Case law
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Osama Al Ramahi v. Eric Holder, Jr.
725 F.3d 1133 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 6, 2013
To qualify for asylum, an alien must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s application for asylum was “filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158 … Clearly, waiting six months or longer after expiration or termination of status would not be considered reasonable.
Cited 53 timesPublishedFernando Del Valle v. Scott Thorne
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jan 23, 2020
Moreover, it was clearly established at the time of Thorne’s actions that discharging a taser on a non- threatening individual who had not committed a serious crime and had not engaged in aggressive or violent resistance … Accordingly, Zastrow’s role did not render him an integral participant in Thorne’s actions, and Zastrow is entitled to qualified immunity.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedUnited States v. Ortega-Ortega
197 F. App'x 667 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 16, 2006
The district court was thus required to conduct the “modified categorical” analysis to determine whether “documentation or judicially noticeable facts ... clearly establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for … clearly and unequivocally that the conviction was based on all of the elements of a qualifying predicate offense.”
Cited 0 timesPublishedUnited States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
457 F.3d 1009 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 8, 2006
Exceptions to clearly 9140 UNITED STATES v. … The proposed requirement discourages qui tam suits, as it establishes yet another roadblock to obtaining juris- diction for such suits.
Abrogated on other grounds by United States Ex Rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (2015)Cited 36 timesPublished324 F. App'x 653 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 28, 2009
The court found that Buckley established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. … would qualify for a mixed-motive instruction”).
Cited 0 timesPublishedProduce Pay, Inc. v. Izguerra Produce, Inc.
39 F.4th 1158 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 8, 2022
United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a qualified immunity defense may be raised at the pleadings stage in civil rights cases despite the difficulties of “decid[ing] far-reaching constitutional … Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th 1193 (9th Cir. 2021) (upholding dismissal of complaint based on qualified immunity); Weisbuch v.
Cited 13 timesPublished19 F.3d 26 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 2, 1994
immunity. 2 The court denied the motion as to Fewell and Wickham on the ground that the law governing their conduct was clearly established and that their use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances … A. 14 First, we conclude that the basic law governing the deputies' conduct was clearly established at the time of Bray's death.
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · May 30, 2019
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crockett’s Fourth Amendment claim related to Crockett’s fecal sample on the basis of qualified immunity because defendant’s conduct did not violate clearly established … Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014) (defendants sued under § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violated a right that was clearly established; “a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedHarmston v. City and County of San Francisco
627 F.3d 1273 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Dec 10, 2010
Reading these provisions “in pari materia,” the Supreme Court has held that “only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. … We also held that the remand order “qualifie[d] as an appealable collateral order under Cohen.” Id. These cases establish that remand orders are “final” for purposes of sweeping in prior non-final orders.
Cited 43 timesPublishedClaudia Rueda Vidal v. Andrew Bolton
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Sep 23, 2020
To defeat Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, Rueda Vidal must allege facts sufficient to support a plausible claim of (1) a violation of a constitutional right, that (2) was clearly established when the challenged … Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, as Rueda Vidal has not alleged facts sufficient to plausibly, not merely possibly, allege a violation of a clearly established right
Cited 0 timesUnpublishedVictor B. Valencia v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General
439 F.3d 1046 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Mar 6, 2006
United States, 495 *1049 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), a violation of section 261.5(c) qualifies as a crime of violence and hence as an aggravated felony “if and only if the full range of conduct covered … Under this “modified” categorical approach, we examine “documentation or judicially noticeable facts that clearly establish that the conviction is [an aggravated felony] [,] such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction
Cited 59 timesPublishedUnited States v. Denise Robertson
895 F.3d 1206 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jul 20, 2018
The district court’s finding that Agent Longton did not act in bad faith was not clearly erroneous. … On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding Agent Longton did not act in bad faith. See United States v.
Cited 144 timesPublished81 F.3d 1480 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 30, 1996
As to the first requirement, the blind plaintiffs in this case are clearly disabled. … However, it is not dear whether they meet the “qualified” prong because, as noted infra, they have failed to identify a specific program, activity, or benefit for which they are “qualified,” i.e. for which they “meet[] the
Cited 164 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Jun 16, 2008
Standing alone, that provision clearly would pre- clude our jurisdiction. … First, the regulations set out a non-exhaustive list of six potentially qualifying “ex- traordinary circumstances.” Clearly, this list provides a partial adjudicative standard in and of itself.
Cited 0 timesPublishedE. K. v. State of Hawaii Department Of
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 28, 2013
The GED and CB programs clearly satisfy the first prong of the definition. … Under both statutes, a plaintiff who requires an accommodation to meet a program’s essential eligibility requirements can establish the “otherwise qualified” element of the prima facie case only by producing “evidence of
Cited 0 timesPublished24 F.3d 249 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 20, 1994
I. 4 The DVA 1 argues that summary judgment was properly granted because Tanner did not establish that he was an otherwise qualified handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and thus failed to make … a prima facie showing of discrimination. 2 Tanner contends that he raised triable issues of fact material to whether he was an otherwise qualified handicapped individual at the time of his termination. 5 To establish a prima
Cited 0 timesPublished324 F. App'x 653 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 28, 2009
The court found that Buckley established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. … would qualify for a mixed-motive instruction”).
Cited 0 timesPublishedOtto D. Gray Etc. v. Swanney-Mcdonald, Inc., William Lawman v. Swanney-Mcdonald, Inc.
436 F.2d 652 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Feb 1, 1971
Appellants do not challenge appellee’s right to an exemption if the appellee can qualify as a retail or service establishment. … They contend that the district court’s implied finding that appellee was such an establishment was clearly erroneous because appellee did not prove that no more than 25 percent of its business was for resale.
Cited 18 timesPublishedCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Apr 18, 2005
Even if Zone could prove this hypothesis true through testimonial or documentary evidence, he would not qualify for relief under the Bartkus exception. … Accordingly, [I] first examine whether the district court clearly erred.” Executive Software N. Am., Inc., 24 F.3d at 1551 (citations omitted).
Cited 0 timesPublished16 F. App'x 766 · Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · Aug 14, 2001
Because Diaz did not qualify for the 2 level reduction under § 3El.l(a), he is ineligible for the additional 1 level reduction under § 3E1.1(b). See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2000). … Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that the Supreme Court had preserved AlmendarezTorres as a narrow exception to the rule *768 established in Apprendi v.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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