obtained maps to the car dealerships and used his car to transport the group throughout the night. … In the face of this substantial evidence of his involvement, the jury’s guilty verdict was clearly based on sufficient evidence. B.

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalition for Economic Equity

950 F.2d 1401 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 6, 1991

These accounts include numerous reports of MBEs being denied contracts despite being the low bidder, MBEs being told they were not qualified although they were later found qualified when evaluated by outside parties, MBEs … Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation under color of state law of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and federal laws.

Barnes v. Southern Pac. Co.

300 F. 481 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 4, 1924

A. 216 , we had occasion to consider the grant to the Northern Pacific, and rearded it as of a qualified or limited fee, made on implied condition of reverter in the event the company ceased to use or retain the land for … What specific acts of the railroad com'pany may constitute abandonment need not be discussed, further than to say the question generally is largely one of intention, to be established by acts which clearly indicate nonuser

United States v. Malta

81 F. App'x 246 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Nov 17, 2003

Pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1, the offense statutory maximum establishes a career offender’s offense level. … First, the offense clearly involved five or more persons; specifically, Brenda Malta, James Malta, Lii, Naki, Candelaria, and Garcia.

California State Foster Parent Ass'n v. Wagner

624 F.3d 974 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 30, 2010

Section 672(a) requires the State to make foster care maintenance payments “on behalf of each child” qualifying for foster *980 care. … We therefore conclude that § 672(a)’s language is clearly mandatory, satisfying the third and final Blessing factor.

Michael Robert Pulido v. Chris Chrones, Warden, Michael Robert Pulido v. Chris Chrones, Warden

487 F.3d 669 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 30, 2007

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law. … To warrant habeas relief, "[t]he state court’s application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable,” not merely incorrect. Lockyer v.

Jacqueline Benjamin v. B & H Education

877 F.3d 1139 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 19, 2017

The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no expectation of compensation. … The test it establishes for employment is one of “control” that cannot be usefully applied to a school.

Samper v. PROVIDENCE ST. VINCENT MEDICAL CENTER

675 F.3d 1233 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 11, 2012

To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the ADA, Samper must show that “(1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions … [2] An individual is qualified if “with or without reason- able accommodation, [she] can perform the essential func-  SAMPER v. PROVIDENCE ST.

United States v. Robert Joseph Satterfield

572 F.2d 687 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 22, 1978

Despite an offer of immunity, Merri-weather testified that he would not under any circumstances testify about those statements exculpatory of Satterfield. … because corroborating circumstances do not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the witness.

Derrick Loftis v. Almager

704 F.3d 645 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 11, 2012

Loftis appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for his no contest plea. … West plea as a plea of nolo contendere that does not establish factual guilt.” Id. at 1089.

Rattray v. City Of National City

36 F.3d 1480 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Oct 7, 1994

and Veterans Code section 392 [granting immunity to members of the militia for acts performed in the course of their duties], California is immune from suit based on [a member of the militia's] alleged negligence unless … We adopt the holding of the Second Circuit. 36 According to established practice, all elements of a defamation claim, with the exception of actual malice in the case of a public official, must be proved by a preponderance

United States v. Carr

513 F.3d 1164 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 25, 2008

It is well established that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 , 91 S.Ct. 1056 , 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). … As the state “Felony Judgment and Sentence” clearly demonstrates, Carr voluntarily pleaded guilty to and was convicted of an offense that he knew was a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.

Alfrey v. United States

276 F.3d 557 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 11, 2002

As discussed below, the record does not establish that public policy was at play in the prison officials' choice amongst the "range” of cell-search options. … At the very least, we ought to require such a regulation clearly to grant discretion, and for the exercise of that discretion to be policy-based.