Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersca7

9,632 results

1.66s

  • Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy L. Killeen

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 28, 2020

    I concur with the majority opinion that, on this record, Speech First offered insufficient evidence of injury in fact to qualify for associational standing. … At this stage of this litigation specific facts establishing standing have not been presented. II.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • United States v. Lloyd J. Baretz

    411 F.3d 867 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 21, 2005

    The district court expressly found that the $54 million in loss to REFCO was established by a preponderance of the evidence. … Amended § 3E 1.1 provides: (a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • United States v. Arnold L. Hollingsworth, Jr. And William A. Pickard, III

    27 F.3d 1196 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 2, 1994

    . -, 112 S.Ct. 1535 , 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992), the courts of appeals had been drifting toward the view, clearly articulated by the Second Circuit in United States v. … We do not wish to be understood as holding that lack of present means to commit a crime is alone enough to establish entrapment if the government supplies the means.

    Cited 89 timesPublished
  • Jack Cooper v. Retrieval Masters Creditors

    42 F.4th 675 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 29, 2022

    But the rejection of that offer, especially if it is not a Rule 68 offer of judgment that qualifies for limited fees, should not be the sole fact that determines the fee award. … “Success must be measured not only in the amount of the recovery but also in terms of the principle established and the harm checked.” Zagorski v.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • David SEARS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee

    840 F.2d 394 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 26, 1988

    Ulrich was treating Sears; it is evident from the record that he was not an expert retained solely for the purpose of establishing a *400 disability. … Indeed, the doctor’s conclusions are qualified to encompass Sears’ then-present status. For example, Dr. Ul-rich concluded only that Sears was disabled “at the present time due to the severity of his current symptoms.”

    Cited 80 timesPublished
  • United States v. Harris, Spencer

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 6, 2008

    A probation officer then prepared a presentence investi- gation report (PSR), in which the officer determined that Harris was a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), because he had two prior qualifying felony convictions—an … The evidence was found in the same search as the drugs and weapons that supported the charges in the indictment, and the evidence clearly supported a jury verdict on a felon-in-possession count.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • 35 Fair empl.prac.cas. 296, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,517 James I. Grann, Johnny E. Winston, Gerald R. Whitfield, John F. Stippl, Francis L. Retelle, Steven R. Reinstra, Richard J. Miller, Robert M. Lombardo, Steven A. Koecke, Rudolph J. Jergovic, Bernard D. Hebard, William S. Gilfroy, Dennis A. Gerfen, Lemuel B. Graser, Robert J. Faust, and Kenneth D. Couture, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. City of Madison, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee

    738 F.2d 786 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 25, 1984

    Defendant cannot claim that Croal and plaintiffs are really the same people as they clearly are not. … The Commission designates state agencies that qualify under 706(c) of Title VII as "706 Agencies." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.70(a) (1983).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Federal Facilities Realty Trust v. Kulp

    220 F.2d 495 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 6, 1955

    It is at this stage of the proceeding, before final decree, that we are asked to reverse the order denying Darrow's petition. 5 It is essential at the beginning that we establish Darrow's status. … We think his petition was clearly within the jurisdiction of the District Court and that he should have had a hearing upon the merits. 12 It is urged that he is protected by a right of action against the two employees in

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Betty J. Archie v. City of Racine, Ronald W. Chiapete, and George W. Giese

    847 F.2d 1211 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 23, 1988

    This finding is not clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 , 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789 , 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). … Home Telephone and Snow-den together establish the indifference of constitutional norms to the content of state law. .

    Cited 439 timesPublished
  • Fabick, Inc. v. JFTCO, Inc.

    Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 9, 2019

    1760 & 19-1872 Moreover, a reasonable jury could have found that the ev- idence presented by JFTCO did not establish continuous use of the Fabick mark in the region sufficient to establish senior holder status. … A factual or legal error may be suf- ficient to establish an abuse of discretion.” Id.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • 58 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 768, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,383 Delbert King, and Vernon Brickey, Cross-Appellant v. General Electric Company, Cross-Appellee

    960 F.2d 617 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jun 8, 1992

    National Automatic Tool Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 87 (7th Cir.1986). 16 In order to establish a prima facie case in a reduction in force case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1 … Because a judge tries Title VII cases, we review those verdicts under a clearly erroneous standard. Sears, 839 F.2d at 309 .

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Higgason, James v. Morton, Howard

    171 F. App'x 509 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 21, 2006

    Nevertheless, the court concluded that Autterson was shielded from liability by qualified immunity. … The fact that Higgason’s attempt to litigate his claims in state court was unsuccessful does not establish that Indiana’s remedy is inadequate. See Hamlin v.

    Cited 24 timesUnpublished
  • Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations Board

    358 F.2d 656 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Mar 11, 1966

    But a literal reading fails to take into account the history and purpose of the Section, which shows that it was not intended to immunize a union member from discipline for defiance of a decision of the majority to strike … The last portion of the proviso to Section 101(a) (2) of the LMRDA quoted above, however, clearly protects the rights of a union reasonably to discipline members who violate contract clauses.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • United States v. Odicho, Sulayman

    215 F. App'x 546 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 8, 2007

    Eisha, having received immunity, testified for the government at trial. She explained that “Carlos,” a man she had met only twice, recruited her to sell a kilogram of cocaine. … The government need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that property qualifies under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) as forfeitable drug proceeds. See United States v. Melendez, 401 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2005).

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Lamar Chapman, III v. Burton Berger & Associates and James Gregory Smith

    46 F.3d 1133 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 6, 1995

    As Judge Smith's act of voiding a default judgment was clearly within his jurisdiction as a judge of the circuit court, he is entitled to immunity. … of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."'

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Debra C. Moran, and State of Illinois, Intervenor-Appellant v. Rush Prudential Hmo, Incorporated

    230 F.3d 959 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 19, 2000

    Section 514, however, contains a saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), which qualifies § 514(a) by excepting state laws from preemption when those laws “regulate[ ] insurance.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A); see Ward, 526 U.S. at 367 … Section 4-10 clearly satisfies the second and third McCarran-Ferguson factors. 3 The second McCarran-Ferguson factor is satisfied because § 4-10 creates a mandatory term in the insurance contract and, thus, “changes the bargain

    Cited 45 timesPublished
  • Bryn Mawr Care, Incorporated v. Kathleen Sebelius

    749 F.3d 592 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 8, 2014

    The district court ruled that Bryn Mawr failed to establish a protected interest, and that has been the parties’ focus on appeal. … “A property interest of constitutional magnitude exists only when the state’s discretion is ‘clearly limited’ such that the plaintiff cannot be denied the interest ‘unless specific conditions are met.’” Brown v.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Murphy v. United States

    285 F. 801 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 2, 1923

    But, standing alone and not otherwise qualified, they are not accepted as disqualifying a confession made pursuant thereto. … It is true that conspiracies may be established, though the efforts of the conspirators be futile.

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • Brian Miranda v. Blair J. Leibach

    394 F.3d 984 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 20, 2005

    We believe that the rule requiring that all issues for appeal be preserved in a written post-trial motion is solidly established in Illinois law. … United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ], qualifies as an intervening circumstance” that may purge post-arrest confession of taint of unlawful arrest); see also, e.g., State v.

    Cited 87 timesPublished
  • Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Association, Inc. v. Linley E. Pearson

    716 F.2d 1127 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 26, 1983

    their own or because they are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try. 47 Third, the nature of these cases is such that one cannot assume that attorneys will volunteer to represent minors at the hearings even for clearly … Those minors would qualify as indigent because, as far as their access to money is concerned, they are indigent.

    Cited 11 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.