Case law

United States v. David Lehman

468 F.2d 93 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 24, 1972

Clearly, the IRS agents used no physical coercion against Dr. Lehman. Nor is there any credible evidence of promises of nonprosecution or of leniency. … You being an expert and qualified as an expert, is there any obligation for a taxpayer to deposit all of the money that he earns into a bank account ? “A. No. “Q.

United States v. Joseph Polichemi

201 F.3d 858 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jan 13, 2000

After sixteen potential jurors had been qualified, the judge would call for simultaneously submitted peremptory challenges and then empanel those who were not struck. Jury selection began on May 15, 1996. … While the term “implied bias” is not one that is used often, the concept is nonetheless well established in the law.

Lachman v. Illinois State Board Of Education

852 F.2d 290 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 18, 1988

Once it is shown that the Act's requirements have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the responsible authorities. 9 Clearly, the consultation and procedural requirements of the Act have been met in this … MSTEP alleged that the complaint did not establish that it owed a duty to appellants. Therefore it claimed not to be a proper party defendant.

Benders, Evelyn v. Bellows and Bellows

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Feb 12, 2008

Bellows acknowledged in his affidavit, whatever B&B decided in May, Benders would have been a “qualifying employee”— and thus eligible for the December 2003 contribution—if not for her change in status. … While Benders clearly had an economic inter- est in reporting the matter, the evidence shows that she also held a good-faith belief that what B&B was doing was not lawful.

Ricky Outlaw v. Herb Newkirk and Cameron Mable, in His Individual Capacity

259 F.3d 833 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 3, 2001

Outlaw notes that the defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that Outlaw could not establish that Mable slammed the cuffport door on Outlaw’s hand with the malicious intent to harm him. … the evidentiary materials that Outlaw submitted were insufficient to prevent summary judgment as a substantive matter, (and have not excluded any of Outlaw’s materials from consideration on the ground that they did not qualify

Wayne A. Brannigan, Applicant v. United States

249 F.3d 584 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 20, 2001

"cause" and "prejudice," which is more difficult than establishing "plain error." … Crucial here is the answer to the question whether Apprendi qualifies as a new rule that was "previously unavailable" to Brannigan.

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Loomis

97 F.2d 831 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 20, 1938

The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now familiar law. … "(e) Qualifications of incorporators; selection of localities for establishment.

Martin v. Shawano-Gresham School District

295 F.3d 701 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 3, 2002

Thus, the plaintiffs can only succeed if they establish that the school had a duty to protect Timijane from suicide after the school day ended. … Martin 14 Because we conclude that the facts fail to support a constitutional claim, we need not reach the question of qualified immunity or whether the school district had a custom or policy creating municipal liability

Bourbon, Kenneth v. Kmart Corporation

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Aug 4, 2000

If Bourbon can establish his prima facie case, Kmart must then articulate a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for his termination. … Ordinarily, if all a plaintiff in a discrimination case could show was that he was qualified for a job (or promotion, or retention) but was passed over in favor of a person of a different race (sex, religion, etc.), his

Harriett G. Woodward, Special Administrator of the Estate of Justin Farver, Deceased v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc.

368 F.3d 917 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 17, 2004

CMS policy dictates that any employee administering the mental health screening and completing the CMS form was required to be qualified to do so. … He noted that Farver “came in almost screaming for help,” and that he had “never seen [a suicide risk] that was more [clearly documented] than this case.” Dr.

United States v. Shriver

980 F.2d 456 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Nov 23, 1992

‘When the language of the statute is lucid, we examine the legislative history only to see whether it reflects “a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.” ’ United States v. … The only problem is that both § 2512(l)(a) and (b) contain the qualifying term “primarily”, a word that forces the reader to inquire into the quantum or degree to which the design renders the device illegitimate.

Phillips v. Lincoln National Life Insurance

978 F.3d 302 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 21, 1992

Since autism has an organic cause, it did not qualify as a mental illness. Id. See also Malerbi v. … In Northbrook we held that the contra proferentem principle was inapplicable because “the record clearly establishes that [the insured] was a co-drafter of the ... policy and not simply a party given a take-it-or-leave-it

Patrick W. Simmons v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., Freeport & El Paso Railroad Co., People of the State of Illinois and Illinois Commerce Commission, Intervening-Respondents. People of the State of Illinois v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., Intervening-Respondent

775 F.2d 854 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 22, 1985

ICC, 724 F.2d 668 , 671 (8th Cir.1984), the segment is clearly unprofitable. 20 Petitioners also question the evidentiary burdens the Commission imposed on them. … Both parties agree that under the rule established by City of Cherokee v.

Local 65-B, Graphic Communicat v. NLRB

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 10, 2009

and change work schedules; to hire, recall, transfer, promote, demote, suspend, discipline or discharge for cause; to layoff employees because of lack of work or other legitimate reasons; to establish and apply … “[O]n matters which the [ALJ], having heard the evidence and seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency should be reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown.”

United States v. Stephen L. Shriver, Joseph R. Denman, Harry Lawrence Daly, and Joseph D. Fones

989 F.2d 898 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Apr 2, 1993

‘When the language of the statute is lucid, we examine the legislative history only to see whether it reflects “a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.” ’ United States v. … The only problem is that both § 2512(l)(a) and (b) contain the qualifying term “primarily”, a word that forces the reader to inquire into the quantum or degree to which the design renders the device illegitimate.'

United States v. Bobby G. Seale

461 F.2d 345 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Jul 6, 1972

He qualified his statement of representation to the court by saying that all defendants took the position they were not fully represented in Mr. … In Offutt, the court established a two-part test for the intent requirement. This was done by distinguishing between contempts involving “clearly blameworthy” conduct and those involving other less serious conduct.

Mark Cody v. Taft Harris and Dontron, Inc.

409 F.3d 853 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 31, 2005

While acting as general sales manager, Cody thought it would be wise for the station to establish a presence on the internet. … The article is clearly hearsay. Fed. R.Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement made by an out-of-court declarant offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted).

United States v. 8136 S. Dobson Street, Chicago, Illinois, Rodney Anderson

125 F.3d 1076 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Sep 24, 1997

Any attempt by the Ordower plaintiffs to serve the unserved defendants “would be clearly untimely under Rule 4(j) 4 and any new complaint filed by plaintiffs would be dismissed as time-barred.” 826 F.2d at 1573 . … Corp, 58 F.3d at 1193 (adopting approach of majority of circuits that seizure without predeprivation hearing does not, standing alone, require that property be immune from forfeiture).

Bay State Milling Co. v. Martin

916 F.2d 1221 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Oct 22, 1990

Under this instruction, liability presumably could be established on the basis of any one of the misrepresentations. … The jury might also consider the other acts or statements for purposes of determining compensatory damages although some of the other acts, even those that were clearly tortious, could not qualify strictly as misrepresentations

Sidney Clark and Julia Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.

501 F.2d 324 · Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · Dec 16, 1974

Although the district court has discretionary power to assess costs, the action it took was improper and clearly an abuse of discretion. … The selling price is arrived at by establishing direct costs and adding an amount for overhead and profit.